Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

418. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach¹

Washington, January 27, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Indian Food Mission

Our party returned late Wednesday² night from Tokyo, New Delhi, Rome, Paris, Bonn, London, The Hague and Brussels.³ The list of capitals includes all the members of the Indian Aid Consortium except Austria and Canada. Austria has been consulted by the Ambassador, and Canada has been briefed in advance.

Our posture throughout was that we were appearing in support of requests made by the Government of India, whose Ambassadors did in fact appear in each instance, and make the necessary case for aid. We explained that we were undertaking confidential consultations, as part of the process through which our Government and others could reach decisions on emergency food aid to India. We told the host governments that the President was considering a message to Congress on the subject, but would make no decision and take no action until this round of talks was concluded. His decision, we said, would turn in considerable part on the views of other governments.

Except for Bonn, which will report its views within a few days, all the governments we saw authorized us to report:

1. That feeding India during the period of its transition to self-sufficiency in food should be accepted as an international responsibility;

2. That the consortium is a practical and successful device which should be used at this time;

3. That the emergency food plan for India should not be allowed to diminish the flow of resources coming forward under other development programs, but should be considered additional to the targets for each country suggested by the I.B.R.D.;

4. That in general the arithmetic we suggested seemed acceptable as a working basis for consideration, although it should be stressed that no government made a firm promise to meet its consortium quota. Each did, however, promise to make its best efforts to find the necessary funds indicated by the consortium plan, within the limits of existing or politically possible budgets.

5. All agreed that food aid should be planned on a relatively long-term basis, in the context of India’s general economic plans, so as not to interrupt progress under those plans, or to justify a suspension of India’s trade and investment liberalization measures. Everyone agrees that if the Indians have to use a good deal of their foreign exchange for food, they will be required to suspend their trade liberalization programs, as Pakistan has done.

So far as Germany was concerned, no key ministers were in town when we arrived. We had a thorough briefing with officials and junior ministers. Their preliminary reaction was positive, despite the obvious restraint of Dr. Strauss’ budget. We were assured an early decision, both in terms of the general idea, which they found attractive, and with particular reference to the offset possibility.

The talks with the Government of India were positive. The doubts represented by Ambassador Nehru’s position here were much in evidence. But at a meeting with Indian Ministers, we were told the Government of India was entirely satisfied with our explanations, and would take full responsibility for our position. Their main concern, in terms of their own planning, and their election, was that we publicly announce a sufficient interim allocation to assure minimal food supplies for the year. We were told that rations in Bihar and Utter Pradash will be reduced to 700 calories a day.

We gave the figures about our own probable participation in the program only to Agriculture Minister Subramanian and to L.K. Jha over drinks at the Ambassador’s house at the end of the day. The thought that we should now make an interim allocation of only 1 million tons fell like a stone. They said it would be exploited badly in the election. “Look”, people would say, “those candidates have relied on the Americans, and this is all they could get.” Subramanian emphasized that the pipeline would run out in March, and that there was literally nothing in sight for him to plan on at the moment except for what we could do now, and Canada later.

With these considerations in mind, we strongly recommend a present interim allocation of 2 million tons. Anything less might spoil the political effect of the message in India; weaken Subramanian and other staunch friends; and, in some Indian minds, justify undoing trade liberalization.

We believe the results obtained in these talks justify going forward with the proposal as planned in the earlier drafts of the message. If the message is to be released early next week, we should inform each of the consortium governments in advance, as well as Australia. We should also explore the possibilities of approaching the U.S.S.R. A separate message should go to the Government of India. We expect that follow-up work by the Indians and by our Embassies, together with the effect on each government of the favorable decision of others—notably the German commitment for $35 million, which we hope to obtain soon—should help move the total level of commitments towards a reasonable pattern of sharing.

We are not able at this time to estimate these contributions with any degree of certainty; the most we can say is that food assistance mobilized under the Consortium will not be effectively translated into significant food grain deliveries before the second half of calendar 1967, and may, although substantial in amount, even then fall short of our goal of $120 million.

The group accompanying me on the trip worked extremely well and enthusiastically. And the help of our Ambassadors and Embassy staffs was superb. They had prepared the way with imagination and zest, and I am sure they will follow up well.

Recommendations:

We recommend:

1. That the President proceed with his message to Congress for an international and additive effort to meet India’s food needs under the general supervision of the World Bank Consortium.

2. That he announce in the message an interim allocation of 2 million tons of food grains to help fill the food gap of the next few months,⁴ avoid endangering Subramaniam and others we support, and permit India to plan without suspending its trade liberalization measures. (Note. Under Secretary Schnittker calls attention to the alternative possibility of providing an interim allocation of 1 million tons now and another 1 million tons a month from now.)

3. That he also announce the approval⁵ of a $25 million grant under the PL–480 Title II for distribution by CARE and other voluntary agencies. The mission was asked about this program in New Delhi and its need seems clearly indicated.

4. That the President authorize the initiation of interim allocations of food grains by reimbursable Purchase Authorizations (PAs) so that shipments can begin immediately even though it will take several weeks to complete an agreement with India.

5. That we be authorized to proceed forthwith to work with the I.B.R.D. in planning the next meeting or meetings of the consortium, and in following up all member governments with Bank help to get government positions as firm as possible before the meeting.

Eugene V. Rostow

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/Rostow. Secret. Concurred in by Schnittker. Sent to the President under a January 27 memorandum from Katzenbach, stating, “I am authorized to say that Secretary Freeman and Administrator Gaud approve the recommendations in the report, as I do.”
2. January 25.
3. Reporting telegrams from Rostow detailing the progress of his mission, which began in Tokyo on January 16, are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/Rostow and SOC 10 INDIA.
4. Another copy of this memorandum was revised by President Johnson to read: “1 million tons of food grains … of the next month” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India’s Food Problem, Vol. 3)
5. Johnson changed recommendation 3 to read “That he also ask for the approval …”