Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

89. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, February 23, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Supersonic Aircraft for India and Pakistan

This is to alert you that we will probably have to make important decisions regarding the supply of supersonic aircraft to both Pakistan and India before the Ayub visit in April and the Shastri visit some time thereafter. You should also know that the Vice President indicated he was interested in this question when I saw him just before my Jordan trip.

India

In an apparent policy shift, Defense Minister Chavan asked Ambassador Bowles for F–5’s on January 22. (See New Delhi’s 2113² at Tab A.) We have asked the Ambassador if he can get more information about what is behind this request, particularly if it indicates the Indians are backing away from their MIG-21 agreement with the Soviets. (See Deptel 1584³ at Tab B.)

Also, we have received a report of undetermined reliability from a covert source to the effect that Chavan believes that the Soviets have reneged on an oral commitment they made to him to provide production facilities for an advanced version of the MIG-21. Now they insist that all India can have is facilities for producing a version of the MIG-21 that will be obsolete by the time it is produced. The report also indicates that Chavan believes the Soviets are lagging on deliveries of finished MIG-21’s. (Deliveries now, however, seem in fact to be underway.)

Pakistan

On April 27, 1964 we told General Musa we would provide Pakistan with two additional squadrons of F–104’s in FY 1966 if the political climate was right at the time. Our long-run modernization plan for the Pakistan Air Force calls for the two squadrons of 104’s followed by F–5’s in FY 1967, of course, subject to our political decision to do so. (During the winter we had some indications that we might be able to get by with only one squadron of F–104’s.)

We believe it is best that we reserve judgment for the present on both of these questions. In the case of India, we will need much more information regarding the factors behind the Indian request. In the case of Pakistan, we will wish to make a careful review of “political climate” as the time for President Ayub’s visit approaches. We will, of course, want to consider carefully the effect of providing supersonic aircraft to each country on our relations with the other. In this regard we may wish to consider not only providing aircraft to both countries but also denying them to both.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 17, and cleared in draft by Edward A. Padelford (NEA/NR), A.J. Moses (G/PM), Thomas P. Thornton (INR/RNA), and Joseph B Norbury, Jr. (EUR/SOV).
2. Document 86.
3. In telegram 1584 to New Delhi, February 5, a joint State/Defense message, the two Departments expressed interest in Chavan’s request for F–5 aircraft, and listed a number of questions for the Embassy to pose in probing for the motivation behind Chavan’s request. The response to the request would depend on a clearer reading of what prompted the request. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA)