Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

388. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, November 8, 1966.

6826. For the Secretary from Ambassador Bowles. Reference: New 6660;² State 80047.³

1. I appreciate your strictly eyes only cable on the Indian food situation. As you point out, we are facing heavy demands from many directions and something has to give. Against this background I shall take up your points one by one.

A. Our cable 6660 on India’s current agricultural performance is the result of a thorough study by all elements of our mission here plus lengthy discussions with everyone we could find in India who might have an enlightened opinion or reliable knowledge of Indian agriculture. Our analysis was specifically checked against the broad knowledge of Bernie Bell, who has been in India for the last sixty days heading the World Bank Study Group which has been exhaustively studying the Indian economic and agricultural situations since September 1964 and which will soon report to the consortium. Bell himself fully supports our findings as does Sir John Crawford, the eminent Australian agricultural economist now in Delhi as a member of the World Bank team. Both Bell and Crawford will underscore these views when they reach Washington in the next two or three weeks following the consortium meeting in Paris. I suggest you talk to them and judge for yourself.

B. Frankly and confidentially what particularly worries me is the fact that the most sober and balanced analysis we can develop here has on several occasions been undercut by hearsay reports by people who had not been here or whose information is fragmentary. For instance when I was in Washington the President told me he understood that India is falling down badly on its fertilizer program. When I ran this down I discovered that this story grew out of someone’s interpretation of India’s reluctance to extend its March 1, 1967 deadline for the special incentives to new private sector plants, a reluctance which I explained in our 6660 as reflecting India’s judgement that by holding to this date for the time being it might induce quicker decisions by the fertilizer companies.

C. May I repeat that our report on the unprecedented revolution now occurring in Indian agriculture is an accurate, balanced and considered one, fully supported by the findings of every foreign agricultural expert whom we know in India. India’s recent performance, while not perfect, is substantially ahead of anything we anticipated. In the language of Bill Gaud’s memorandum to Walt Rostow of October 7, 1966,⁴ it is “incomparably better than in any previous year.”

2. I am aware of and concerned by the shortages in our own available stocks of wheat and other claims on our resources.

A. The needs here are desperate and are so recognized by everyone concerned. As far as priorities are concerned we must take into account the possibility of India disintegrating under the economic and political pressures set in motion by the adverse monsoon throughout most of India last year and compounded by a monsoon this year which has failed even more dismally in an area inhabited by 100 million people.

B. It should be stressed that India is prepared to take large amounts of milo, which I understand we have in substantial supply as well as any other edible grains. I hope that with our existing supplies we will be able to meet India’s minimum requirements during the first half of 1967, and that by the latter half increased supplies as result 30 per cent expansion US wheat acreage will be sufficient to satisfy remaining needs until the harvest a year from now. While I fully appreciate our desire to avoid any further reduction in our foodgrain stockpile, we may have to weigh the adverse implications of such temporary reduction against the importance of keeping people alive and avoiding the disintegration of the largest and most strategically placed non-Communist nation in Asia.

3. Last night the Canadian High Commissioner told me that Canada had been asked to provide 2 million tons of wheat and that it was his impression that his government would agree. He thought that one million tons would be on an outright grant basis as in the case of Canadian shipments this year and the second million would be on long term credit. The Australians and French also tell me they have been asked for wheat. The French Ambassador said he thought his government would react favorably. I hope that the Australians can also be persuaded to provide assistance in view of their favorable crop.

A. I recognize the political problems that would be created by India purchasing large amounts of grain for hard currency from others while receiving grain on a concessional basis from US. I have no knowledge of what the Soviet Union will do. However, since they have had a good crop, I would not be surprised to see them come up with some well-timed gesture.

B. India will obviously have to secure whatever she needs by whatever means. We must remember that we have a crucial stake in seeing that the foreign exchange required to keep India’s economy moving is not completely diverted into famine relief; Soviet political interests, as they see them, may lie in precisely the opposite direction. In any case, we have never allowed the greed and short-sightedness of other nations to set a ceiling on our performance, and this is no time to start.

4. I know you will agree that no nation, however enlightened its leadership, can change its foreign policy overnight. Thirty years after our own isolationist policies had become irrelevant, Congress voted to deny France and Britain the military equipment necessary to defend themselves against the Nazis. Similarly, India is still clinging doggedly to the sterile premises of the Bandung Conference. The so-called Non-Aligned Summit Meeting here in Delhi was a ridiculous performance: there will probably be more silly gestures in the future.

A. However we should not underestimate the progress we have made in India on foreign policy matters. The biggest circulation dailies [garble—invariably?] criticized the Moscow communiqué: criticism of the recent Yugoslav-UAR-India communiqué was even more devastating. In the last year, partly due to our own efforts here, a large number of key Indian journalists have visited East Asia including Viet-Nam. As far as I know their reports in every instance have been strongly sympathetic with our interests in Asia. Under separate cover I shall send you recent articles which reflect this profound shift in thinking.

B. There is no doubt in my mind that if we get into a war with China, India will, reluctantly to be sure, be dragged in on our side much as we were dragged into two world wars in support of the French and the British. In the meantime India will continue to be frustrating, difficult and inconsistent reflecting the inner conflicts of a new nation facing staggering problems and possessing, not unnaturally, a vast sense of insecurity and a realization of its own relative weakness.

C. While the Indians look to us hopefully for support, they are by no means taking us for granted. They are keenly aware of the inadequacy of our supplies and of our emphasis on performance as a precondition for assistance. They have experienced the suspension of our aid and our short-tether policy of doling out PL480 a few months at a time, a policy which whatever its advantages has made rational long-term planning in India impossible. As we reported, the GOI has come under extremely heavy attack for its so-called dependence on the US for PL480 and other assistance. As a consequence, the government has been extremely hesitant to approach us for additional assistance; if anything, it has recently underestimated its needs in dealings with us.

5. Tomorrow I shall send a cable to you and the President outlining my deep anxiety about the political and economic situation here.⁵ I do not exaggerate when I say the future of India, with its democratic promise and economic potential, is hanging in the balance. What is at stake is not only India’s stability but its future relationships with US and other Western nations; these will be profoundly affected by developments in the next six months.

6. The 2 million tons of wheat and milo which I recommended in late August is still being held in abeyance. Even if the President approves it today a significant slowdown in the arrival of food ships here will be inevitable by mid-January, which is the very time when the food shortage will be most critical and with the election only one month away political tensions most acute.

7. It is absolutely essential, Dean, that we keep these food grains flowing and that we take a fresh long term look at the importance of a stable friendly India to American security interests in Asia. If India lapses into chaos or antipathy, and in my opinion these are very real possibilities, the massive sacrifice we are making in Vietnam will lose much of its meaning. I know that we can count on you to do everything possible at what I really believe to be a crucial moment. With warm personal regards.⁶

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Secret; Nodis: Eyes Only. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.
2. See footnote 2, Document 386.
3. Document 386.
4. Reference is to an October 8 memorandum from Gaud to Rostow assessing Indian agricultural performance. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. III)
5. Telegram 6843 from New Delhi, November 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA)
6. In a November 9 memorandum to the President, Rostow characterized this cable from Bowles as a “vivid, somewhat overstated, but essentially accurate account of the nature and seriousness of the situation created by the crop failure in the state of Bihar and neighboring areas.” He added that Ambassador Nehru had called him to warn that starvation was expected in India by February unless the flow of U.S. grain was resumed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India’s Food Problem, Vol. II)