Office of the Historian

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, November 7, 1966, 1:37 p.m.

80047. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Re your 6660,2 I believe I should let you know very privately that we have some major problems back here about reproducing in 1967 anything like the food shipments we made to India during 1966 and that we should not let the Indian Government take it for granted that we can be a source for such food in advance of any decisions actually made.

It comes as a deep disappointment that “imports from abroad must at least equal those of calendar year 1966.” The following questions are going to be highly relevant back here:

1.
How good is Indian performance on their own commitments? Your 6660 is most helpful but indications of any failure to make the maximum effort could be very damaging here.
2.
Our own prospective supply situation is not encouraging in terms of repeating next year what we did this year. Quite apart from actual production and wheat stocks, it was necessary for us to be much more restrictive on a number of other countries this past year because of Indian requirements. It will not be easy for us to continue this policy without deep injury in other places.
3.
What are the prospects for India’s obtaining substantial amounts of food from other sources? In this case, it will not be very agreeable here for the Indians to use their available foreign exchange to buy in other markets and leave it to us to come forward with major concessional food shipments. They at least ought to offer to buy in our market. If, for example, they purchase large quantities of grain from the Soviet Union on relatively hard terms, it would create serious questions as to why they should not buy in our market on similar terms. Similarly, it will be important for them to get concessional help of substantial amounts from others. What do you know about Indian plans in this regard?
4.

While we must avoid the overt impression of political conditions, the truth is that India has a political constituency in the US which it must nourish if it expects substantial concessional help. This is simply a political fact of life since the President has no resources except those made available by Congress and this in turn is affected by the general political atmosphere. I am sure you realize that the gratuitous departure of India from a position of non-alignment in Viet-Nam does not help at all. I cannot understand why the Indians cannot simply support the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 and the idea of a peaceful settlement. The Moscow communiqué and the demand for a unilateral cessation of bombing are complicating factors which should not be underestimated.

I mention these factors because they bear upon paragraph eleven of your 6232.3 It would be most unfortunate if the government leadership should proceed on the basis that they can somehow rely upon us at the end of the day to come through with whatever is required. If they face a repeat of their 1966 situation, they have some formidable problems to solve and should not be in the mood to take us for granted. Anything that you can send us on the above or other related points will be greatly appreciated.

Warm regards.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Rusk on November 6, cleared by Hare and Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk.↩
  2. Telegram 6660 from New Delhi, November 4, was sent by Bowles to the President and Secretaries Rusk and Freeman to put the “critical Indian food situation” in clear perspective. In the 10-page cable, Bowles described the crisis facing India and the need for U.S. help to avert a tragedy. He credited the Indian Government for its strenuous efforts to improve agricultural output and concluded that only repeated failure of the monsoon rains prevented a significantly expanded harvest. Bowles argued that the “short-tether” policy governing U.S. food shipments was self-defeating in that it created the impression of political pressure and gave leverage to an opposition seeking to unseat the Gandhi government with which the United States had worked closely in attempting to modernize Indian agricultural methods and open up the Indian economy. (Ibid., SOC 10 INDIA)↩
  3. Dated October 27. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 INDIA)↩