Office of the Historian

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1

Rome, January 20, 1967, 0837Z.

3769. Pass White House, AID, USDA/AmEmbassy New Delhi. From Rostow and Schnittker. During a private conversation Thursday evening with Messrs. Subramaniam and L.K. Jha, the Ambassador and Leonard Weiss also being present, our tentative planning figures from American participation in the 1967 food delivery program for India were revealed in strict confidence. Both Jha and Subramaniam strongly urged an interim allocation at least sufficient to carry India’s minimal food deliveries through June, taking other sources of supply into account.

Problem of deliveries during second quarter of CY 67 also arose several times during our earlier discussions with Indians. They made point that all food deliveries in sight during first quarter totaled 2.3 million tons which is below target of 850,000 tons per month. To compensate for these shortfalls and reduced offloadings during monsoon GOI requires million ton arrivals monthly between April and June to meet 10 million ton target for year.

As of now, with exception of Canadian offer and indicated interim US allocation no deliveries in sight after March. Subramaniam estimated needs during second quarter to be 3 million tons and both he and Jha urged that an interim allocation of only one million tons announced now would be politically dangerous especially for officials and ministers closely identified with economic liberalization policies.

Pending assurance of supplies for April–June GOI considering a further cut in allocation to states during February which would reduce quotas to Bihar and in ration areas to 700 calories a day. Other subjects discussed during conversation will be covered in telegrams from Embassy Delhi.2

Reinhardt
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, SOC 10 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Passed to the White House at 8 a.m.↩
  2. In a January 23 memorandum to Freeman, Schnittker also reported he found that Subramaniam and other Indian officials had grave reservations about supporting the idea of funneling food assistance to India through the India consortium. They were also concerned about the self-help requirements of the new Food for Peace legislation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. V)↩