38. Letter From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)1
Dear Chet:
I’m concerned by a number of developments, or the lack of them, which have tended to cloud the highly favorable atmosphere upon your departure.
First is the lack, to my knowledge, of a major effort to get across to the GOI as yet about the grossly inflated size of their five-year plan. Any program of this magnitude would inevitably be at the expense of economic development and we’ve got to get across as soon as possible that this would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. AID is quite unhappy, and will become more so when the extent of diversion contemplated sinks in. Moreover, pressure against undue diversion of foreign exchange from the development program is a good indirect means of getting the Indians to focus on the need to cut down their elaborate hardware demands, especially in the air defense field.
Chavan’s visit and then TTK’s will simply be a flop if we have to spend all our time pressing them to squeeze the water out of their plan. If we let this issue become later a major bone of contention between the US and India it will do neither country any good. By all odds the best thing, therefore, is to get the Indian Finance Ministry to do our dirty work for us. We’re relying on you for this.
I don’t know what you did to General Adams (all to the good nonetheless), but it’s highly premature to start plugging 104s. We barely got an F6A plus HF–24 engine program going, with a few squadrons of F5s as a possible alternative, when you come back changing the bidding again. Mind you, I think it makes political sense to give India 104s if necessary, but this must emerge as the logical outcome of a prolonged discussion in which we successively discard other options. Again, we here have seen nothing firm about whether you have ever even tried out the original package on the Indians yet.
I hate to badger you like this, but we scored rather a breakthrough when you were here and it’s dangerous to attempt to improve on what we got without even trying it out. As I know you realize, there are strong suspicions here that indeed you did try out the package and got nowhere, so are coming back for more. If this is the case, tell us [Page 90] so because only if you tried and failed will we be able to argue effectively for trying something else.
I’ve just heard you have the amoebic bug. All best wishes for a quick recovery. It’s also best for cosmetic reasons that you postpone your return in May as late as possible.
Meanwhile, do try to warn off Chavan and others from coming with any exaggerated expections of the US cornucopia. Big ideas which are then disappointed will only set back our Indian enterprise at a time when we finally got it moving forward again.
Once again my apologies for these admonitory words. But you know they come from a friend. All the best for an early recovery.
Sincerely,
P.S. Since writing this, I just saw your talk with TTK.3 Good stuff!
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret; Via Classified Pouch; Eyes Only for the Ambassador.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
- Reference is to a conversation that Bowles had with Finance Minister Krishnamachari on April 23, which was reported in telegram 3158 from New Delhi, April 23. Bowles found Krishnamachari in an emotional state anticipating a joint attack on India by China and Pakistan within 3 months, an attack he feared would have to be met without U.S. military assistance, which the United States would be unable to provide in an election year. Bowles reminded Krishnamachari that the United States had come to India’s defense in 1962, and assured him that in similar circumstances it would do so again. Bowles then turned the conversation to the issue of military assistance, and stated that the United States had decided on a longer range program provided that the Indian budgetary situation was worked out in a rational manner with a minimum drain on foreign exchange. He noted that the proposed 5-year plan called for a doubling of foreign exchange defense expenditures as compared with figures discussed the previous fall. Bowles said that such expenditure was more than India could afford given her need for more rapid economic growth. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA)↩