Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

456. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 31, 1967, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• India Food

After careful consideration, it seems to me that there are four criteria your India food decision should meet:

1. It should combine:

• —enough more wheat to avoid in India the most serious political unrest and human misery associated with food shortages—or at least to counter the argument that disaster followed directly from U.S. parsimony, and
• —enough conditions and limitation to keep the pressure on the Indians to produce and the other donors to come across at the October consortium meeting in such a way that their matching debt roll-overs prove to be additional.

2. It should be consistent with our commitments to other donors throughout the matching exercise. (Specifically, I am afraid this means that we cannot now refuse to accept—or decide to discount by some percentage—debt relief as eligible for food matching.)

3. It should provide a matching argument which the average Congressman with other things on his mind can understand and accept (see Tabs A and B).²

4. It should give you maximum protection from both the domestic political dangers:

• —the danger of maintaining wheat shipments to India while cutting expenditures for domestic food distribution programs; and
• —the partially conflicting danger of the political heat from falling U.S. farm prices and the charge that you are cutting P.L. 480 to take the costs of fighting inflation out of the hide of the American farmer.

I don’t pretend to have a perfect solution. But I believe the following formula comes as close as we can:

1. Authorize one million tons of wheat now.

2. Announce that we will be constantly reviewing the need for more, particularly in the light of our very difficult budget problem. (We could try here to establish the fact that when wheat prices are falling it does not help the budget to cut P.L. 480—indeed, it hurts.)

3. On matching, take the line that we do not yet know with precision the extent to which we have been matched with additional resources. We shall only know after the October consortium meeting—but even then, with a margin of uncertainty. But there is substantial evidence that we have been matched—at least up to the cost of one million tons—and we don’t want the Indians to starve while we make absolutely sure.

4. To assure that the principle of matching is preserved, the amount of our 1967 consortium contribution will not be final until we are certain how much of the aid and debt relief which has been generated since last May is real and additional to ordinary consortium contributions. (We would leave the strong implication that any shortfall between the cost of this wheat and the total of real additional aid will be deducted from our consortium contribution.)

5. Before the announcement, have Freeman, Katzenbach, and Gaud brief the Congressional leadership, the Chairmen, and ranking minority members of the foreign affairs committees, the agriculture committees and the appropriations committees. If there is a howl of protest, they should report back to you before making the announcement.

This solution would:

• —leave it open for you later either to ship more wheat or to cut back for domestic political reasons;
• —keep the heat on the Indians and the other consortium members; and
• —give you maximum protection—though none too much—with the Congress.

I think all your advisers would support this plan, though you may wish to check it with Secretary Rusk.

A final word, Mr. President.

With all its imperfections, this has been a remarkable exercise you have mounted. These are the results.

1. Australia entered and Canada confirmed the legitimacy of being in the food-aid business—ending the notion once and for all that food aid was a question of U.S. surpluses.

2. France, Japan, Germany, Scandinavia, Belgium, the U.K., the Netherlands, and Italy accepted the legitimacy, in principle, of their contributing to food aid with either food production resources or money.

3. At the time of great difficulty in generating aid funds, we all managed somehow to keep enough foreign exchange flowing to permit India to continue the relaxation of bureaucratic controls.

4. We have embedded in Indian policy firmly a top priority for agriculture.

5. We have engaged the World Bank for the first time in the food aid business on the consortium principle and have a basis for keeping it there on that principle—which guarantees reasonable burden-sharing in the future.

6. If you wished to proceed with the full 1.5 million tons for, say, domestic price reasons—I believe a viable case could be made.³

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. IV. Confidential.
2. At Tabs A and B were undated draft matching arguments.
3. Jim Jones added a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads: “Appeals to me. Do not mention w prices.” The quote apparently reflects President Johnson’s response to Rostow’s recommendation to authorize the shipment of 1 million tons of wheat. On September 1 the White House released a statement to the press that confirmed the President’s decision to authorize the shipment of an additional 1 million tons of wheat to India. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 765–766. When he was informed of the decision, Ambassador Nehru’s response was “thank God.” (Memorandum from Walt Rostow to the President, September 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 40, September 1–10, 1967) On September 9 Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture Jagjivan Ram wrote to Secretary Freeman to express the gratitude of his government for the shipment of grain. (Ibid., Vol. 41, September 11–14, 1967)