Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

395. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson¹

Washington, November 28, 1966.

SUBJECT

• India—Analysis Team Report—Recommendation

ENCLOSURE

• Team Report²

1. The enclosed is self-explanatory. The team sought to make it objective and quantitative with a minimum of subjective evaluations. Particular attention was given to measuring whether India had met the commitments made by Minister Subramaniam at Rome. In certain cases commitments as to action were implicit rather than explicit. In these cases the effort applied was evaluated accordingly.

The sections on the Food Situation include both objective evaluation and some judgments.

The political situation is more in the area of State than Agriculture. Nonetheless, I felt you would welcome opinions from the last credible source “on the ground.”

2. My evaluation of the Report is as follows:

A. The Indians have met their clear cut commitments. The record is not a complete 100 percent where results are concerned but they have come close and have, I believe, sincerely tried to deliver.

B. The food situation is grave. Two million tons of grain must come from somewhere between mid-January when the pipeline runs out and April, when the spring crop comes in. (How much relief the spring crop will give remains to be seen.) Otherwise there will be starvation in India during that period. The balance of the year will have to be considered separately.

3. Alternatives—There are four possible ways to get the 2 million tons of grain:

A. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Indians could get it by the use of military force internally to procure in the surplus states. But this would postpone, not lessen, the total requirement for imported grain in 1967. The President can best judge the politics of such a course of action. Subramaniam’s analysis is carried in the Report.

B. It is possible that Canada could ship some in time to help. Australia is another possibility. So far neither France nor Russia have given encouragement. It is not likely that any combination of these could get the 2 million tons needed in the next few months.

C. India might buy commercially. One hundred million dollars would buy about 1.5 million tons of wheat and a third more grain sorghum. India’s free foreign exchange reserves are estimated at 150 to 200 million dollars. The President can best judge the practicality of India using these reserves in light of the economic development program.

D. The United States. However, the logistics of moving grain from the U.S. are such (6 weeks at a minimum) that there is a real threat of famine if we wait to see what other countries do, and whether India will take the necessary steps to procure internally or buy outside commercially.

The Team reported to me that Minister Subramaniam outlined his three alternative courses of action:

A. A contribution from the United States at the level of recent months.

B. A reduced contribution from the United States supplemented by a commercial purchase.

C. Use military force for internal procurement and supplement by commercial purchase.

He stated that he knew exactly what he would have to do under each alternative. He asked that the U.S. make up its mind so he would know what alternative to follow.

4. Political

I do not feel competent to pass judgment on the political situation not having been exposed directly for 6 months. Mrs. Jacobson who is an experienced political observer reports that it is most sensitive and that the current government will likely stand or fall on the food question and whether the U.S. acts promptly. The Team reported to me that Subramaniam said that the present government would be defeated if the Army was used for compulsory procurement. He predicts that under such circumstances he would not be re-elected.

5. Recommendations

A. I would recommend that an interim allocation be made promptly. On the record the Indians have met their commitment made to the U.S. at Rome. They are trying hard. Agriculture today is clearly the number 1 item (perhaps as much as defense) in their planning and budgeting.

In 1965 the U.S. allotted 6 million tons of food grain to India. The Indian “self-help” effort in 1966 merits, in my judgment, a continuation of shipments at least at that level. We have shipped 3.2 million tons so far in this fiscal year. The 2 million tons I recommend be allotted between now and mid-February would fall within the 6 million ton level of 1965. Such an allocation could be made at once or in two segments—1 million tons immediately and the second million could be made subject to the confirmation of the Congressional team that India is making an adequate agricultural effort and couldn’t get the grain from any other source in time to prevent disaster.

B. Any allocation should be made under strict conditions. It should be clear that the continuation and strengthening of self-help efforts is a condition. Negotiations on self-help should begin soon to be completed following the Indian election. Any further allocation should depend on clear and definite Indian commitments to take further specific steps to strengthen their agriculture.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. III. No classification marking.
2. Attached was a November 27 report from Martin E. Abel and Arthur T. Thompson to Freeman entitled “Evaluation of Agricultural Self-Help Efforts and Review of Food Situation in India.”