123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

485. Udorn August 18 meeting made considerable progress in sorting out various possibilities and problems associated with action in Laos panhandle. Bangkok represented by Ambassador Martin, Gen. Easterbrook, air attaché and CAS rep, Vientiane represented by Ambassador Unger, Col. Law, CAS representative, Col. Tyrell and political counselor. Alexis Johnson, general Deputy Sullivan and Jorgensen attended from Saigon. This cable summarizes conclusions and recommendations arrived at, indicating responsibilities agreed upon for follow-up actions.

(1)
[10 lines of source text not declassified]
(2)
It was considered that intelligence emanating from Kha operations in southern panhandle, particularly on movements of VC personnel, units and material would be useful asset to feed directly into Vietnamese operational units along Lao-Vietnam frontier. When such intelligence adequately developed, CAS Vientiane will notify CAS Saigon, which will arrange with MACV to have direct communications linkage established from Kha teams to proper ARVN units.
(3)
Ambassador Unger agreed that shallow ground penetration by ARVN units would be acceptable into sparsely populated areas of Laos contemplated by ARVN JGS “bridgehead” east of Chavane and west of Dak Prou (this is I Corps area and middle bridgehead of three which ARVN has proposed). Penetrations would have to be limited to about twenty kilometers and should involve absolute minimum of air support or resupply. MACV will crank this acceptability factor into its plans on assumption operation could be conducted without active concurrence of RLG.
(4)

There was considerable discussion re feasibility larger scale operations on Route 9 into which “bridgehead” concept being discussed between MACV and JGS could be fitted. Concept discussed would contemplate Lao units, heavily assisted by Thai, moving eastward from Eno through Phalane, while another Lao unit (replacement for current Lao Bao volunteer battalion 33) heavily assisted by ARVN, moved west from Lao Bao putting squeeze on Muong Phine-Tchepone segment of Route 9. It was considered that such an exercise would hit Viet Minh/Pathet Lao in their most sensitive spot, and therefore large and instantaneous Viet Minh reaction would have to be anticipated.

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Such an operation would require the use of substantial forces up to two or three battalions and would also require close air support. Ambassador Unger stated that operations of this magnitude could not be hidden; that the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh would put heavy pressure on Souvanna and that unless US gave Souvanna a guarantee of support by US air and possibly ground forces, such an operation would be unacceptable in terms our relations with RLG. Ambassador Martin made same point with respect Thai participation. Consequently, we could not initiate such an action on a significant scale unless we were willing to give the Thai, the RLG and the GVN assurances that we would move in rapidly with US military support, either air or ground, or both, to extricate them from anything bigger than they could handle with their own resources.

It was considered, how that the fact of planning by itself for such an operation, mutually conducted through US intermediation, but involving Thai, Vietnamese and some Lao participation, could have healthy repercussions, both on the present situation and for the longer future, and should therefore not be rejected. Moreover, some more limited actions in this region, involving Thai and Vietnamese encadrement, but not to exceed hit and run type operations, might prove feasible. MACV will examine this further with view making recommendations.

(5)
More limited ARVN ground operations near Route 9, of company size, probably airborne, and probably building on the Leaping Lena2 experience, were also discussed. Ambassador Unger expressed considerable reservation about such plans as well as re larger GVN “bridgehead” plans in this area and doubted Souvanna would accept them under any foreseeable circumstances. He would, however, reserve definitive comment until he could examine specific proposals, such as those which might be mounted along the route from Route 9 to Muong Nong.MACV will prepare specific proposals which will be submitted for examination, including Embassy Vientiane.
(6)

In discussion possible air action in the panhandle, Embassy Vientiane reps reported that General Ma, Chief of Lao Air Force, has examined twenty military targets suggested by MACV, GVN, and CAS, in corridor area south Mugia Pass and expressed willingness attack them with Lao T–28 force. Was willing assign ten planes to this action, and felt that, with good weather, could accomplish task in ten days of operations.

Because it is believed some of these targets are protected beyond capability of Lao pilots to penetrate, it was agreed that Embassy Vientiane would examine target list, designate those targets which it felt RLG capable of handling, and reserve remainder for Yankee Team to eliminate during armed “reconnaissance” missions. When such division of [Page 257] targeting completed, MACV, through second advon, will seek authorization for Yankee team strikes and will coordinate YT–RLG actions. MACV will also examine to see if there exists residual target requiring use VNAF and/or Farmgate.

(9)
In discussion RLG air capabilities, question arose re possible augmentation its current strength. Two methods were proposed (a) augmentation T–28 force by assignment remaining T–28’s now in Vietnam as soon as A–1–E’s arrive in country, (B) assignment VNAF aircraft (A–1–H) and pilots to Laos, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Embassy Vientiane will study and make appropriate recommendations.

In considering all the foregoing conclusions and recommendations, an effort was made to strike a balance between military desirability and political acceptability. Conferees were keenly aware of need to avoid precipitation of a major political debacle (such as resignation of Souvanna) by overzealous pursuit of conspicuous military actions which might, in practice, have only marginal benefits to situation in Vietnam. Therefore the scope of agreed operations (both ground and air) which was considered feasible fell short of this which would represent the most effective military action within the capability of friendly forces. Finally, however, it was recognized that even the maximum action of which currently available friendly forces would be capable probably falls considerably short of being truly effective as a military solution to the panhandle problem.

Bangkok and Vientiane invited comment or correct foregoing summary.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent priority to the White House, DOD, and CIA, and repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Leaping Lena, code name for South Vietnamese Air Force air drops of South Vietnamese intelligence gathering teams along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.