185. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)1

Governor talked to Unger re Sullivan’s telegram2 re a Laos telegram [conference?] and Governor’s memo to Secretary3 that he fully agreed with Sullivan.

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H: Politically it would unstick the situation. I urged the whole thing be dropped and concentrate on the other country or some other way of getting it started. It was amazing to see the Secretary’s message.4

Amb. Unger said something about entering the picture through Article 19. It would not have anything to do with the conference. He said absolutely essential there be such talks. Something on a six-nation basis that gives some entrance wedge.

H: I think Bill is right. We are going to get into terrible trouble. Even a six-nation [conference] … the whole thing is fraught with danger. The whole point is to have private conversations. This is a silly performance. It would just open the door. All these facts come out; just couldn’t help it. What is our answer?

U: Just haven’t got answer for some of the points Bill raising.

H: Cambodia thing quite different. In other [Laos conference] these facts would unquestionably come out in the talks. How could you prevent it? I think the whole thing is absolutely unthinkable. I have been against it. Souvanna doesn’t want it. It would unstick the rather tenuous situation that exists. Article 19 relates to co-chairmen talk, consulting with the whole range of conferees, particularly with the ICC countries and the Lao themselves. We are out of that. Article 19 doesn’t do us any good because we want to be in place where we can have corridor talks, they call them after session talks. Here there would be the most violent attacks against us which we couldn’t answer. It’s just a pipe dream. Everything they could get hold of they would throw at us. I think it is just borrowing trouble.

  1. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology, Telephone Conversations, Nov. 1964–1965. No classification marking. Transcribed in Harriman’s office. “PM” appears on the dateline on the source text.
  2. See Document 182.
  3. Dated May 14, in which Harriman “completely endorsed” Sullivan’s view of the damage that would be caused by a conference on Laos. In addition Harriman suggested that a potential conference on Laos “would cause perhaps irreparable damage to the tenuos political situation that now exists.” Harriman strongly urged concentration on a Cambodian conference and finding other ways to start negotiations on Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
  4. Document 183.