Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

516. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, October 11, 1968, 1400Z.

8406. From Ambassador. Ref: State 252292.²

1. Following letter from Akhbar to McCloskey, dated 9 October, was received late Wednesday:³

“Thank you for your letter dated 3 October 1968.⁴ It is correct that I had given the US authorities assurance that as long as the Peshawar communication unit agreement remains operative, we will afford you all the necessary support stipulated in the agreement. I am glad to know that you found this support satisfactory.

The Government of Pakistan has served notice for the termination of the agreement on 18 July 1969. It therefore follows that all the provisions of the agreement will lapse on that date. You will also recall that apart from the notice given by the Government of Pakistan, I had been giving the US authorities hints and indications on the termination of the agreement many months before hand. You will therefore agree that every opportunity has been given to enable you to plan an orderly and smooth evacuation of the base, as it will cease to operate as a communication unit on 18 July 1969. The agreement and all its provisions will lapse on the above date.

You are therefore advised to dismantle and ship out of the country any removable property by 18 July 1969 as the provisions of the agreement exempting such property from inspection, search and seizure would lapse on that date and the US Government will have no further rights in the matter.

The evacuation of any movable property left over in the base after 18 July 1969 may be subject to separate negotiations between the two governments.”

2. Impossible yet to be certain, even after today’s meeting, whether this repudiation of Akhbar’s previous assurances, obviously fathered by Yusuf, represents merely a gambit of a tough opening bargaining position or a deep-seated decision of GOP not to yield one inch—at least sans tanks.

3. Today’s meeting attended on our side by Oehlert, Rogers, McCloskey and Nastoff. On theirs by Yusuf, Akbar, Piracha and Farooqi.

4. Presented aide-mémoire (copy being pouched along with transcription of meeting notes)⁵ which first addressed itself to exchange of McCloskey/Akhbar letters pointing out that next to last paragraph of letter sounded like a threat to seize any USG property remaining on base after July 17, 1969.

5. Their side flatly and firmly denied any such threat was intended and indicated they considered it subject to negotiations because they do not consider that agreement conveys any such rights. However they did not give categoric assurance in form satisfactory to us that we can operate through termination date and then dismantle and ship in orderly fashion.

6. If further negotiations indicate that GOP will not back down from position Akbar letter then I would regard this as not only unfriendly but actively hostile since it is tantamount to a threat to confiscate USG property unless we accept a close-down substantially in advance of date called for by the agreement. The agreement guarantees USG right to operate base as a communications unit and to use equipment through July 17, 1969, and also specifies that title to removable materials, equipment or property will remain in USG and “may be removed freely by the USG at any time.”

7. It is my prayerfully arrived at conclusion that we should refuse to submit to any such threat which contravenes the provisions of the agreement, repeated oral assurances previously given, and the accepted standards of conduct between friendly nations.

8. I therefore recommend that, if GOP remains intransigent on this point, and if necessary to overcome such intransigency on the part of GOP, we be prepared to discontinue both economic aid and the supply of military spare parts.

9. More than Peshawar is at stake. In Friends Not Masters⁶ Ayub states that each bilateral negotiation “would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties… to illustrate, the United States would not be too eager to provide us with unlimited economic and military assistance if we were to establish bilateral relations with major Communist powers without regard to American interest of strategies in Asia. If we cannot in an unlimited way identify ourselves with American interests, we must learn to do with less than unlimited American assistance.” (Pages 118–119.)

10. In a conversation last week with Chargé Rogers and Admiral King, Piracha stated and emphasized the doctrine of “limits of tolerance.”

11. It seems clear that the GOP is testing the limits of tolerance of the USG. If we show a high threshold of tolerance in this matter then we can never hope again to win GOP support for any policy of ours which is opposed by either USSR or ChiComs unless we are then willing to face a confrontation. To back down would be an almost irreparable show of weakness. To stand firm might win the day. At worst it would clarify the situation and we would know how far GOP has committed its policy toward its Communist neighbors without regard to USG interests, policy or sensibilities. Such a confrontation is bound to come sooner or later unless the USG is content to continue economic aid and military spare parts regardless of GOP preferential treatment of Communist interests without regard to USG interests.

12. Although of course I did not raise such issues at today’s meeting, I repeated my recommendation of paragraph above for the longer haul. In addition to the strategic concerns supporting those recommendations, any action by GOP to seize USG property would cause justifiable US political tempest, particularly if aid or sales to GOP continued, and also would raise a serious legal question concerning the applicability to our economic aid program of Section 620 (e) of FAA—the Hickenlooper amendment. While that provision could be read as not covering expropriation of USG property, we believe it would be anomalous to construe it as applicable to cases of seizure of US citizens’ property but inapplicable where property of USG is involved. At our meeting today, I brought to the attention of GOP the possible applicability of Section 620 (e) to any expropriatory action.

13. Balance of aide-mémoire, which was discussed at some length, covered:

A. Review of antecedent events of termination notice, President Johnson’s letter to President Ayub of July 14,⁷ latter’s letter to President Johnson dated July 19,⁸ and Piracha’s information of appointment of Yusuf/Akbar committee;

B. A recognition of GOP’s previous support of base, the need for the base, its irreplaceability, its importance, the unfavorableness to USG interests of the GOP termination notice and its attendant circumstances; and

C. A proposed phase out schedule which tracks that covered by my instructions except that for bargaining purposes I added six months to each time phase.

14. Throughout discussions second portion aide-mémoire GOP side maintained strong stance that base must cease all operations on 18 July 1969, but:

A. Indicated it would be helpful to them if we would ostentatiously dismantle some elements prior to July 18, 1969, which we indicated we could and probably would do; and

B. Stated that they would need to consider and discuss aide-mémoire proposals before taking a position.

15. Neither our aide-mémoire nor our conversation indicated any equipment we would be willing to give them in return for some extension and they did not raise the question.

16. Next meeting set for October 18 at time to be agreed upon. Would hope at that meeting to obtain acceptable assurances our rights of removal of property.

Oehlert

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. The Department, in telegram 252292 to Rawalpindi, October 9, welcomed the opening of negotiations on Peshawar scheduled to begin on October 11 and recognized the importance the sale of tanks to Pakistan could have on the negotiations and indicated that vigorous efforts were being made to facilitate such a sale. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 PAK)
3. October 9.
4. Not found.
5. Airgram A–607 from Rawalpindi, October 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK-US)
6. Reference is to Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
7. See Document 503.
8. Document 505.