Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 1, 1964, 6:13 p.m.

1456. Kashmir. Following summary FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.

Secretary met with Foreign Secretary Bhutto April 29.² Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador G. Ahmed and Minister Iftikar Ali. Assistant Secretary Talbot also present.

Secretary opened conversation by expressing appreciation for Bhutto’s help in getting agreement on CENTO communiqué.

Bhutto said he would like to start with Kashmir situation. UN Rep Bunche had talked to Ayub during his recent visit subcontinent and told Ayub he had not known how critical situation was until he had visited Kashmir. He had been struck by intensity of feeling on issue. Ayub replied he hoped Bunche appreciated GOP’s problem of keeping lid on those who demand action on Kashmir problem.

GOP viewed release of Sheikh Abdullah as due to two factors, upsurge of feeling in Indian-held Kashmir following the loss of the Sacred Relic, and “our modest efforts in the Security Council.” Credit goes, however, to Security Council itself and its members.

Bhutto noted that US had had reservations about timing of Security Council debates in February and March and added “time has shown debates were helpful.” Climax is now approaching. Security Council can assist in arriving at settlement of issue.³ One could not expect anything miraculous but could expect some action to bring together parties to dispute to discuss problem, i.e., Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru and Ayub. It would be difficult for any of parties to take initiative however. This would not be true if Security Council requested talks. Bhutto personally out of touch due recent travels but his “tentative ideas” were as follows: There should be Security Council session. Short speeches would be necessary to bring record up to date. Council should then take some action to inject its authority into situation. Would be premature to send out SYG as mediator. However he could visit subcontinent personally and encourage talks between parties. Bhutto said he had discussed this idea with Butler⁴ who thought it was reasonable. Bhutto then asked, “Does this appeal to you?”

Secretary asked what clues GOP had as to influence of Nehru’s illness on situation. He assumed it was considerable. Bhutto replied “So they say.” Secretary remarked he had impression Shastri now more influential in foreign affairs. Bhutto replied, “Yes, but Security Council could strengthen his hands.” A fair proposal coming from Security Council would do this and would bring world opinion to bear. On other hand, inaction would provide Indians with further opportunity to proceed with integration of Kashmir. Secretary noted release of Sheikh Abdullah must have introduced major new element into situation and Indians must have recognized this. Secretary asked for Bhutto’s assessment of why Abdullah was released at this time. Bhutto replied Indians had probably released him to let off some of steam built up in Kashmir; his release sooner or later was inevitable. One theory was Sadiq⁵ had timed release so as to have Sheikh Abdullah eclipse Bakshi, Sadiq’s personal rival. Of course Sadiq could also take credit for a popular measure. Another theory was that the release was planned to coincide with passage of a bill further integrating Kashmir into India. Personally he believed first theory more plausible.

Secretary said he thought SYG had standing authority to go out to subcontinent if he were willing. Bhutto replied it would depend on members of Security Council. Talbot added “and parties to dispute.” Bhutto said no, only members. India and Pakistan not members of Council and India has opposed past resolutions. Repeated he not asking for mediation by SYG, just that he get in touch with parties and go and assess situation which threatens peace of area. Ambassador Ahmed added India would not object; it could not object. Requirement now was to lend authority of Security Council to SYG role. He should act under new authority, not under continuing authority.

Secretary inquired about expectation at last SC meeting of what next session would do. Bhutto replied that effort to reach consensus had broken down on language in operative part. The phrase “UN action” had not been acceptable to his Government. Said that if Council goes back to consensus route his instructions were to procure a reference to “wishes of the Kashmiri people in accordance with UN resolutions.” Bhutto also expressed view that if SYG visits subcontinent he should certainly see Sheikh Abdullah. In reply to a question Bhutto also said it was not clear whether Sheikh Abdullah was talking about self-determination for all of Kashmir, though he seemed to have made an oblique reference to Azad Kashmir as one of the four regions of Kashmir.

Secretary asked if Paks sufficiently confident about results of any plebiscite to agree to any number of options being put to people of Kashmir so long as one is accession to Pakistan? Bhutto replied yes. There is hope in Sheikh Abdullah’s statements but he is vague as to what he wants. This is not true of people of Kashmir, even in Jammu.

Secretary noted situation now in motion and offers opportunities, but this probably not due so much to Security Council as Bhutto seemed believe. Bhutto replied “We cannot get solution only with Security Council, nor without Security Council.” Secretary said he would talk with Ambassador Stevenson and work out our position,⁶ also we should hear from New Delhi on Sheikh Abdullah’s talk with Nehru. At close of conversation he added it would be hard to find any question whose solution would give us greater satisfaction.

Remainder of conversation was on other topics and is being reported in separate telegrams.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs Harold Josif on April 30, cleared by Special Assistant for UN Planning Elmore Jackson in IO, and approved by Grant. Also sent to New Delhi, London, and USUN.
2. Bhutto was in Washington for the CENTO Ministerial meetings.
3. The UN Security Council was scheduled to begin reconsideration of the Kashmir issue on May 5.
4. British Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler.
5. G.M. Sadiq, Prime Minister of Kashmir, succeeded G.M. Bakshi in October 1963.
6. In the wake of Rusk’s conversation with Bhutto, the Department sent a message to USUN informing the Mission that the consensus statement approach followed before the Security Council adjourned no longer seemed viable. The Department felt that the minimum Pakistan could reasonably expect from the renewed Security Council debate was an outcome reminding the Indian Government that they were not conducting negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah in a vacuum nor with unlimited time. (Telegram 2833 to USUN, May 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1, INDIA–PAK/UN)