Office of the Historian

517. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1

Rawalpindi, October 20, 1968, 0900Z.

8628. Subject: Peshawar/Tanks. Please pass White House. From Ambassador.

1.
Last evening President Ayub phoned me to say that he had decided to “take a calculated risk” and agree to some extension of base operations along the lines of my previous proposal.2 He emphasized [Page 1028] that he was willing to take such a risk because he was anxious to be helpful to USG in any way he could.
2.
He added that he had instructed Secretary Yusuf to get in touch with me and work out the details.
3.
Ayub then said that there was another matter he had meant to discuss with me the evening before. He reminded me of his conversation with President Johnson and me in Karachi last December 233 about “horses”, said he greatly appreciated all the efforts which had been made in that direction, and that he hopes that those efforts would be carried forward to early fruition because he badly needed the “horses.”
4.
I assured him that every possible effort was being made.
5.
Pursuant to appointment I met with Yusuf at 1000 hours this morning. He handed me an unofficial unsigned aide-mémoire4 reading as follows:
A.
Dismantling, packing and removal of the facilities, installations and equipment shall commence in January 1969. This will be accompanied by a staggered thinning down of personnel.
B.
All facilities, installations and equipment not dismantled by the cut-out date (i.e. 17 July 1969) will be dismantled not later then 31st December 1969 in accordance with a fixed monthly programme.
C.
All dismantled facilities, installations and equipment shall be packed and crated and be removed from Pakistan as early as possible and in no case later than 28th February 1970. All remaining base personnel will be evacuated completely by the same date.
6.
Attention is called to the reference to “a fixed monthly program” in paragraph 5 (B) above. Yusuf and I agreed that we would meet again on Monday, October 28.
A.
For him to receive our formal response to the above proposal (I would hope and urge that it be accepted, since it covers all desired points except for Sugar Tree operation for some months after 31 December 1969); and
B.
If possible for US to submit a proposed fixed monthly schedule although it was agreed that there could be an exchange of notes along the lines of the aide-mémoire with the fixed monthly schedule to be furnished later. Would hope to be able to submit the schedule on October 28 and would appreciate guidance along those lines ASAP.
7.
There was one disturbing element in the Yusuf conversation, but I do not consider it insurmountable. He stated that, in addition to an exchange of letters embodying the point of the aide-mémoire, there should be a verbal understanding that all antenna would be down by July 17, 1969.
8.
I told him that, while I was not technically informed, I believe that such a requirement would negate the intention for us to be able to operate selected equipment through 31 December since I did not believe that the equipment was operable without antenna.
9.
He responded that what they wanted was continued use in “a discreet manner” with all antenna indoors if possible or at least as unobtrusive as possible.
10.
The gist and tone of the conversation was such that I believe they will not insist on the antenna point provided much of the most obtrusive elements are down by July 17 and further progress in that direction is evident thereafter.
Oehlert
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The text of this telegram was sent to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in telegram CAP 82588, October 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Cables, 5/68–11/68)↩
  2. When Oehlert met with Foreign Secretary Yusuf on October 18, Yusuf informed him that the U.S. proposal to phase out operations at the Peshawar facility gradually following the termination of the base agreement on July 17, 1969, had been considered, but the Pakistani Government position was that all operational activities at the facility must be terminated on July 17, 1969. (Telegram 8589 from Rawalpindi, October 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK-US) Oehlert expressed his disappointment over the position taken by the Pakistani Government in a conversation with Ayub on October 19. He told Ayub that the decision to force the closure of the facility on July 17, 1969, would be seen by many in Washington as evidence that Pakistan attached greater importance to its relations with China and the Soviet Union than with the United States. (Telegram 8625 from Rawalpindi, October 19; ibid.)↩
  3. See Document 475.↩
  4. Not found.↩