Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, September 7, 1967, 1819Z.

33331. Subj: U.S. Policy Toward Indo-Pak Relations and Our Bilateral Security Relations with Each Country.

1. As addressee posts are aware, recent months have seen gradual evolution in U.S. policy toward military supply relations with India and Pakistan, flowing from policy changes announced last April. Some of these changes have at least implicitly intersected with broader questions; e.g., recent discussion (State 14083)² of how far we should go in telling each Government what we are doing with the other involves to some degree question of comparative priority we attach as between efforts to resolve or reduce Indo-Pak disputes and our efforts to strengthen our bilateral security relations with each.

2. Posts have made valuable contributions to the policy discussion which has preceded and accompanied these changes. New Delhi’s 16350,³ for example, flagged desirability of our all agreeing amongst ourselves on assumptions underlying our actions and posture in subcontinent. This in turn led to recent SNIE⁴ on military threat and force level questions. Although results necessarily somewhat limited, SNIE has established certain conclusions which we can accept and build on.

3. The policy conclusions set forth below are designed serve as guideposts for further operational decisions in coming months. (We are deliberately omitting for present any consideration of nuclear question; NPT draft has just been tabled in Geneva, and it unusually difficult right now to predict how questions of nuclear weapons and security will interrelate with other subcontinent security questions.)

A. Indo-Pak reconciliation remains an important U.S. goal; its achievement would greatly facilitate achievement of important U.S. bilateral and regional objectives. Experience has shown, however, that our resources and influence operate at maximum disadvantage when directed toward goal of reconciliation; in fact good historical case can be made that under present circumstances we cannot bring about reconciliation no matter how hard we try. It follows that our efforts should usually be directed more toward strengthening our bilateral relations with each country than toward bringing them together. There are however certain regional issues we must continue to address, viz.:

1) Renewed conflict: We have clearly indicated that if the two countries insist on fighting each other again they will be dealing us out of picture as significant supplier of resources. This is a solid and uncomplicated position which we should all continue to recognize and enunciate as a fundamental element of our policy.

2) Arms race: We have no intention of fueling an Indo-Pak arms race either directly or indirectly and we intend to continue to apply diplomatic and perhaps other pressures toward persuading each Government to hold line and in due course reduce its defense expenditures.

3) Regional initiatives: Our desire not to be caught in middle should not inhibit initiatives, particularly in economic areas which might bring the countries together or head off issues that might evolve in the political or security fields. As example of former we are examining possibility of encouraging an initiative by a third country to seek to restore normal links between the two countries in telecommunications, air, road and rail services, and trade and transit rights. An example of latter might be effort solve Eastern waters problem and thereby avert casus belli through IBRD or other third party initiative.

B. This means that while we will continue to counsel each Government to follow moderation and restraint in its dealings with the other we should, except under currently unforeseeable circumstances, avoid taking substantive positions or otherwise become substantively involved on Kashmir or other Indo-Pak issues not cited above.

C. Each Government can be expected to continue to press with imagination and vigor its ongoing efforts to embarrass our relations with the other. We should discourage such efforts as actively as we can without causing significant damage to our bilateral relationships.

D. The reasons why it is in our interest to strengthen our bilateral relations in security matters differ as between India and Pakistan. With India we have a more immediate threat of military pressure from China; the Chinese threat in Pakistan from our view is more of a political nature at this time. In each case we have additional important interest of strengthening our ability to help keep down defense spending. Strategically our Indian interest is stronger but we cannot afford to pursue it so single-mindedly as to destroy or severely restrict our Pakistani interest. It would be most desirable if GOI could be brought at least implicitly to recognize that it was in their interest too that we maintain a constructive relation with Paks. Indians should understand this relationship based on our conviction that we should seek avoid isolating Pakistan, and thereby driving her closer to ChiComs. We also believe Pakistan’s political stability and economic progress sufficiently significant for long range security of sub-continent to justify our continued support and encouragement.

E. Since we are not going to revert to major military supply role in either country in foreseeable future our assets for strengthening our security relationships will remain restricted. But they will not be negligible, and skillful orchestration of a variety of different activities can, as suggested in New Delhi’s A–14,⁵ increase our total effectiveness. Our role as economic and food aid supplier will provide underlying strength to our efforts in security field though economic aid leverage can usually be applied with precision only in cases where the objective we seek is directly related to the purposes for which aid is being provided.

F. Task that lies ahead in each country is difficult per se and further complicated by inevitable impact of what we do in either country on the other. Very few of decisions that will face us will be clear-cut; this makes it all the more important that we continue operate on same wavelength.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Coon on August 30. Cleared by Heck, Spain, Handley (draft), Vice Chairman of Policy Planning Council Joseph A. Yager, Linebaugh (S/P), Wolf (G/PM), Brown (IO/UNP), Roy (EUR/SOV), Rees (AID/NESA), and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Harry H. Schwartz. Approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi and repeated to London, Moscow, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. The reference is in error and has not been further identified.
3. Not found.
4. Document 451.
5. Dated July 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 INDIA–PAK)