Office of the Historian

48. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, May 27, 1964.

Mac—

While Bob McNamara is dead right that F–104s are too rich for India’s blood (and that F–5 is far better suited than F–104 to most of our indigent clients), I suspect he’d agree that issue really turns on political grounds:

1.
Indians are determined to get supersonics somewhere, most likely MIGs. To have a fighting chance of pre-empting them we have to offer something they think comparable.
2.
All of us except Bowles feel that India is already so signed on to MIG deal that it couldn’t back out now. Thus odds are we’d get the [Page 110] political credit for being forthcoming without really having to give. All-important here is not to make Indians feel they’re second-class citizens, i.e. they can’t have F–104s when Paks already have them.
3.
True, F–104s are wasteful but they need involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. We’d merely substitute 104s for other credit items. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway why not let it flow back to us?
4.
While pre-empting MIG production isn’t absolutely crucial, it is a sensitive sector. More important, since Indians are passionate about 104s (Chavan was simply afraid to raise it with Bob), it would put capstone on a highly successful Pentagon exercise in which we’ve brought Indians a long way.
5.
Soviets are picking up too many options we let drop—Bokaro, VOA transmitter, supersonics, etc. An F–104 offer is about only big gesture we have currently available—at a crucial time of indecision following Nehru’s death.

On all these scores, I’d argue for a package proposal of: (a) F–6As as interim help; (b) all-out help on HF–24; (c) if this doesn’t pan out, 2–3 squadrons of F–104s a few years from now—all predicated on India not going ahead with MIGs (except rounding out one squadron they have). I’ll bet this offer (which probably wouldn’t be taken up) would produce enough real political plus to justify the military loss.2 And Paks, though mighty unhappy, couldn’t complain too much; they’re getting F–104s too, and they’d face supersonics in any case—better our 104s than a lot more MIGs.3

R.W. Komer 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64–6/64. Secret.↩
  2. Bundy sent a copy of this memorandum to McNamara with a covering note that reads, in part: “Bob—While I know how flinthearted you are on fancy birds for the underdeveloped, let me try out on you the political side of the case. Here’s a note to me from Bob Komer, which I find quite persuasive.” (Ibid., Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 4/64–6/64)↩
  3. Foreign Minister Bhutto called McConaughy in on May 26 and stated that Ayub had instructed him to stress the mounting Pakistani concern over reports of the likelihood of increased U.S. military assistance to India. Bhutto said that if the Indian threat to Pakistan was enhanced by such assistance, Pakistan would be forced to reduce its involvement in “free world concerns and interests in Asia” and concentrate on the preservation of its own vital national interests. (Telegram 2293 from Karachi, May 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA)↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩