Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

394. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President’s Special Assistant and Chief of Staff (Moyers)¹

New Delhi, November 28, 1966, 1106Z.

7126. 1. Because I felt that we have done all that we can do through regular channels to communicate the importance to U.S. interests in India of keeping the grain pipe line full and because USDA team is now making its report, we have been sending in only routine reporting cables.

2. However as this emergency grows I am taking the liberty of cabling you directly and privately because I want to be absolutely sure that those close to the President and the President himself understand the agonizing political-economic situation which is building up here in India. In view of the turmoil of Manila, the US elections, the continuing Viet-Nam crisis and some unpleasant surgery, it would not be surprising if the full implications of our messages have failed to filter through.

3. Here is the situation as briefly and soberly as I can state it: by next Wednesday or Thursday the Indian Cabinet will have to decide whether or not to cut the already meager rations on which some 120 million people largely in the urban areas are living in order to spread the available supplies over a longer period.

Under the very best of circumstances the moderate pro-democracy Congress Party is bound to face severe losses in the elections in February. If the already inadequate daily foodgrain ration to these 120 million people is cut these losses will be significantly greater and the prospect of a government emerging which is closer to the U.S. will diminish sharply.

4. I have been making a vigorous and continuing effort through background talks with the Indian press and key Indian officials to temper the current fears, insecurity and distrust. Thus far the Indian press and GOI spokesmen, including Mrs. Gandhi,² have been remarkably moderate. However as starvation deaths grow significantly and the electioneering climate takes over, such restraints will be cast aside and moderation will go by the board.

5. Although I do not know the real reasons for the delay I surmise from newspaper dope stories out of Washington and from various visitors that several factors are involved. Following are some of them with my comments:

A. India is not doing enough to help herself. Although India after 200 years of stagnation is not doing everything it should in agriculture, it is doing far more than we dreamed it could do two years ago. This is the consensus of every qualified observer who has had a first hand look (including experts for the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the World Bank and our own mission). India’s water development still lags and adequate credit facilities are lacking in many areas but even here the prospects for progress are encouraging.

Unless I am profoundly mistaken India will be close to foodgrain self-sufficiency by 1971 and in a balanced food position by 1975.

Although it may properly be charged that the Indians should have given agriculture a much higher priority several years ago we ourselves carry a certain responsibility for the delay.

In the 1950’s the economic assistance policies of the USG in India were not designed to make India self-sustaining in foods but consciously or unconsciously to preserve India as a dumping ground for PL 480 food surpluses which at that time seemed limitless. It has only been during the last three years that the USG has itself faced the Indian food situation realistically and attempted to deal with it vigorously.

B. India should ask others besides Uncle Sam. India has been pressing all nations in a position to help vigorously in the last few weeks, and some of these nations will probably come through (Canada, Australia, perhaps even Soviets). However, no nation other than U.S. is in a position to keep the food grain pipe lines full during the next crucial 90 days.

C. The necessary food is available in India, if only the surplus states would give it up to the needy areas. This story, which seems to have originated with a Warren Unna article, is based on gross misinformation. The Indian Government has been vigorously procuring in the few surplus states in desperate effort to maintain rations in large urban areas throughout India and at the same time boost deliveries to famine-torn Bihar and up.

D. Mrs. Gandhi is unfairly critical of U.S. policies in Viet-Nam. I more than almost anyone else can sympathize with the President’s frustration over the vagaries and contradictions of India’s foreign policies; the Moscow communiqué was particularly irritating as I told Mrs. Gandhi in a blunt personal letter the day after the communiqué was signed. However, this situation is not new. India’s non-alignment evolved out of the independence movement and has been in full bloom now for nineteen years. (Note: It took us Americans forty years and two world wars to learn the folly of isolationism.)

Moreover if we can avoid undue strain on our relations with India now I believe that there is a better than even chance that the new government which will be formed after the elections will adopt a posture more favorable to us in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Many key Indian political leaders, some of whom may emerge with greatly enhanced influence following the election, already have a keen appreciation for what U.S. is trying to do there. Last week Blitz and the Communist press were in an uproar because the Indian Government told the North Viet-Nam representative here in India not to release a statement critical of the U.S. which had been prepared for the press.

In any event, the appearance that U.S. is delaying food shipments because of displeasure with India’s Viet-Nam policy which has been created by leaked news stories out of Washington simply sets off a strong chauvinistic reaction here which plays into the hands of those who most strenuously oppose our policy.

6. Nevertheless, even if one were to concede these arguments and, I must emphasize that all but the last run wholly counter to the evidence available to us and the qualified analysts and observers who have recently gone over the ground, one absolutely fundamental question remains: is the United States with its traditional commitment to human welfare going to stand by idly in the face of a major and increasingly apparent human disaster in India and permit that disaster to occur? This question will necessarily be answered by our action, or inaction, in the next ten days. Whatever we decide to do thereafter, no matter on what scale or priority, will come only after starvation has become inevitable to an unknown number of people barely living today in the Bihar area. It will not be long before our TV screens and front pages will be overflowing with grim pictures and stories of this tragic situation.

7. As far as India is concerned our failure to act will provide a bonanza political opportunity for the Communists and lose us the respect and confidence of even the moderate groups in one of the few remaining democratic nations in Asia and Africa, confidence which hae been painstakingly built up over the past two decades. With all our power and wealth we simply cannot permit our moral leadership, to which the President has personally contributed so much, to be gravely and perhaps irreparably damaged by allowing Indians to starve while we wait for still more facts.

8. By now Martin Abel of the Department of Agriculture, who knows India well and who, as you know, has been making an intensive study of the food situation here during the last ten days, has reported to Orville Freeman who I assume will then report directly to the President. Unless I am mistaken, Abel’s analysis and also Dorothy Jacobson’s will coincide in most respects with our own.

9. I earnestly hope that based on this additional information the President will release the emergency grain necessary to maintain the pipeline flow at least well into March. This will see us beyond the election and through a dangerous crisis period in which both we and they can be grievously hurt, and leave time for a sober consideration of our 1967 Indian food plan. If we are forced to cut down this coming year on our shipments to India let’s do it next fall and not now.

10. One possible approach that might allow us to meet the current emergency while protecting our Congressional rear is as follows:

A. Announce soonest that we are releasing 500,000 tons of wheat and milo on an emergency basis with the understanding that the Indians will pay for it with their own money if we should decide to discontinue the food aid program.

B. Ask the Congressional delegation headed by Bob Pogue and Walter Mondale which is coming out here in two weeks to give the President their judgment immediately following their visit of the importance of extending this emergency program by an additional million and a half tons of foodgrains. This would cover period until President can consult in early January with Congressional leaders or secure a new joint resolution if this is indicated.

C. Postpone decision on the 1967 food aid program for India until after Congress has had an opportunity to take suitable action in January. The 2 million tons will alleviate need for further decisions until late January.

11. If this personal message adds nothing new to what the President already knows please file and forget it. However if you feel it can be helpful in further clarifying the situation please use it as you think best.

12. Believe me, Bill, I would not send this personal plea for action if I were not very deeply concerned by what may be ahead.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Eyes Only. The message was [text not declassified] addressed to the White House, Eyes Only Bill Moyers.
2. The Associated Press reported from New Delhi on November 26 that Prime Minister Gandhi told the Press Club of India that India had been forced to seek food from other parts of the world because of a delay by the United States in signing a new P.L. 480 agreement. She said the delay was purportedly because India was not making sufficient efforts to increase its food production, but she denied that this was the case. As a result of the reduced flow of grain from abroad, she said that the government was considering a cut in grain rations to the Indian people in order to provide more food for the drought-affected areas of the country. (Ibid., NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. III)