Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

384. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, November 6, 1966, 1545Z.

1751. Ref: State 71125.² Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan.

1. In meeting with Foreign Secretary Yusuf at 1700 hours November 6, called at his request on military supply policy, he stated he had talked with President Ayub following my meeting with Yusuf in Karachi on November 3 (Pindi tel 1716).³ The following is statement of Government of Pakistan. (Yusuf had hand-written statement, quite possibly prepared by Ayub, which he read to me and from which I took notes):

A. Pakistan does not want arms race with India. It wants only minimum deterrent force consistent with safety and security of country. Since minimum force depends on nature of threat, Pakistan would welcome agreement with India on arms limitation. To that end Pakistan would be willing to enter into secret talks with Government of India at place and level to be fixed by mutual consent.

B. Pakistan believes best place for talks is Delhi. The reasons are (1) that in its view this would cause less speculation than meeting by high level representatives of two countries in a third country and (2) that this would remove usual Indian ploy of delaying months to await non-existent instructions from Delhi.

C. Pakistan believes talk should be held within the framework of a political settlement and that it is therefore essential that talks on political issues (which I interpret to mean Kashmir) should proceed simultaneously with arms limitation talks. However the talks need not be by the same representatives or in the same location.

D. The Government of Pakistan has stated in the past and reiterates that it has no offensive or defensive alliance with China. The present arms agreement with China has a fixed financial limit and will be allowed to run its course. The bulk of Chinese equipment has already arrived, only a small portion is yet to come. The arrival of the remainder will be spread over a period of time.

E. To the extent Pakistan obtains military equipment from the United States in the future, her need to tap other sources will be correspondingly reduced. Pakistan would prefer equipment of U.S. origin as its people are conversant with it. They are seeking military equipment from Russia, but have not pushed this, preferring to wait to determine what may be available from United States. In view of the limitation on Pakistan’s resources, terms on which arms are supplied will be an important consideration.

F. There is now a major deficiency in Pakistan’s military equipment. This consists of (1) losses in the last war not yet filled and (2) additions to equip increased force raised since war and necessitated by Indian expansion. Pakistan does not desire equipment for expansion above its present armed force level, but only adequately to fill out equipment for Pak forces that exist today.

G. Pakistan will be willing to talk in terms of exact figures and numbers when she discusses her requirements in the event the United States determines to help her meet those requirements.

H. The President cautions that while Pakistan will enter into talks with India in good faith, these talks by their very nature can be protracted and the outcome uncertain, and she cannot delay her procurement until such time as agreement is actually reached.

I. The President again wished to raise the question of the tanks to be purchased from Germany. (Pindi tel 1615).⁴ These tanks are not additive to the tank force but are for replacement purposes. Most of Pakistan’s tanks are Sherman tanks which are no longer being made and spare parts for which are difficult to obtain. It is Pakistan’s desire to phase out these tanks, replacing them with tanks of the kind requested. Because they are excess with Germany and she has no place for them, they can be obtained for a reasonable price. Yusuf does not have numbers available but they will depend on how many Sherman tanks are to be phased and when. Yusuf can get us estimates of numbers if we desire.

2. President Ayub leaving for London morning of November 13. I am prepared return from Dacca to Karachi to talk with him about any message received from Department before that time. (Importance attached by President Ayub this subject indicated by fact Secy. Yusuf telephoned me yesterday and asked me to postpone my trip to Dacca one day in order to hold above reported meeting with him.)

Locke

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi.
2. Document 382.
3. Locke’s November 3 meeting with Yusuf was a follow up to the discussion of military supply policy with Ayub on November 1. Locke asked for a commitment by Pakistan to engage in secret arms limitation discussions with India, expressed concern over the level of defense expenditures in India and Pakistan, and asked for assurances that military supply agreements with China would be limited. (Telegram 1716 from Rawalpindi, November 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 PAK)
4. In telegram 1615 from Rawalpindi, October 28, the Embassy reported that Pakistan was seeking U.S. approval of the purchase of M–41 and M–47 tanks and 155 mm. cannon from West Germany. The Germans were reported willing to sell but only through a third party and with U.S. acquiescence. The Foreign Ministry noted that India had obtained Seahawk aircraft from Germany through Italy in a similar fashion. (Ibid.)