Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

37. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 20, 1964, 3 p.m.

3122. Dept pass Defense. Deptel 2085 sent April 15² was delayed in transmission and did not reach us until Saturday. While we are in agreement with general principles laid down, we believe careful coordination between New Delhi and Washington is essential. In this regard, we are concerned about Dept’s intention of spelling out US position to BK Nehru before our presentation to GOI has been more fully developed here. Following is report of our activities and plans in preparing GOI for Chavan visit and suggestions for future actions:

1. Immediately upon my return from Washington on April 9, I held preliminary talks with Shastri, T.T. Krishnamachari and Chavan. Since all three individuals were in highly emotional state as result of Abdullah situation, I spoke in general terms about size of military budget and its effect on Indian development, the need to distinguish more clearly between Chinese intentions which are evil and Chinese capacity which is limited, and on our desire to work out close relationships on military matters similar to relationships on economic development. In this initial talk I felt it important to leave generally hopeful impression in regard to US assistance side-by-side with expression of deep concern that budgetary situation might be getting out of hand.

2. Simultaneously, DCM held meetings with Kaul and other members of Secretariat, while Gen Kelly talked with Chavan expressing same general views and then inaugurated series of more detailed meetings with Indian military. This completed what we consider to be first stage of our effort here in Delhi to give Indians sense of general direction we are likely to take.

3. The second stage of our New Delhi operation is comprehensive memorandum which I am directing to Prime Minister on India’s defense problem and US relationship to it. Although I doubt PM has capacity or desire to discuss this memorandum, copies are going to TTK, Shastri and Chavan and I expect to discuss it with them in detail Wednesday or Thursday³ of this week. Copies of the memorandum are being airgrammed Dept. It contains the following points:

A. Over period of time, close working partnership has developed between USG and GOI regarding India’s economic development. Our present task is to develop similar relationship in military field. This requires us frankly to explore security problems which India faces, her own capacity to meet them, amount and type of assistance that is required and ways USG can be most helpful.

B. US and India are generally agreed on the Chinese Communist intentions which are obviously aggressive and expansionist. It is also clear that Chinese military capacity under certain conditions is substantial.

However, key question is manner in which Chinese may be expected to pursue their aggressive intents and their capacity to bring their potential strength to bear against India in particular.

Comment: It is critically important to avoid appearing to water down the menace that China holds for India and Asia. We have been trying to persuade India for years that China is aggressive and dangerous power. A blunt USG effort to minimize Chinese threat at this stage would be considered first as inconsistent with what we have said before and second as transparent reaction to Pak pressure to reduce aid to India. Even if it should succeed, this approach would only play into hands of Communists, Menonites and Hindu extremists who are following precisely this same line in effort to substitute Pakistan for China as India’s number one enemy. Our approach should be to play up evil intent of Chinese and then distinguish between the intent on one hand and capacity on the other of Chinese to bring their strength to bear. Even here we must be careful not to undermine the Indian confidence in our motivation and judgment.

C. Therefore, we see India’s defense problem as two dimensional: (1) an adequate military defense shield and (2) the building of vigorous, dynamic society which is impervious to covert Chinese Communist infiltration. Although we feel defense shield is of vital importance, USG’s experience in other areas has demonstrated that even strongest and most expensively equipped armies are ineffective unless they are vigorously supported by people who feel sense of progress. On this score, we have made our share of mistakes and we do not want to see India repeat them.

D. Against this background, we must say in all frankness that we do not believe India’s defense projection is properly balanced between military-political-economic factors; indeed we doubt that India’s economic development can proceed at an adequate pace unless foreign exchange allocated to defense is reduced. Although we strongly favor India saving her foreign exchange by producing items such as small arms ammunition, etc., we would warn against domestic production which puts too heavy drain on foreign exchange and capital and trained personnel.

E. Although these questions will require definition and discussion, we are aware of India’s need for more modern interceptors and hopeful we can be helpful in this regard; also in aiding domestic production which saves foreign exchange while not placing undue drain on India’s domestic industrial growth, plus assistance along present lines for Indian army.

4. We have carefully avoided all references to Soviet equipment or specific ways that money can be saved. At this stage we believe it is far better to let Indians think situation out themselves. If we can once persuade them to cut down size of plan and foreign exchange that goes with it, pressure may be focussed on SAMs and MIGs which is where we want it. However, if we go too far in appearing to direct Indian foreign policy, they will dig in their heels regardless of effect of such actions on their relations with us. Indians, whatever their weaknesses, are bright people and we do not have to pound the desk and repeat our points ad infinitum for them to understand them.

5. Third stage here will be personal talks I expect to have with Shastri, Chavan and TTK. Hopefully these discussions will be completed by Thursday night; will promptly cable results. Until these talks are completed, I strongly urge that discussions between Department and BK Nehru be postponed.

When Nehru was here in Delhi he was in an emotional and frustrated mood, and unpleasantly irritated at USG. Although this mood may be explained by concern over father, it was sufficiently noticeable for MJ Desai to comment on it to me. While I believe Department is correct that BK Nehru sees situation much as we do, I would not trust him at this point to report Department’s views to GOI in balanced manner. If distorted interpretation of his talks with Dept suggesting somewhat different US position should arrive before we have completed our own presentation considerable crockery may be unnecessarily broken.

6. In any event, following my talks with Shastri, TTK and Chavan, which I hope will be reflected in tone and content in discussions with Nehru in Washington, we will follow through here to pick up loose ends.

7. In regard to Indian defense progress itself, we believe, as reported in Embtel 3052,⁴ that we are approaching moment of truth in our military relations with Indian Government. Although our long delay and indecision is understandable, we are now close to being dealt out of meaningful role in Indian defense situation, at a time when political situation here is in a state of flux and Soviet Union increasingly freed of its inhibitions in regard to China may be prepared to take much more forthcoming role in regard to military assistance. At present, we are in position of denying India sophisticated ground force equipment, dragging feet on domestic military production and offering them airplanes which they consider obsolescent.

In our opinion, Gen Adams’ message to JCS⁵ which arrived this morning is wholly sound; indeed it is along precise lines of our own recommendations in Embtel 3052.

As Gen Adams properly states, anything less than a program of this kind will leave us sitting on side lines with only marginal influence over Indian military policy at time when Indian military may be called on for an increasing political role.

One final word: since my arrival here last July, we have been faced with long list of difficult situations ranging from VOA to Bokaro to Kashmir wrangle, to failure last fall to go through with military assistance-political package, to need to explain USG position in SC which Indians considered antagonistic and unfair.

If we are now planning to move ahead with Indian military program it is important that US Mission in New Delhi appear to GOI as primary means of communication and of US action. Therefore, if Department’s and Pentagon response to our recommendations is positive, I recommend that we be authorized before Chavan group leaves for US to give top Indian officials preliminary knowledge of positive contributions that we have in mind, with whatever caveats may be required. This will greatly strengthen our ability to deal effectively with GOI on future questions in a particularly critical and difficult time.⁶

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 INDIA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD and passed to Defense.
2. Telegram 2085 to New Delhi, April 15, outlined the approach officials in Washington planned to take in discussing military assistance and the Indian 5-year plan with Defense Minister Chavan and his party when they visited Washington in May. The focus of the discussions would be on attempting to demonstrate how India could achieve a reasonably satisfactory defense within a limited resource ceiling. To pave the way for this approach, the Department felt that preliminary work was necessary in Washington and in New Delhi. The Embassy was instructed to encourage the Indian Government to impose a more austere limit on defense expenditures than that envisaged in the 5-year plan, and to do so prior to Chavan’s visit. (Ibid., POL 7 INDIA)
3. April 22 and 23.
4. Dated April 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA)
5. Not found.
6. In telegram 2144 to New Delhi, April 21, the Department concurred with the tactics proposed by Bowles of gradually moving into progressively expanding discussions regarding the Indian 5-year plan, but questioned the wisdom of a written exchange with the Indian Government concerning it, for fear of a leak, which might prejudice the negotiations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 INDIA) On the same day, Bowles sent an 8-page memorandum to the Prime Minister entitled “India’s National Defense and American Assistance.” A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Washington as an enclosure to airgram A–1049 from New Delhi, April 22; ibid.