Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 24, 1964, 10:54 p.m.

1250. Embtel 1683 and ARMA CX–291.² Without attempting to answer all points reference message, following are main lines of our present thinking:

1. In absence major communist military moves in Laos or developments with respect SVN compelling major policy change, our military actions in immediate period ahead, insofar as they concern Laos, should be selected with a view to (a) deterring further PL/VM moves; (b) bolstering morale and capacity non-communist forces; (c) keeping Souvanna in office and bolstering his position; and (d) maintaining US freedom of action. We do not envisage supporting efforts to drive communists back in PDJ or elsewhere if this would require major action.

2. It is in line with this general approach that we have been more forthcoming in publicity about recce flights while reluctant to admit involvement in T–28 operations. Fact is that former are necessarily more visible here and elsewhere and that we have been taking firm and consistent line both in public and with important third countries that we are not directly involved in T–28 operations. On this basis, believe we can make out sound case that we are not violating Geneva Accords for reasons set out Deptel 1174.³ On other hand use of US pilots in T–28’s or employment of SAW detachment, for example, could not be so defended and would be unwise unless need was truly critical.

3. We recognize importance of remaining in step with Prime Minister in terms both explaining actions we take and protecting and strengthening his position vis-à-vis conservative generals. At moment it seems there may be more danger Souvanna getting out in front of us than vice versa. Particularly relevant is his presentation proposed three-pronged attack on PL in area junction routes 7 and 13 (ARMA CX–291) “with maximum US support to include use American pilots with T–28’s and armed US recce.” Along lines our present thinking we are not prepared use US pilots in T–28’s although air lift activities and reconnaissance support within existing guidelines quite acceptable.

4. More basically, our first reaction is that operation on scale outlined ARMA CX–291, involving as it does movement of forces from already threatened Attopeu area and complex maneuvers with air support, runs extremely serious risk outright defeat in view past experience FAR. Even if operation were relatively sure of success it would be out of line with basic stance we wish maintain at this time (see para 1 above). As we see it, proposed operation would not really contribute to relieve Muong Soui situation but apparently aimed to achieve psychological lift of victory. We also not clear just how this planning has been arrived at or whether Kong Le and Amkha are really in accord on this concept.

5. We not clear just how serious threat to Muong Soui is but are planning medium-level recce operation there for 26th or 27th and preparing plans for further low-level operations if required. From here it looks as though assets now proposed to be devoted to CX–291 operation could be much better employed strengthening defenses of Muong Soui. Alternatively, we would think preservation neutralist forces in secure position more important than retaining foothold in PDJ. There may well be merit in evacuation neutralist forces to Vang Vieng area as Amkha originally urged.

6. In any event, it would certainly help if Souvanna could publicize threat to Muong Soui and provide additional basis justifying possible extensive low-level recce operations if required. If Muong Soui actually attacked, we probably prepared, along lines Embtel 1613,⁴ to authorize US civilian pilots fly T–28’s, but had not thought we could go further than this in response this particular action.

7. Realize above if communicated to Souvanna might sharply deflate his present rather ebullient mood and perhaps endanger his position with conservative military leaders. If we conclude we should discourage CX–291 operation, line we would propose would be to say that RLG forces not yet ready for such ambitious undertaking but that we prepared to take substantial measures to beef them up further. Among these could be:

a. Furnishing additional T–28’s. We exploring this urgently.

b. Additional Thai pilots and perhaps other forms of Thai volunteers greatly expanding present limited Thai elements with RLG forces. In this connection, Bangkok should explore in wake of Milton talks just where Thai do stand with respect such additional efforts.

c. Whatever else you recommend except that for present we would not consider introducing US military personnel in any capacity for reasons stated para 2 above.

8. Above reasoning also means we should certainly not encourage any military move to recapture PDJ areas themselves. Obviously, what we have is serious problem of maintaining Souvanna and RLG morale while restraining them from unwise military action and while we pursue negotiating track. Believe we can do a lot within present guidelines but we are most reluctant to go further in the direction of US involvement at this time. Our essential effort is to use negotiating track to build up Souvanna position and ICC role and to frame and isolate withdrawal issue while putting this off for significant period to avoid premature crisis.

For Bangkok: Re Para 7 b above, request you explore immediately Thai willingness supply additional pilots for T–28’s on same basis pilots already with RLAF. For longer term, we wish explore possibility large-scale Thai encadrement (Deptel 2319).⁵ Thai Minister has suggested best way of proceeding on this would be for Ambassador to approach Thanat for general discussion Thai views as to what needs to be done in Laos. Minister implied Thanat would himself probably raise possibility of volunteers. You are best able judge whether this is good way of proceeding but unless you perceive strong objection, request you explore matter in some way without compromising Thai Minister.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart and William Bundy, cleared in substance with McGeorge Bundy and McNaughton, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Bangkok and repeated to Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, and CINCPAC.
2. Document 100. In telegram CX–291, the U.S. Army Attaché in Vientiane reported on a June 23 meeting with the Lao General Staff and Souvanna to discuss a FAR offensive against Pathet Lao strongholds at the junction of Routes 7 and 13 north of Vientiane and west of the Plain of Jars. The ultimate objective of this extensive three-pronged offensive would be to relieve pressure on Muong Soui. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
3. In telegram 1174 to Vientiane, June 16, the Department suggested that U.S. armed reconnaissance over Laos was designed to provide the ICC and the Royal Lao Government with information on North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao military dispositions on the Plain of Jars: a task the ICC was no longer able to perform. (Ibid., INT 6 PHOTO LAOS)
4. See footnote 3, Document 100.
5. See footnote 4, Document 100.