Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

108. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

RFE–47

Washington, July 1, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Laos: The Situation and our Options

We have attempted to weigh US options in Laos against the background of the changes that have occurred there over the past year. The courses of action open to us fall into four general categories: 1) continuing in our present stance; 2) attempting to reconstitute the neutral solution; 3) opting for formal or “hard” partition essentially along present lines of control; and 4) seeking this partition with expanded non-Communist territorial holdings.

The Situation

Although, in many respects, the situation we now face in Laos is similar to that of twelve months ago, certain differences alter our position and outlook:

1) The neutralists’ status has changed markedly. The April coup has undermined Souvanna’s position as a neutral, although the unravelling of the coup under international pressure may have strengthened him somewhat in his role as leader of all non-Communist forces. Militarily, the territorial base of Kong Le’s neutralist forces is all but lost.

2) The image of the Vientiane government as a three forces coalition has eroded further. The Pathet Lao, continuing to reject Souvanna’s right to take action as head of the national government in the absence of unanimous agreement by all three parties, has charged that Souvanna is a captive of the right and the United States. It has declared that it cannot regard him as premier as long as he continues on his present course, and has announced that it will withdraw its entire representation from Vientiane. Souvanna has designated non-Communists to act for the long-absent Pathet Lao cabinet members without formally replacing them. The possibility that the Communists are prepared at a time of their own choosing to establish a rival government is suggested by reports that they have organized a “true” neutralist-Pathet Lao shadow government.

3) The right wing has become both more militant and more fractured. Differences between Phoumi and the Sannanikones have come closer to the surface and Phoumi’s power position is something of an enigma.

4) There have been further defections from Kong Le’s forces to the “true” neutralists. Khamouane Boupha also appears to have allied himself with the “true” neutralists. Should the Pathet Lao attempt to portray their neutralists as the sole remaining neutralist faction, the adherence of Khamouane Boupha with his territorial base in Phong Saly and his control of 1500 troops could lend greater credibility to their claims.

5) The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support, have extended their control over almost all of the territory they occupied jointly with the neutralists before 1962. They have also done considerable damage to the Meo. We continue to believe, however, that they do not propose to move to the Mekong at this juncture.

6) The United States, to the limited degree implied by our air activities, has become an open military participant in the hostilities.

7) North Vietnam has responded to American escalation signals by expressing its determination to defend itself and by practical defensive measures. However, even if Asian Communist demands for reconvening the Geneva Conference primarily reflect fear of escalation, this fear has not yet caused them to modify their negotiating terms nor is it yet clear that they have abandoned their military advance in Laos.

The Prospects

Together these developments certainly make it even more difficult to sustain the argument that Laos can be effectively neutralized by international action. To some degree also, the real world of Laos has been altered in that the de facto partition has been geographically sharpened by the Communist advance in the Plaine des Jarres and the consequent removal from most of that area of neutralist forces formerly intermingled with the Pathet Lao. Whether the closer relationship that has developed between the right and the neutralists constitutes a corresponding advantage for us is open to some question; the relationship is a tenuous one at best.

These alterations, however, do not eliminate the prospect, which is indeed fortified by the advent of the rainy season, that we are in for another period of stalemated negotiations and relative military quiet.

Our Options—The Present Course

Under these circumstances, we have the option of accepting Laotian marching and countermarching as tolerable since our vital interests lie in Vietnam and friendly forces hold the Mekong. This stance, in essence a continuation of the posture we have adopted to date, permits us to claim the support of the Geneva Accords for Souvanna as Prime Minister and thereby justify our assistance to him. Our continued diplomatic activity and limited retaliatory measures will probably keep credible our Mekong deterrent. This will spur Moscow to use what little leverage it has to keep Laos below the boiling point.

Meanwhile, we can continue to press for effective utilization of the Geneva machinery and support Souvanna’s efforts to secure acceptable terms from the Pathet Lao through our diplomatic and military moves. By pushing for full implementation of the Geneva Accords, we will maintain credit with those neutrals and allies who are anxious to avoid a further spread of hostilities. Our own military involvement and commitment would thus remain at a low level.

As time goes on, however, particularly if Pathet Lao territorial nibblings are not met with at least some successful FAR/neutralist counter nibbles, morale in Vientiane may reach a critical point. Souvanna’s position at this stage may present us with one of two problems. If he continues his present militancy, he may demand US moves that will destroy the uneasy status quo or destroy it himself by leaving the scene. If, on the other hand, he tolerates continuing the status quo with only limited retaliatory measures against the Communists, he will face moves from the right to overthrow him which, if successful, would intensify the pressures on the United States to alter its stance.

We will face also the problem of adjusting our interventions on behalf of friendly forces to meet two somewhat conflicting objectives: maintaining the plausibility of our ultimate deterrent and avoiding premature escalation. This problem is likely to grow progressively more difficult and acute. On the one hand, restraint may make our actions ineffectual, with all the obvious impact on Lao morale and on domestic and international opinion. On the other hand, we will be uncertain whether moves of greater force will induce Communist restraint or a sharply-increased response. In any case we will remain under continuing pressures to accept a new Geneva Conference. Moreover, these pressures will increase in direct ratio to the threat of escalation of US and Chinese Communist involvement.

The difficulties and frustrations of this stance have been amply demonstrated over the past two years. It remains an open question, however, whether other courses would be both feasible and more profitable. Omitting measures focused essentially outside Laos, which in any case would have to be directly related to measures within Laos itself, alternative policies fall into two general categories: a concerted effort to reconstitute the neutral solution; or a more open acceptance and exploitation of the partition.

A Reconstituted Neutral Solution

In our present stance, reconstitution of the neutral solution remains our ostensible objective. However, existing circumstances make achievement of this objective highly unlikely. As the contenders are now disposed, restoration of the tripartite government in any real sense would require concessions unacceptable to one side or the other. For Souvanna at this juncture to disassociate himself from the right in terms acceptable to the Pathet Lao would require him in effect to surrender a position that he has reached with our encouragement over a considerable period of time. Any alternative leader prepared to abandon this position would be difficult to find outside the ranks of pro-Pathet Lao neutralists who would be unacceptable to the right. Even if Souvanna were prepared to abandon his position, moreover, it is difficult to see how he could secure right-wing acquiescence; another coup in Vientiane would thus become highly likely. If we acceded to Souvanna’s abandonment of his terms and increased the pressures on the right to acquiesce, this reversal of our public position would call into question our basic resolve, particularly in the minds of the Thai and South Vietnamese.

For the Pathet Lao and their Chinese and Vietnamese supporters, on the other hand, Souvanna’s present terms can hold no interest unless rejecting them presents unacceptable dangers. It is possible, although unlikely, that the cumulative effects of our present air activities could induce the Communists to modify their current stance in order to secure a recess that would leave open the possibility of forward movement at a later date. Souphanouvong’s apparent acceptance of the Polish proposal for tripartite negotiations may be a move in this direction. It is more likely, however, that to raise the level of threat and to bring about effective Soviet leverage would require US military intervention on a considerably more substantial scale. At best, this intervention on behalf of the neutral solution could lend credence to the viability and defensibility of that solution, restore the territorial balance (perhaps more fully observed and effectively policed) and restore the tripartite stalemate in Vientiane. At worst, it could lead to prolonged hostilities and higher levels of outside Communist support for the Pathet Lao, with the USSR constrained to provide at least diplomatic and propaganda backing for the Communist side. Between these extremes, and perhaps most likely, we could anticipate intensified pressures for an immediate, unconditional reconvocation of the Geneva signatories.

Weighing the risks of this course against the very limited likely advantages suggests that if American military power is to be applied on any significant scale in Laos it should be in pursuit of broader objectives than those attainable through an effort to reconstitute a neutral solution, which has not proved successful in the past and which holds little prospect for greater success in the future.

Exploitation of Partition—Present Territorial Arrangements

As a result of military action over the past year there is now less intermingling of friendly and hostile forces and, therefore, a somewhat more coherent territorial base for the transformation of the “soft” partition that has existed in Laos since the signing of the Geneva Accords into a more formal division under rival regimes. There is also some possibility that both Souvanna, now completely disenchanted with the Communists, and the Pathet Lao, close to a break with Souvanna and in a stronger territorial position, might find such a division more attractive than would have been the case a year ago. However, a “hard” partition on the basis of present territorial holdings would be of questionable advantage to the United States.

The principal area in which friendly and Communist forces were intermingled—the Plaine des Jarres—has now come largely under Communist control and is unlikely to be negotiable. Intermingling remains a problem south of Luang Prabang and south and west of the Mekong between Ban Houei Sai and Luang Prabang. Territorial adjustments in this area have been largely in favor of friendly forces and, under a partition proposal, shifts might be negotiable. Khammouane Boupha’s sector of Phong Saly, however, would probably move from its present still somewhat anomalous status to complete identification with the Pathet Lao side. Meo positions are almost entirely within Pathet Lao territory, and the Meo would be difficult if not impossible to move to another area as a fighting force.

Without the Plaine des Jarres, RLG territorial holdings would be more compactly disposed, more defensible by Lao forces, and more effectively fortified by conventional means against further nibbling. Were we, however, to initiate or accept a firm partition after having lost the Plaine, we would be seen as moving or reacting from weakness and the plausibility of our Mekong deterrent, although not necessarily weakened, would certainly not be enhanced.

Under such partition, we might wish to continue to uphold the concept of international neutrality for our zone in Laos, without, however, compromising its right to request and receive defensive support from friendly powers. This stance would offer the prospect of maximizing international acceptability and support of a reconstituted Royal Lao Government and might even provide some basis for the continued use of the ICC, at least as a device to keep its members involved in the Laos problem and to publicize Communist violations. In a partitioned Laos, however, efforts by us to maintain Souvanna’s position against erosion from the right could no longer rely so completely upon the importance of his international acceptability, with the danger that our role in Lao internal arrangements would be more vulnerable to charges of external dictation. At the same time, the retention of Souvanna himself in this situation would be less vital to our interests, particularly after a successful transition had been made to the new arrangements, although the problem of coming forward with a competent successor able to unify the various factions will remain. In any event our involvement with the Lao government would be likely to increase, with past performance holding little promise that even the complete elimination of the Pathet Lao factor in the non-Communist zone would result in a government notably more united, dedicated, or capable.

Although the complete collapse of the Geneva arrangements might remove formal restraints on our assistance to the Vientiane government, the practical effects of this removal could be rather limited except insofar as we wished to inject our own or Thai and perhaps other ground forces. Already Souvanna has been willing to legitimize a fairly wide range of overt military assistance. Such Meo and similar activities as we wished to continue in the Pathet Lao zone would require covert support in any case, and there are distinct limitations on the amount of assistance that FAR and neutralist forces themselves can absorb.

Partition of Laos on this basis would provide no more real protection against subversion than did the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the question here being whether the Pathet Lao supported by the North Vietnamese would be as effective in this role as the Viet Cong. Certainly the long border, approximately 1,000 miles, could not be closed effectively against infiltration from the Communist side.

Finally, partition of Laos along existing territorial lines would leave the Communists in control of the corridor into South Vietnam. As the same time, in considering operations to restrict Communist use of the corridor based in South Vietnam or elsewhere, we would no longer need to be restrained by the effects of such operations upon tripartite arrangements in Laos.

Exploitation of Partition—New Territorial Arrangements

To establish a partition based on territorial arrangements other than those that now exist would almost certainly require the intervention of United States forces on some significant scale, especially if the territorial arrangement were to be genuinely advantageous. To be advantageous in a partition, such an arrangement should be the Mekong Valley plus the panhandle rather than the Mekong Valley plus the Plaine des Jarres.

In our contingency planning of the past, a move into the panhandle has usually been envisaged as a response to a clear Communist military threat to the Mekong. If, however, the panhandle is seen as seizable and worth seizing in the interests of our position in Vietnam, it is questionable whether we benefit by waiting for the Communists to provide us with a trigger only to maximize the international legitimacy of our position. Our posture, for some time, has communicated our determination to move more decisively if necessary to protect the Royal Lao Government and South Vietnam. We have the evidence on which to present a strong case against Communist violations of the Geneva Accords. Moreover, for many of the countries making up the numerical majority in the world community, the question is not so much who is right in Indochina as who is likely to win. For our allies, as well as for friendly neutrals, the question is not so much whether the United States should apply its power more forcefully as it is whether there are means of applying this power that we are prepared to employ and that can be effective in stemming the Communist advance without precipitating major hostilities. Especially, for those countries that might be expected to participate usefully in our action to greater or less degree—Thailand, the GVN, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and Australia—the most significant issues are thus those of scope and effectiveness.

We could certainly expect a vigorous Communist response to an effort to seize the panhandle, including: a significantly greater use of North Vietnamese forces, an enhanced supply effort, and, simultaneously, redoubled appeals for an immediate Geneva Conference backed with threats of further escalation. If, however, our advance were to go no further north than would be required to secure the Pathet Lao road net fanning out of the Mu Ghia Pass, we would not be posing a direct threat to vital North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist territory and would thereby minimize the prospect of a genuinely escalatory military reaction.

If we were to embark upon such an action we would of course have to accept the indefinite commitment of United States ground forces, in an area that lends itself by terrain and forest cover to prolonged and effective guerrilla resistance. By the same token, although reducing infiltration into South Vietnam, we probably would be unable to seal it off completely and infiltration efforts through other routes (e.g., the DMZ, the sea, and Cambodia) would continue. Finally, the effect of interdiction of infiltration routes on the Viet Cong effort would be primarily psychological and, in terms of military capabilities, long-run rather than immediate, and would not provide a substitute for more vigorous and successful politico-military action in South Vietnam itself.

Our ability to seize, hold, and at least partially seal the panhandle, even though not significantly reducing Viet Cong capability in the short-run, could bolster morale in South Vietnam as evidence of effective action against the enemy in what has become his territory. Similarly Thai confidence in our intentions and capabilities would be reinforced and there might be some positive impact also on defeatist “wave of the future” attitudes elsewhere in Asia. At the same time, there would exist the danger of becoming involved in a prolonged and inconclusive campaign—not to speak of a failure—which would tend to reinforce the belief that a Western power, if it denies itself its ultimate weapons, is ineffective against a determined military/subversive campaign in areas bordering on Communist Asia.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. VII, Memos, 7/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.