Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, October 21, 1966, 6:33 p.m.

71125. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Military Supply Policy for India and Pakistan. For Ambassadors Locke and Bowles.

1. This message contains instructions relating to continuing review being conducted here of our military supply policy for India and Pakistan.

2. Our premise is that it is vitally important for US interests not to be forced to choose between these two countries, as their current tactics are designed to get us to do. Our continuing objective is to build both sound US-Indian and sound US-Pakistan relations; we do not intend to permit either to veto what serves our policy interests in the other.

3. Our problem, however, is that both India and Pakistan are now pursuing policies that divert their own limited resources from development, dilute the massive economic aid we are providing each of them, and cause a dangerous drift toward greater dependence in the military field on Communist China and Soviet Union. Neither GOI nor GOP appears sufficiently to recognize serious consequences this situation has had and will continue to have for their own interests in relations with us and our ability in practical terms to help them meet their problems. Neither seems aware that public and Congressional reaction to last fall’s tragic Indo-Pak war, diminished resources for foreign aid overall, and our bed-rock commitment in Viet-Nam could make it impossible for us to do what we believe needs to be done even in area economic aid (not to mention security field) unless some more constructive element than now exists is introduced into Indian-Pakistan relations.

4. We believe this situation requires bilateral discussion with leadership both countries, on frankest possible terms, to consider what we can do toward curtailing arms race between them and at same time serve other US interests, including prevention Communist influence (particularly ChiCom) from eroding our own position further. In first instance this requires that we begin exploratory conversations with GOP and subsequently with GOI, in order better ascertain whether and how a change in our current military supply policy might better serve US interests in subcontinent.

5. Against this background, action addressees authorized undertake action along following lines:

(a) For Rawalpindi: You should arrange fully private session with Ayub for frank and exhaustive review of where we stand in our relationship. You should reaffirm our strengthened confidence we on right track in rebuilding sound US/Pak bilateral relationship. You should then go on to review our growing concern over difficulties India and Pakistan having in coming to grips in meaningful way with their problems, new evidence arms buildup, and risk this poses for peaceful and steady growth stronger economies and better life people both countries.

(b) You should say that you have therefore been instructed to talk frankly with Ayub in order consider together what might be done to build basis for more durable peace in subcontinent. (If asked by Ayub you may indicate that Ambassador Bowles is being instructed do the same in New Delhi.)

(c) You should go on to describe what we believe is our common interest with Ayub in the peaceful resolution of Indo-Pak issues and in curbing the arms race potential in subcontinent now, before new and even more costly round of arms procurement ensues. We would like to know from Ayub what he is prepared to do to further these objectives. You should say that present trend in both countries strikes us as strongly counter-productive and that we see heavy responsibility on leadership both sides to act now to curb this trend before it too late. You should explore with Ayub his arms supply relationship and intentions with ChiComs, noting that while asking us for decision on spares he has never taken us into confidence to any degree on his intentions arms procurement generally, including possible deal with Soviets. (FYI—This designed elicit expression Ayub’s intentions re Soviet supply. Even though it would not raise same problems for us as does ChiCom source, it has bearing on prospects for further arms spiral. End FYI.)

(d) You should also explore with Ayub on what basis he prepared support efforts achieve understanding on force levels, materiel procurement, and defense spending, that would head off arms spiral in subcontinent while protecting legitimate security requirements of each country. (FYI—Important thing is to get something going, preferably with India, but at least with us. End FYI.) What specifically would Ayub be prepared to do in this area? You may wish reinject idea of secret Indo-Pak talks in this context, suggesting to Ayub that for our part we see merit in idea that he and Mrs. Gandhi designate individuals who have their confidence and trust and who could explore in non-public discussion, preferably outside South Asia, what might be possible in arms limitation and other problems, including Kashmir. (Further elaboration this point was contained State 16670.)²

(e) You should tell Ayub we can appreciate his security concerns, as spelled out in his letter to President August 20.³ But Ayub should recognize that we have our problems too and that what we can do to help him meet these concerns depends on what he can do to help us. Specifically it depends heavily on genuine, determined efforts on Pakistan’s part to lower tension and to demonstrate its intentions on arms limitation and resolution other Indo-Pak problems. Ayub must also realistically recognize that any modification our present arms policy would assume acceptable limits on his arms supply and political relations with ChiComs. Moreover Ayub should know that we frankly see real problems in any modification our current arms sales policy because of disruptive risks for Indo-Pak reconciliation process and he should fully understand our belief this consequence can only be avoided if there is in fact forward movement Pak-Indian relations.

(f) In sum, we want Ayub to know that we appreciate fact that his past dependence on US equipment puts him in present circumstances in difficult position, that we are not oblivious to his security problem, that we currently reviewing possible modification our military sales policy, but that in view misuse our equipment in 1965 we can assist in reactivating US supplied equipment only if he will help create conditions which give promise of peace in subcontinent and no recurrence of events 1965 and help head off arms race. Until we have some better idea of what he is prepared to give on his side of the bargain we have little basis on which to act. He should also be fully aware that any leak of this exploratory conversation would obviously increase the obstacles to a modification of US arms policy.

(g) FYI—Above is as far as you should go with Ayub in first round in suggesting possibility some give in our present arms sales policy. Our thinking however is that if Ayub’s response is considered satisfactory after assessment in Washington, we would subsequently indicate to Ayub that we are ready discuss with him GOP’s legitimate military requirements and how they might be met, it being understood any US supply role would be limited to cash sales lethal spares for previously supplied US equipment not readily available from other Western sources and sales of non-lethal equipment. To extent lethal spares are available from non-US Western sources, we would prefer that Pakistan rely on such sources in future and we would be prepared help facilitate this in ways open to us. To extent such spares not available these sources, we would discuss with Paks what supplementary amounts might be available from us. We have in mind limited, transitional level of spares from US. (We presently envisage $8 million as ceiling figure for all spares, lethal and non-lethal.) Finally, although we do not intend resume supply lethal end items, we would indicate readiness over longer term to help GOP in arranging for procurement justifiable new equipment of this nature from other Western sources. End FYI.

(h) For Delhi: We recognize that because of risk of leaks, there should be minimum delay between time our first démarche to Ayub and corresponding representations Delhi. But we believe we cannot authorize those representations until Washington has assessed Ayub’s response. Precise nature our instructions to you for representations with Mrs. Gandhi will depend on nature Ayub response. Tentatively, however, we see your initial representations along following lines:

(1) Refrain from discussing precise nature our initial approach to Ayub on arms limitation and possibility some degree relaxation arms policy.

(2) Instead, stake out general contours of the way we see our strategic interests in Asia and how US and Indian interests coincide.

(3) Within this context discuss what we both can do to minimize ChiCom presence and influence in Pakistan, when issue of Pak security is paramount factor.

(4) Explore options available to us. As we see it these boil down to actions on India’s part involving willingness to talk, to compromise, and to make concessions on basic problem such as arms control and Kashmir; and/or US actions to maintain moderating influence in Pakistan. Extent to which India can or cannot move on former has bearing on what US will need to do on latter.

(5) Urge GOI that now is time to move decisively on arms balance and limitation. This is process which larger power must effectively initiate, failure do so serves only interest of ChiComs. This means India as well as Pakistan must unilaterally exercise restraint now in arms acquisition and it also means that start must be made toward eventual bilateral understanding that will encompass materiel acquisitions and force structure as well as defense expenditure levels.

(6) Underscore for GOI that our economic and military supply policies are related to this objective. We do not intend under foreseeable circumstances return to military supply relationship we had with Pakistan (or India) prior September 1965. However, some flexibility on our sales policy should be maintained. Regardless of our policy Pakistan as sovereign state is going to insist on meeting what it considers its minimum security requirements. Indeed, Indian recognition of this will reduce GOP fears that India desires to undo partition.

(7) Discuss with GOI how to maximize India’s public understanding and minimize India’s public misinterpretation of US actions. In context present realities Indians should understand that India is central to our interests in Asia; security of subcontinent is essential element of this interest; and our future policies, including those relating to military supply, will reflect this.

(i) For both Rawalpindi and Delhi: Both approaches when made should take note of representations we have already made during economic aid discussions on risk of arms race and urgency downward trend defense spending. They should note that same basic concern is fundamental in approaches you now making on broader issue of arms limitation and imply without specifically saying so that magnitude and kind of future US economic aid will be related to efforts each makes in arms limitation.

(j) For London: You should inform HMG in closest confidence of kind of explorations we undertaking first with GOP and then with GOI. Rawalpindi and Delhi should similarly inform High Commissioners, bearing in mind that any leaks would jeopardize whole operation.

6. It is important that all concerned recognize that our efforts at this stage purely exploratory in nature and that we making no commitment as to specific policy decisions. We see steps outlined above as first in series exploratory steps with both leaders, aimed at achieving progress toward understanding on arms balance and limitation which could encompass wide variety of approaches. We are aware any progress will be slow and that there are clear limitations in degree influence we can hope to have through limited military supply policy we envisage. Essentially our purpose at this stage is to learn more than we now know how our policies as a whole can effectively help contain arms race, reduce dependence either country on Communist sources supply and at same time promote fundamental need for continuing patient Indo-Pak dialogue. Where we go from here, including role British might play, will depend heavily on nature your first approaches to GOI and GOP and your own recommendations.

Katzenbach

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and Coon on October 6; cleared by Hare, Spain, Heck, Handley, Warren, Macomber, Hoopes, and Walt Rostow; approved by Secretary Rusk. A handwritten notation on the telegram reads: “OK/L” suggesting that the telegram was also cleared by the President. Also sent to New Delhi and London and repeated to CINCMEAFSA.
2. Dated July 27. (Ibid., POL INDIA–PAK)
3. See Document 369.