Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

20. Telegram From the Consulate General in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

Hong Kong, April 9, 1964, 5:39 p.m.

1771. Ref: Vientiane’s 1109;² Dept’s 1085.³ Souvanna received me this morning and listened with interest to accounts latest developments in talks on Vientiane security situation (Vientiane’s reftel). He said that this was good news because at his departure he had been greatly concerned over this problem and the hostile attitude shown by General Phoumi. He then gave us following comments on his conversations in Hanoi and Peiping:

1. He had received assurances that Peiping would not link the Laotian question with that of Vietnam, and this he hoped had cleared the way for a settlement. The North Vietnamese, for their part, had always sought to link the two questions. When asked whether anything had been said in Hanoi on this topic, he said there had not been, but he expected Peiping to use its influence upon Hanoi. The Viet Minh in Laos had always insisted on keeping the frontier zones under their control. But Peiping’s position that the two questions should be kept separate, assuming it was sincerely held, meant that Peiping recognized that RLG’s authority extended to all Laos. For us this position was excellent, he said; now all depended on the meeting of the three factions scheduled for April 17.

2. A key question now was the position of General Phoumi, and whether he would oppose the application of the Nov. 27, 1962 agreement providing for a unified administration, the formation of a mixed police force assuring security at Vientiane, and the establishment of a 30,000 man national army composed of 10,000 man-contingents from each party. Phoumi would have a problem, he recognized, in demobilizing 50–60,000 men, but he believed a solution could be found. If the agreement could be implemented it would mean, he repeated, that the authority of the RLG would extend to all Laos including the corridor.

3. When I asked him how the PL would be likely to react, he said they would have to agree to free circulation throughout Laos. In Hanoi where he had talked with Pham Van Dong and Gen. Giap for two-half hours and later with Pham alone for four hours, he had made them understand that they should use their influence on the PL to make them accept this. He had told them this effort was his last; if he left, it would mean civil war, and North Vietnam would be affected. They had asked him to remain and had said they would do everything they could to help him resolve the Laotian question. If Hanoi keeps promise, Souvanna said the position of the PL at the April 17 meeting will change and will become less stiff.

4. Turning again to the question of Phoumi, Souvanna said that the USG must press him very strongly not merely to see his own personal interests but those of his country and of peace in SEA. Since Sarit’s death,⁴ Phoumi had been seeking as an alternative support from SVN and Taiwan; it was important that neither make him any promises. Phoumi, without his permission, had met twice with General Khanh, and once in Bangkok Mar 17 with ChiNat Chief of Staff Peng Meng-chi. This latter intelligence he had only learned of while in Peiping and from the Chinese Communists. All this was very dangerous. (It occurred to me at this point that Souvanna’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the PL might have been improved by those activities of Phoumi’s, but decided it would be better to leave this point for Amb Unger to make if it has validity and is useful.)

5. When I sought further comment on the chances of the PL accepting this arrangement, Souvanna said he thought that the PL wished to return to the government, but because of the poor security in the city they had been unable to remain. He also had authorized two neutralist ministers to leave, and even his own personal security had been menaced. (He seemed at this point to imply that if the security issue could be settled, PL cooperation could be obtained.)

6. This concluded substantive part of our conversation, Souvanna passed on copy of text of communique with North Vietnam, which we had not seen. He mentioned that he also had given copy to Chinese who had not heretofore seen text (being separately airpouched). In parting I mentioned great esteem in which he was held by my superiors in Washington and high importance they attached to success of his efforts.

Rice

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Confidential, Priority, Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon, Taipei, and Vientiane.
2. In telegram 1109, April 8, Unger stated that meetings held between FAR military leaders and the Directorate of National Security to discuss the security of neutralist military personnel in Vientiane had taken place on April 6 and 7. Unger hoped the situation would improve. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)
3. In telegram 1085 to Hong Kong, April 8, the Department instructed Rice to obtain from Souvanna an indication of the results of his trip during Rice’s courtesy call. (Ibid., POL 7 LAOS)
4. Sarit Thanarat, former Prime Minister of Thailand, died on December 8, 1963.