Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 19, 1964, 8 p.m.

1023. Deptel 749.² This morning I congratulated PriMin Souvanna on resumption diplomatic relations with South Viet Nam and then referred to Phoumi’s March 14 Dalat meeting with Gen Khanh, noting that we have also been in touch with GVN on various propositions discussed at that time. I said I presumed Gen Phoumi had reviewed these matters with Souvanna but I wanted also go over them since we wished to have his views.

Before I had proceeded very far Souvanna asked me whether there were any secret agreements between Phoumi and GVN. It emerged as we reviewed proposals that Phoumi had touched on discussions with Khanh in briefest and most general terms and Souvanna was almost entirely unaware of specific proposals. He said while it true that area of action under discussion adjoins Phoumi’s zone, Souvanna nevertheless is ultimately responsible for all actions in Laos with international implications. He also referred to his forthcoming trip to Hanoi and Peking,³ acknowledging that he does not know how much he can accomplish there, but pointing out that aggressive actions involving South Vietnamese, like some of those contemplated, would certainly assure complete failure his mission. He said he could envisage situation in which actions of sort contemplated would have to be taken if it clear all hope of realizing neutral solution of Laos is lost. At this point he would probably invite U.S. to come to his country’s aid to avoid its falling to Communists, at which point he would himself probably withdraw from scene, but this moment has not arrived and he still means continue make maximum efforts achieve peaceful solution and hopes we will continue support him in this.

I told Souvanna it was precisely because of our firm intention to continue supporting him that I had opened with him discussion Dalat proposals. Although Gen Phoumi had told me several times he had cleared these matters with Souvanna I desired and my government had specifically instructed me to ascertain PriMin’s attitude on those matters which directly affected Laos before determining our own position. I said I would report his views fully on each of proposals, adding there might be those instances where we felt some action was of overriding importance and not entailing too serious risks, in which case I would raise matter with him again.

I emphasized to Souvanna that our concern lay not only with Communist actions against neutralist and conservatives in Laos but also with South Viet Nam’s struggle to preserve its independence, and I hoped that in his Hanoi and Peking visits he could protest not only against the actions taken to undermine RLG but also the violation of Laotian territory committed by North Viet Nam to pursue its subversive war in the south. Souvanna said “we are all fully aware of what is going on” and that this has been subject of his repeated protests to North Vietnamese Amb here and will certainly be pressed in Hanoi and Peking.

Souvanna then requested me to ask Washington for its suggestions as to what line he might possibly pursue in Hanoi and Peking in order explore whether there are in fact any grounds for constructive negotiations or compromise to improve situations Laos, Viet Nam and South East Asia in general.⁴ He said he would of course put forward any ideas we might offer entirely as his own and make no mention of US, but if he knew what kinds of adjustments might have chance of being acceptable to us then his talks might be more useful than otherwise.

With regard to specific actions outlined numbered para I(2) Saigon’s 1767 sent Department,⁵ proposals contained CAS Saigon 5161,⁶ and refDeptel, Souvanna’s reactions were as follows:

(1) He accepted without comment idea of establishing covert five-man GVN military liaison team Savannakhet.

(2) With regard to air actions, for example at Tchepone, this brought immediate negative reaction from Souvanna who said this would promptly put Laos question back on war footing and he specifically asked this not be done. As a variant, to be invoked if Communist pressures increase in future, I asked what he would think of augmenting present T–28 fleet with additional planes painted with Lao markings flown by South Vietnamese, perhaps with Lao passports. Souvanna indicated his readiness consider something of this nature if situation should deteriorate badly.

(3) He accepts modest (not anything like regimental scale) cross border operations in southeastern part of Laos, particularly if units made up of Montagnard stock common to SVN and Laotian territory and if penetrations not too deep. (See airgram A–263.⁷)

(4) I did not raise question commando action along Route 7 in North Vietnam from Meo base in Laos since plan 34A mentioned ref Deptel not available here. I deferred this point also because of Souvanna’s special sensitivity with regard Meo as well as question my mind what benefit to US objectives North Viet Nam to be gained from action in NVN salient containing Route 7. If objective is to interdict use this route against Laos, believe we can proceed on basis plans which CAS, ARMA, and Embassy develops and periodically reviews.

(5) I did not raise question aerial photos, not knowing what relation this proposal bore to already agreed high level US aerial photography and, if not the same, what kinds of planes, pilots and which areas envisaged.

At conclusion our conversation it was evident Souvanna pleased we had consulted him and asked me be sure that actions to which he had objected would not be undertaken. He made clear he was particularly concerned nothing be done to render useless in advance his Hanoi and Peking visits, although it also seemed clear regardless their outcome he most unlikely agree to bombing and strafing Tchepone and other points.

At same time Souvanna stated he has no intention letting Communists take over Laos and although his objective is be able live in peace side by side with Communist neighbors, if this not possible and Communists attempt takeover, then only answer is war and he would hope US would help.

Comment: If Souvanna raises Dalat military proposals with Phoumi I will no doubt get annoyed reaction from latter, to which my reply obvious. If not, I would not propose discuss with Phoumi until we on US side are agreed which actions acceptable, which to be rejected, and which deferred. Needless to say I believe our decision should take full account Souvanna’s views expressed above. I also subscribe fully to analysis paras 4 and 6 ref Deptel.

I doubt it would be useful have Souvanna discussing with Hanoi or Peking problems of Viet Nam or South East Asia with view to compromises in which we might also become involved. However, he will obviously be discussing Laos regardless and believe there are some suggestions in that regard which we might make to him; we will have proposals in subsequent message.⁸

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon.
2. Document 16.
3. Souvanna Phouma’s trip, April 2–8.
4. In telegram 1058 from Vientiane, March 26, Unger proposed to encourage Souvanna to protest to leaders in Hanoi and Peking their governments’ support of the Pathet Lao, the Viet Cong’s use of Laos for attacks on South Vietnam, and to express willingness to accept the return of Neo Lao Hat Xat ministers to his government provided Pathet Lao controlled areas were available for visits by top members of his government and the ICC. In telegram 796 to Vientiane, March 27, the Department approved Unger’s line, but hoped that Souvanna would also stress that the United States had no territorial ambitions or desire for bases in Laos. (Both Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS)
5. Those agreed actions between Phoumi and Khanh as reported in telegram 1767 from Saigon, March 17, were: free ARVN passage into southern Laos, creation of a combined Lao-South Vietnamese Staff, bombardment by unmarked South Vietnamese T–28’s, abrogation of the 10-kilometer limit on hot pursuit, combined South Vietnamese and Lao units, ARVN officers with Lao units, and Meo (Hmong) incursions into North Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)
6. See Document 15.
7. Dated March 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 LAOS–VIET S)
8. See footnote 4, above.