Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

86. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, January 29, 1965, 1:30 p.m.

2113. A new development has occurred in Indian military planning which we believe to be of significant importance. First indication occurred last Friday² during courtesy call on Defense Minister Chavan on which I accompanied General Johnson.³

After usual pleasantries Chavan stated that important changes had occurred in GOI thinking in regard to Air Force. As result he would like to renew at future meeting his request for American assistance on somewhat different basis. Consequently on January 28 Gen Johnson, John Millar⁴ and I met with Chavan and Secy of Ministry of Defense PVR Rao for three-quarters hour. Exchange developed along following lines:

1. Chavan stated that after several months consideration he and his colleagues are now ready to accept analysis which Secy McNamara advanced in their Washington conversations last May; i.e., that India should cut down her present wide variety of planes, that F104G was expensive toy which India could not afford, that India had urgent need for ground support aircraft to defend itself against China, that F5 was ideal plane for this purpose to complement Indian-produced HF–24 Mark I and that it would be long time if ever before HF–24 Mark II would become reality.

Based on this review GOI would therefore like to request assistance in procuring minimum of three squadrons and maximum of six squadrons of F5As to be spread over two or three years. He explained this to mean 16 aircraft per squadron plus spares.

2. In response to my inquiry about current GOI plans in regard to MIG-21s Chavan stated that they expected to receive 24–36 MIG-21s from Soviets. In reply to my further question about MIG-21 production in India, Chavan said that while project was proceeding satisfactorily it would be at least ten years before this production line could contribute significantly to India’s defense.

Rao added that there was no security threat to U.S. equipment since Soviets were limited to two sites—Chandigarh and Nasik—and were forbidden to leave them. The last Russians to visit Hindustan Aircraft Limited were Bulganin and Khrushchev.

In regard to plans for HF–24 Mark I Chavan stated that he and his colleagues believed that with our help this plane could be made into effective ground support aircraft. They would greatly appreciate help of U.S. experts in solving technical problems and any advice for improving plane generally. They would also appreciate modest amount of U.S. financial assistance to which we referred in previous cables. Rao added that a successful HF–24 (model unspecified) would eliminate the need to produce MIGs.

3. In response to Defense Minister’s presentation I stated that while we were prepared to help India in every reasonable way to strengthen her defense against China, we were concerned by relationship of Soviet Union to Indian Air Force. If India had not decided to proceed with MIG-21 production line willy-nilly we would have been willing last June to go a long way towards meeting India’s needs for more modern air force.

Although we had no desire to carry on cold war here in India or anywhere else, we were faced with practical problems which involved not only our security but also India’s. U.S. and Soviet Union were both agreed that primary need is to avoid nuclear war. However, once we move beyond that first priority U.S. and USSR national objectives varied profoundly.

For instance our second highest priority is to develop working relationship with Soviets which will enable us to lower tensions and to cooperate in solving many disturbing problems which now threaten peace. In contrast, second highest priority of Soviet Union is to lessen tensions between Moscow and Peking and ultimately to create effective basis for cooperation between Russia and China.

Although it is now clear that fulfillment of Soviet objectives is impossible as long as aging Long March veterans are running China, Kremlin hopes that once Chinese leadership role has passed to younger men the two nations can coordinate their efforts in economic, political and military fields.

In meantime we Americans cannot expect any profound changes in Moscow’s attitude towards us. India should also realize that as long as this situation exists, USSR will be at best uncertain friend. Indeed if Soviets ever have opportunity to choose between China and India, they will surely pick China since China is potential threat to Soviet security and India is not.

4. Chavan stated that he understood our position and thought it was reasonable. India was fully determined to stand up to Chinese political or military aggression. However, he was faced with practical day-to-day problem of building India’s defense on month-to-month and year-to-year basis.

I closed this exchange by remarking that planes we were discussing had ten year life span and during this period we must face possibility of profound changes in Soviet-Chinese relationship. However I would carefully consider his request with my associates here in Delhi and then transmit it with my recommendations to Washington.

Comment: Gen Johnson, Millar and I came away with clear impression that Chavan was not only reversing position his Air Force people had pushed him into last spring and putting in an order for American planes that he rejected at that time but also that he was easing away from Soviet Union as source of military procurement and towards US.

In effect he accepted our position on present costly proliferation of IAF, impracticality and extravagance of F104 cost and performance advantages of F5A, and practical difficulties in way of building HF–24 Mark II. Only item on which he did not fall in line was MIG assembly line on which GOI is publicly committed and from which it would be difficult for them suddenly to pull back.

We here are agreed that it is politically and militarily sound to provide Indian Air Force with a combat aircraft of characteristics of the F5A, for following reasons:

A. Since F5A could be used as interceptor provision of significant number would at least sharply improve chances that MIG project will fade out if not fall through entirely.

B. If we do not provide F5As we see no likely alternative to vigorous continuation of MIG project. Since there would be no controls on MIG production or use this would be to the disadvantage of Pakistan as well as US.

C. F5A would replace multiple makes of obsolescent aircraft and should permit reduction in total Indian requirements.

D. They would strengthen Indian defenses against Chinese and hence would be serving US interests.⁵

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to DOD, CINCMEAFSA, London, and Karachi.
2. January 22.
3. Major General Charles E. Johnson, Chief of the U.S. Supply Mission to India.
4. John Y. Millar, First Secretary of Embassy.
5. On February 2 Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, sent a memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for the Joint Chiefs’ assessment of the request put to Bowles by Chavan as reported in this telegram. Solbert noted that, in his view, the Indian request for F–5 aircraft might provide an opportunity not only to limit the Indian acquisition of MIGs, but might to bring about a substantial restructuring of the Indian Air Force. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 452.1 India)