Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

117. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 28, 1964.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Laos.]

3. Ball then reported on Laos and South Vietnam. He indicated there was little action in Laos. The neutralist/rightist drive had begun. It was too early to detect results. The men were moving on foot through difficult terrain, but he intimated that we could expect a favorable result. He had no particular view on the political situation within Laos, indicating a wait-and-see attitude. He commented on Butler’s trip to Moscow,² stating that the British and the United States were in agreement concerning the terms of a summit conference. He indicated no change in U.S. attitudes or the “pre-conditions” for a 14-nation Geneva Conference. He stated that Khrushchev obviously was tired of the whole affair and wanted to extricate himself from any responsibility in fear that Laos might and Southeast Asia might break out into a more serious situation.

With respect to South Vietnam Ball added very little to what is known. He commented on the “go north” attitude of Khanh but felt that General Taylor’s plan for some “joint planning” would calm things down for the time being.

4. Rusk stated that any change in attitude with respect to U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, including expanding the war in a manner suggested by the JCS, or any other “new look” in Southeast Asia must await the outcome of the Butler talks. He therefore dismissed any consideration of JCS plans.

5. McNamara reviewed the losses in South Vietnam, briefly reciting figures of the rising casualties, the increased rate of incidents and other difficulties. He made no statement concerning the “trend of the war.” He agreed with Rusk that no action should be taken at the present time.

6. General Wheeler then said that JCS had considered three courses of action. He precisely stated the actions. He paralleled those contained in the Board of National Estimates memorandum.³ They involved air strikes in the Laos corridor, which he stated would “hamper but not stop” the infiltration. Secondly the intrusion into the corridor by SVN ground units and he made the same estimate concerning the effect of this. Third, the extension of the war to modest bombing of North Vietnam by unidentified and unmarked South Vietnam planes with SVN pilots. He presented this as an extension of 34–A. He estimated that this would involve no particular escalation of the war and no rise in threat from NVN. He therefore did not advocate a deployment of U.S. units, either ground units, air units or the fleet to strategic locations in Southeast Asia; namely, Clark Field, Thailand, etc. He stated that the Chiefs did not want to take such a move which would have the effect of tying up these units on a stand-by basis with no active mission and hence there would be a rapid deterioration of morale and great criticism at home.

Throughout the discussion by Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler the plan to send additional advisors to South Vietnam was mentioned without comment or explanation. It was accepted that since General Taylor wanted these additional men they should be furnished to him.

Wheeler reviewed the triangle operation in Laos, explained why it was going very slow, but did not seem concerned because of the difficulties and the terrain.

Harriman spoke of the use of the napalm explaining why we felt it should not be used in the PDJ and why the request of Souvanna was denied. Harriman thought napalm was a “sensitive” weapon and that its use would bring violent reaction from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists and would probably add to the pressure for a Geneva Conference on terms not desired by the United States.

The President then asked my views and those of CIA. I stated that we had no disagreement with the reports on the situation in South Vietnam and Laos. The situation in SVN was fragile but we could not detect a coalescence of the dissident forces opposed to Khanh and while Khanh was discouraged, we felt there was a better than even chance that he would survive for the next several months. (Note: This point was mentioned briefly in the meeting, elaborated on at the luncheon meeting.⁴) I then said that we had reviewed the three courses of action proposed by the Joint Chiefs.⁵ Obviously courses one and two against Laos could not be considered in view of Unger’s understandable opposition, which I understood had been accepted by State and JCS. (Note: JCS specifically referred to this in their written report.) There seemed to be no disagreement that Unger’s position was valid. I then said with respect to the third course of action, the North Vietnamese response would be totally dependent upon the level of activity. An occasional bombing would probably be met in response by increased activity of one sort or another in South Vietnam, such as VC moves, acts of terrorism, etc. If the bombing increased in level of activity and the NVN felt a vital interest were threatened, we might see a deployment of air defense units, such as MIG–17’s and 19’s from Communist China. These indeed might be flown by ChiComs. We saw no reason to deploy military units to strategic locations, such as the Philippines or Thailand, unless and until a relatively substantial effort was programmed against NVN, which would lead the NVN and the ChiComs to feel that they were being really threatened.

The meeting adjourned after about 45 minutes. There were no policy matters to discuss. The purpose of the meeting was merely to report to the NSC.

1. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, 1/4/64–4/28/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his secretary on July 29. Bromley Smith also prepared an account of this meeting. (Ibid., National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 9, 7/28/65)
2. See Document 116 and footnote 4 thereto.
3. See the July 28 memorandum from McCone to the President in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 585–587. These three actions as described by McCone were: category 1: air raids on the panhandle by the VNAF, possibly using napalm, and possibly augmented by Farmgate; category 2: ground force cross-border operations by GVN units up to a battalion and perhaps accompanied by U.S. advisers; and category 3: limited airstrikes against military and transportation targets in North Vietnam by unmarked planes flown by non-U.S. air crews.
4. Reference is to a luncheon meeting with the President at the White House at 1 p.m. after the NSC meeting which Rusk, McCone, and McNamara attended. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of this meeting has been found.
5. The JCS courses of action are in JCSM–639–64 to NcNamara, July 27, in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 583–585. The JCS courses of action were described in abbreviated form by McCone in his memorandum to the President, see footnote 3 above.