Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

128. Memorandum From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)¹

Saigon, August 28, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Concept for Attack of Panhandle Targets

1. Pursuant to your direction my staff has been engaged with Mr. Sullivan in efforts to arrive at an agreed Embassy-MACV “Concept for Attack on Panhandle Targets”. After several exchanges of memorandums and some conversation, I cannot agree to the concept expressed by Mr. Sullivan as set forth in his memorandum of 25 Aug (Att 1).² Militarily, the situation in the RVN no longer permits us to allow the VC to benefit from unrestricted use of infiltration routes and centers in the Laos Panhandle.

2. I consider the capability of the Laotian Air Force to neutralize or seriously damage the 22 infiltration associated targets identified in Laos to be negligible. I further believe that political consideration in Laos will not permit the R.L.G. to acquiesce in or direct a meaningful attack within a time-span appropriate to the military situation in the Republic of Vietnam. I also do not believe credible and militarily effective attacks against these targets can be launched by recce escort aircraft in the role of flak suppression. One target, Tchepone Army Barracks, requires 68 sorties for an acceptable degree of destruction.

3. I therefore urgently advocate the only feasible course of action available to us with forces available for attacks on Laos Panhandle infiltration targets. This is air attack by VNAF/Farmgate forces. We have developed complete attack plans for the six principal targets which call for 154 sorties of A–1E/H aircraft. These targets have been approved by CINCPAC for combined planning with the RVNAF (VNAF). Specific authorization from you to conduct such planning has not been granted.

4. I believe that the basis for an excellent moral and political justification for the concept which I advocate rests in the following considerations:

a. The right of self defense in the face of a desperate threat.

b. The targets are illegal DRV enclaves in Laos and constitute an invasion by the DRV of the Sovereign territory of Laos for purposes of supporting efforts to overthrow by force the Government of Vietnam with which the R.L.G. is at peace.

5. With respect to paragraph 3 of the attached memorandum³ this is a mode of attack that may provide the pretext for the results we seek. However, it would not be timely and the weight and location of attacks would be out of the context of credible requirements of the military situations likely to develop.

6. Reference paragraph 4 of Mr. Sullivan’s memorandum,⁴ I do not concur that VNAF/Farmgate actions against targets in Laos should be tied to a decision to attack the DRV if there is likely to be any delay in such a decision. Every day, to the best of our knowledge, the illegal entry of the enemy into the RVN continues through the Laotian targets. This in turn makes the pacification task in the RVN that much more difficult, costly and time-consuming.

7. I request that you grant approval for US/GVN combined planning for air attack on the following targets, initially:

a. Muong Phine Army Barracks (12 Sorties)

b. Ben Thay Military Camp and 4 AAA Batteries (18 Sorties)

c. Ban Na Nhom Military Camp (12 Sorties)

d. Tchepone Army Barracks (68 Sorties)

e. Huong Nong Military Area (10 Sorties)

f. Ban Trim Barracks and Supply Area (34 Sorties)

These targets are clearly identifiable, separated from civilian communities and definitely in support of DRV infiltration into the RVN. Subject to appropriate review of plans, I urge you seek authority to launch these attacks.

W.C. Westmoreland ⁵
General, United States Army

1. Source: Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, 27 July–31 August, 1963. Top Secret.
2. In this memorandum, Sullivan suggested a three-pronged strategy for air attacks on the Laos panhandle. First, air attacks by RLAF T–28’s supplemented by U.S. armed reconnaissance aircraft. Second, air support of ground operations by Vietnamese and Farmgate aircraft depending on the nature of the ground operations. Third, VNAF and RLAF attacks on targets of opportunity in the panhandle, such as convoys, in conjunction with attacks on North Vietnam so long as there was “convincing evidence” that these were North Vietnamese and not Lao targets. (Ibid.)
3. Paragraph 3 of Sullivan’s memorandum of August 25 discussed air support for ground operations.
4. Paragraph 4 discussed the attacks on targets of opportunity in Laos.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.