Tab I
Laos
The U.S. is engaged in overt and covert support to paramilitary
forces in Laos but in large part the elements being aided are remote
from the centers of power and unlikely to be involved in any future
power struggle. Military assistance is being provided overtly to the
regular non-communist forces, at the request and with the approval
of Prime Minister Prince Souvanna
Phouma. These regular forces include the conservative
Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR) under
General Phoumi and the
neutralist forces loyal to Prince Souvanna Phouma under General Kong Le. This overt assistance is in
accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol of the Geneva Agreements,
although we attempt to avoid publicizing it.
Covert support is given to paramilitary guerrilla and intelligence
collecting groups which consist primarily of tribal members. General
Phoumi is, in general,
familiar with our assistance to these groups but not in detail.
Although Prince Souvanna is generally aware of our activities in
this area, he is less so than Phoumi.
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Paramilitary Forces
The principal paramilitary forces in Laos are those receiving covert
U.S. support through CIA. In
addition, however, certain organizations of the FAR can be considered to have a
paramilitary character. These are the Auto Defense de Choc (ADC)
units and the Directorate of National Coordination (DNC).
CIA Supported Covert
Paramilitary Program
The genesis of this program stems from high level U.S. Government
approval in late 1960 and early 1961 in response to a recommendation
by the U.S. Ambassador in Laos that CIA enlist tribal support to fight communism. The main
effort in this program has been development of the Meo, the largest
non-Lao ethnic group in Laos, as an effective guerrilla force and
the provision of plausibly deniable U.S. air support for the
program.
Since the program’s inception CIA has
worked with the two key Meo leaders, Touby Lyfong and Vang Pao. Vang Pao, the commander of the Meo forces, is a
regular FAR officer and the Meo
forces are technically considered to be FAR ADC units. As authorized by the Special Group in
June 1963, this program has expanded to a present force of
approximately 19,000 armed Meo guerrillas (23,000 authorized)
engaged in village defense and guerrilla activities against the
Pathet Lao. [7 lines of source text not
declassified]
In addition to the Meos, CIA has
developed, with Special Group approval, paramilitary and
intelligence assets among the Yaos in northwest Laos (currently
1700; 2500 authorized) and the Khas in south Laos (currently 400;
1,000 authorized) and Lao in central Laos (currently 1,200; 2,000
authorized). The latter assets (Lao in central Laos) operate under
FAR cover.
In support of the above forces CIA
has employed covert air support designed to fulfill resupply
requirements, as well as meet FAR
and neutralist paramilitary and military requirements. This air
support, conducted by an ostensibly private and commercial company,
has been able to continue operations in Laos under USAID contractual arrangements and
through the flexibility of CIA’s
cover and funding mechanisms.
During the development, employment and support of the above covert
tribal paramilitary program in Laos, CIA has provided World War II weapons and associated
ammunition; salary and subsistence and miscellaneous support items.
The budget for the Laos tribal program for FY 1963 was $11,625,000 and for FY 1964 $14,008,000.
ADC
The FAR ADC units, which are not part
of the Meo ADC force, have a total strength of about 9,000 and are
essentially home guard or militia-type
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military units concerned with local village or
urban defense. On occasion, however, they have been used as regular
forces. The ADC’s are considered to be part of the FAR and come under its organizational
command. Thus, General Phoumi controls these units, as he does the
regular FAR troops. Phoumi provides some support to the
ADC’s from US military assistance but the amount is probably
minimal. The neutralists have also begun recently to develop some
ADC elements which will presumably be controlled and maintained by
the regular neutralist forces under Kong
Le.
DNC
The Directorate of National Coordination is an organization of the
FAR charged primarily with
security and police responsibilities. (A national police force has
not been reconstituted as yet.) In addition to acting as the police
force in Vientiane and other areas, the DNC is engaged in intelligence, customs and border
control activities on behalf of the FAR. DNC units are
stationed in the few cities and large towns and penetrate slightly
into the country side in scattered gendarmerie posts of four or five
men. The DNC numbers some 7,800 men
under Col. Siho, of which 3,600 are engaged in police and 4,200 in
military-type activities. Three battalions of the latter in the
Vientiane area are the most important elements of the DNC in terms of any political
involvement. As part of the FAR and
because of Siho’s relationship
with him, General Phoumi
controls the DNC.
Power Rivalries
The basic power rivalry in Laos is between the pro-Communist Pathet
Lao (PL) and the non-Communist Lao.
Although rivalries continue to exist between the neutralist and
conservative factions, the aggressive PL posture toward the neutralists since a year ago has
resulted in a more cooperative neutralist-conservative relationship,
especially between Souvanna and Phoumi, and also between the military in the field.
Rivalries also exist within each of the two non-Communist factions.
Growing restiveness has been reported within conservative ranks. It
is generally recognized, however, that any attempt to create a new
power alignment among the non-Communist leadership requires U.S.
support if it is to succeed. We have made our position clear to all
concerned that the U.S. continues to support Prime Minister Souvanna
and the Geneva settlement and we consider any changes in the
existing setup inimical to U.S. and Lao interests.
Nevertheless, the danger always exists that some ambitious or misled
group might attempt to upset the present fragile balance. A coup
attempt could, for example, come from within the FAR ranks by generals disillusioned
with Phoumi’s leadership. It
could also result from a power play by Col. Siho and the DNC, although this would probably require
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support by other FAR elements. General Phoumi claims to have the situation
under control. We can expect, however, to continue to hear rumors
about such coup plotting. In addition, rivalries between neutralist
military leaders will continue to produce rumors about efforts of
one neutralist group to gain ascendancy over Kong Le’s position. These moves,
however, among conservative or neutralist groups, involve primarily
regular military forces.
The danger of an attempt to gain power by the principal paramilitary
group, the Meo, is more remote. The Meo, as all tribal groups in
Laos, are isolated from the country’s political arena and are not
integrated into Lao society. They are located away from the main
centers of the country, living in scattered villages at the higher
elevations (the Yao and Kha tribal groups are even more isolated and
too few in number to pose a threat). Moreover, the Meo are subject
to U.S. guidance and direction. The development of the Meo as a
rival center of armed power with political objectives in a national
Lao context does not seem to be a realistic possibility. The main
problem posed by the Meo, and all other tribal groups in Laos, is
the need for their eventual integration into Lao society and
identification with the Lao nation. Phoumi is beginning to recognize this, as is Meo
leader Vang Pao who has
recently also established a working relationship with Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres
area. Other Lao leaders, however, including Souvanna, continue to
view the Meo and other tribal peoples in the traditional Lao manner
of the tribal people being separate and apart from the Lao. Souvanna
even seems to feel that military support for the Meo could lead to a
greater autonomous status for them. He has expressed opposition to
the use of Thai in support of the Meo. In terms of U.S. interests,
however, the Meo will continue to play an essential and useful
military role as an anti-Communist guerrilla force. At the same time
it is important to continue efforts to impress on the Meo the need
for national identification with Laos and the Lao government. The
first steps in this respect give some reason for encouragement,
although a better relationship with and acceptance by Souvanna is
still essential.
