40. Memorandum of Conversation1

PRESENT

  • General Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • General Musa, Pakistan
  • Brigadier Gul Hassan Khan, Pakistan
  • Brigadier Ismail Khan, Pakistan
1.
The conversation began with General Taylor asking General Musa whether he had been able to see all the US officials whom he had hoped to see during his visit. General Musa stated that he had seen Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Solbert and General Wood.2 The latter had spent two hours with him and they were able to discuss “the letter.”3 General Musa reported that General Wood gave him a general indication of the 64–65 MAP which included no increase in the current ceiling. General Wood also emphasized that the entire program was contingent on the availability of funds and as a result General Musa felt little progress had been made.
2.
General Taylor observed that he was glad General Musa had had the opportunity to make the same points to General Wood as he had made earlier to General Taylor. That even though General Musa might feel no progress had been made an exchange of frank views was usually helpful.
3.
General Musa advised General Taylor that during his frank discussion with General Wood the latter informed him of the US intent to provide two squadrons of F 104’s during the period CY 1965–1966, provided the political climate was satisfactory at the time. General Musa then told General Taylor that he was not happy with the condition now being attached to a military program. He felt that it removed the [Page 94] charm and grace which exists between the military in our two countries. General Musa was so concerned about this that he had discussed it with FM Bhutto who in turn agreed and said he would take the matter up with Secretary Rusk later in the day.
4.
General Taylor advised General Musa that this was not really a condition in the sense described by General Musa but was a fact of life. As General Musa should by now be well aware, US Congressional reaction to MAP is influenced significantly by the political actions of our friends.
5.
General Musa raised the subject of the “7th Fleet Units” currently in the Indian Ocean and stated that Pakistan’s position on this subject is apparently misunderstood in Washington. General Musa said that there was never any intent on the part of Pakistan to give the impression that the “7th Fleet” was not welcome in the area.
6.
General Taylor agreed that he thought the official Pakistan position had been factually reported to Washington, however it was entirely possible that the Pak press had confused the issue for some people.
7.

General Musa reported that General Adams had been very kind to him and had spent considerable time over a two day period discussing the “exercise.”4 General Musa has decided that the US is apprehensive on two points concerning advance planning for this exercise and that this explains our reluctance to agree to planning. He described the two points as:

a.
“We want you to plan against India.”
b.
“The forces agreed to in the plan would mean a commitment of US forces.”

General Musa then emphasized that planning does not mean a commitment. The upshot of his meetings with General Adams is that he will take the exercise scenario home for discussions with his President.

8.
General Taylor suggested that in view of the short time remaining it might be best to postpone the exercise, that such exercises are normally arranged and budgeted for at least a year ahead. General Taylor asked General Musa to make it entirely clear that the US is not pressing this exercise on Pakistan.
9.
The conversation ended with General Musa advising that he has hopes of seeing the Secretary of Defense, in fact he had postponed his departure for two additional days in this endeavor.
10.
General Taylor said he knew the Secretary of Defense would be pleased to see General Musa provided the Secretary’s schedule would allow.
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Pakistan 091.112. Secret. Prepared by Commander John J. Shanahan of the Chairman’s Staff Group on April 30. The conversation was held in General Taylor’s office.
  2. General Robert J. Wood, USA, Director for Military Assistance under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
  3. Reference is to a letter from General Musa to General Taylor concerning the military assistance program for Pakistan. This letter, which has not been found, was discussed in a meeting between Taylor and Musa on April 22. Musa stated that the letter was intended to offer constructive suggestions and was not meant to criticize U.S. efforts. Musa added, however, that the fact that India had received as much military assistance during the past 7 months as Pakistan had received in 7 years was creating political problems for President Ayub. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Pakistan 091.112)
  4. Reference is to a proposed joint U.S.-Pakistan military exercise described by Pentagon planners as a mobility exercise. The proposal was discussed by General Taylor during his visit to Pakistan in December 1963, and again by General Taylor and General Musa during their conversation on April 22. The intent underlying the proposal was to help relieve Pakistani concerns about the U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security.