208. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, December 3, 1965.
SUBJECT
- Escalation of US Activities in Laos—Some Observations on a Developing Situation
- 1.
- The intensification of military activity in South Viet-Nam and the evidence of the presence there of up to seven regiments of PAVN forces has sharply heightened interest in the passage of North Vietnamese men and supplies through Laos. Although it still remains fundamentally true that the fight has to be won in South Viet-Nam, there is a growing feeling that the support which arrives via Laos can no longer be tolerated to the extent that it was in a period when our involvement in South Viet-Nam was not so deep.
- 2.
- Over recent months our efforts to interdict this traffic, both with the Lao and with the South Vietnamese, have considerably expanded. We are now carrying out the reconnaissance, intelligence and interdiction [Page 419] programs like Yankee Team, Steel Tiger, Shining Brass and the Hard Nose and Kha intelligence operations in the panhandle at an increasing tempo. There is in prospect further expansion of these activities, for example, an increase in Steel Tiger sorties from 3000 to 4500 per month. It is hoped also that Hard Nose and Kha operations may move into harassment. These activities, except for Yankee Team, remain covert and unacknowledged. Although the air activity is rather widely known to be taking place, we have abided by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s stricture to refrain from any public acknowledgment of these activities.
- 3.
- Quite recently there has been a tendency to speak more openly about the problem of the corridor and, because of our deepening Viet-Nam involvement, speakers have been impelled to approach closely to a revelation of what we are doing. It may be that Souvanna Phouma, who appears to be increasingly ready to charge the North Vietnamese publicly with what they are doing in the Lao panhandle, may in due course be persuaded by us to let the world know the actions we and the Lao are taking. If so, this can be justified both as collective self-defense and as a response to long-standing and repeated violations of the Geneva Accords by North Viet-Nam. Unless Souvanna modifies his position, however, it is essential that we honor our commitment to him, lest we suffer a set-back in an ever-broadening cooperation which it is very much in our interest to nurture. Ambassador Sullivan’s most recent conversation with Souvanna2 would appear to bear out Souvanna’s increasing readiness to face the facts squarely and it suggests that we may be able to move more rapidly along the lines of para 2 above than we had anticipated.
- 4.
- The infiltration problem has also occasioned a restudy of the various proposals to draw a cordon sanitaire across the middle of Laos, roughly along Route 9, as a means of sealing off the panhandle route. (This is of course different from the spoiling thrust westward by GVN forces mentioned to Sullivan by Souvanna.) This sealing-off project, which would require the overt introduction of foreign forces in violation of the Geneva Accords, might serve to seal off the Ho Chi Minh Trail, although this remains a moot question from a military point of view. Nevertheless it might relieve some of the heavy military pressure in South Viet-Nam, even though leaving a substantial guerrilla and insurgency problem still to be solved. However, we would inevitably be trading that gain for the outbreak of a new war in Laos of a type at least as intense as the war we were unwilling to fight in 1961. Can we not assume that North Viet-Nam would throw itself into that fight at least as hard as the one in the south, considering its long frontier with Laos and commitment to the Pathet Lao as well as its apparent determination to keep open an avenue to the south? It seems likely also that Communist China would [Page 420] feel more threatened than at present and might feel the scales tipped in favor of intervention, and there is no doubt that many nations, notably the USSR, and including some of our friends as well, would feel obliged to reach most adversely to our open violation of an instrument they are party to.
- 5.
- If we reach a decision that the support from North Viet-Nam to the south must at any cost be cut off, I suggest that we give consideration also to the alternative of moving into the southern area of North Viet-Nam up to approximately the 20th parallel (or if necessary up to the Nape Pass as well) to cut off infiltration at the source. Such a move obviously has the gravest implications such as the likelihood of Chinese direct intervention, but I believe we should not minimize the possibility of an equally strong Chinese reaction to our taking overt, large-scale action in Laos to seal off the panhandle.
- 6.
- May I note in passing that current attention being given to the panhandle problem threatens to revive some loose thinking and talk which, if reported publicly, could do us incalculable damage. I have in mind references to the possibility of our supporting Thailand in an absorption of Laos or partition of the country between Thailand and South Viet-Nam. Leaving aside the likelihood that an annexation by Thailand in the context of the situation today would, in my opinion, cure none of the military problems which Laos presents, we could also count on a violent reaction by Communist China to any such move. We would also see the disaffection of nine-tenths of those friends of ours in Laos who have over recent years been prepared to cooperate with us quite extensively on matters of common interest.
- 7.
- Our tentative view is that our military and intelligence programs in Laos should be expanded as far as necessary and feasible to meet the infiltration problem, remaining covert, however, except where Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma agrees to public acknowledgment; and that a massive, overt military intervention with the goal of sealing off the panhandle should not be undertaken.