2. At Tab A is a splendid set of cables from Bill
Sullivan in Vientiane showing the rise and probable fall
of an unusually foolish coup earlier today. It is worth your reading
because of the flavor it gives of life in Laos, and still more because
it shows what a resourceful man Sullivan is—in essence he blocked this coup by getting a
tipsy Australian technician to cut some wires.
Attachment A
Vientiane, January 31, 1965, 11
p.m.
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the
Department of State
1164. Considerable activity of confused origin shaking city tonight.
Several roadblocks have mushroomed around city and troop movements
[Page 326]
are reported. One
short burst of automatic weapons fire about 2015 hours.
Most rumors suggest that young colonels may be taking action that
they have long discussed. If so, action likely be diffused and
directed primarily against grievances which are more personal than
institutional.
We have officers with General Kouprasith and Col. Ttoglith [Tong Lit?] at
Chinamao. We are sending others to be with General Siho at his headquarters. Our
purpose is to neutralize main sources of local power in order avoid
escalation.
British Ambassador, who has called Souvanna, has been assured by
latter that situation being brought under his control but we, at
current moment, have no assurance that he knows any more than we do
just what is afoot.
Sullivan
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the
Department of State
Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 12:30 a.m.
1165. As far as we can determine, difficulty in Vientiane seems to be
initiated by Col Bounleut
Saycocie, malcontent chief of logistics and activist
among Young Turks of military establishment. Our best estimate is
that he has only one company of troops. However, this is difficult
to judge with confidence since everybody with a weapon seems to be
milling round in town or on the outskirts.
Bounleut’s principal accomplishment so far has been seizure of radio
station. He has broadcast five communiques announcing coup d’etat in
name of several officers who, to best of our knowledge, are not
engaged in activities. Radio station seems to have been left in
hands of few soldiers who control entrance while main force of
Bounleut’s company have moved south of city in direction of Chinaimo
camp.
I have rounded up Australian technician who runs radio station (he
unfortunately is half-stoned) and also Australian DCM. With
concurrence Australian Ambassador, I am sending a joint
US-Australian Task Force of about 6 men to cut a wire leading from
radio station studios to transmitters, thus putting radio off the
air. They have instructions to do this only if they can avoid
confrontation with military.
[Page 327]
Once we have silenced radio station, I hope we can send Bounleut and
his boy scouts back to their marshmallows.
I have talked with Phoumi by
telephone and am reasonably confident he is not personally directing
this operation. However, he is fairly lathering to take advantage of
anything that develops. Both Souvanna and General Ouane are in King’s palace compound
where I have not been able to reach them by telephone. Three members
of Cabinet are holed up in [garble—hospital?] (where we were having
dinner and where my wife is now plying them with cognac to quell
their trepidations).
In general, it seems to be a normal Sunday evening in Vientiane.
Sullivan
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the
Department of State
Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 12:30 a.m.
1166. ANZUS Task Force has cut wires, putting radio off air. I have
sent two officers from Military Attache’s office to roadblock
controlled by Bounleut’s troops to tell them coup has failed and to
advise them head for the hills. To best our knowledge, only
casualties are two soldiers from Chinaimo who were killed while
attempting run Bounleut roadblock. I am off to see Souvanna at
palace if I can get through.
Sullivan
Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the
Department of State
Vientiane, February 1, 1965, 2 a.m.
1167. I have just come from seeing Souvanna, who is holed up in
King’s compound with most of General Staff and with those Cabinet
officers who not at my house. He was delighted know we had cut radio
and seems to feel that effort will fizzle.
[Page 328]
According his information there are two colonels involved: Bounleut
Saycocie and Khamchan Souvouovong. They dispose at most of two
companies of men. Their chances for success seem nil. He asked if we
could assist in disposing their men.
We sent Assistant Military Attaché to camp which Bounleut allegedly
was using as command post but have not been able find him. We are
now sending same officer to seek him out at roadblock en route Camp
Chinaimo.
In meantime, I am sending General Sang (PsyWar Chief) who still
drinking my brandy at my residence, in company with EmbOff to get
message from Souvanna to broadcast on his Armed Forces Radio
Station. Sang seems somewhat reluctant, but he is being transported
bodily to palace at this moment. Assuming broadcast calms population
and troops disperse, I think we may be out of woods by morning.2
