Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

375. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, September 2, 1966, 1450Z.

835. Ref: State 38151.² Meeting with Pres Ayub.

1. I met with Pres Ayub for 45 minutes Sept 2 with FonMin Additional Sec Agha Shahi and notetaker Piracha also present. After reading letters from Mrs. Johnson and Sec Freeman,³ Ayub carefully studied reftel communication from Pres Johnson.

2. I elaborated on: (a) need for peace on subcontinent, for conditions favoring economic development and for downward trend defense spending; (b) importance Pres Johnson attaches to Indo-Pak moderation and efforts deal peacefully with problems including Kashmir; (c) improvement in US-Pak bilateral relations and mutual recognition respective national interests; (d) US understanding of Pak security concerns expressed in Ayub’s Aug 20 letter to Pres Johnson;⁴ (e) US concern at harmful effects of Indo-Pak propaganda escalation including military tension; (f) US confidence in Pak and Indian top leadership; and (g) possibilities for secret Indo-Pak discussions.

3. Ayub indicated: (a) readiness to establish “trusted communications” with Mrs. Gandhi preferably covering full range Indo-Pak issues; (b) scepticism about utility Indo-Pak arms limitation discussions separate from consideration of political differences; (c) conviction India already has acquired excessive arms while Pakistan does not plan, and cannot afford, further arms acquisition.

4. Ayub interrupted my comments on propaganda escalation to read report from Pak HICOM New Delhi stating current Indian purpose in generating tension is to justify possible postponement of Indian elections desired and discussed in Congress Party circles. Pak HICOM recommended GOP not reply to Indian propaganda. Ayub asked me what GOP should do in such cases since Pak public exposed to Indian propaganda does not know what to think, and internal situation requires some reply.

5. I referred to Sept 6 Defense of Pakistan Day which I hoped would not be occasion for new round of Indo-Pak charges and counter-charges. This regard, I cited anti-Indian press release for Sept 6 (Rawalpindi 813)⁵ which I hoped would not set tone for celebration. (Press release subsequently withdrawn per Rawalpindi 828).⁶ Ayub stressed Defense of Pakistan Day intended commemorate achievements of armed forces and left impression he wishes avoid strong anti-Indian orientation.

6. I suggested establishment trusted communication between Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi might best be through personally known confidants, not anti-Indian or anti-Pak, preferably without political ambition but with negotiating experience and, on arms problems, perhaps with military experience. Ayub volunteered perhaps somebody like Jai Prokash Narain or Raja Gopalacharian on Indian side.

7. Ayub balked when I said hoped could report to Washington that he willing undertake secret Indo-Pak military discussions with or without concurrent consideration other differences. Ayub professed see no purpose in separate military discussion but left open possibility GOP might nonetheless go along if pressed. Ayub asked if US would participate any such talks? I said had not contemplated this and I didn’t know. I added that discussions concerning level of forces might be more relevant to mutual security than less precise approaches through defense budgets and gross national products percentages.

8. When I pointed to possible utility of trusted military officers as confidants on both sides, Ayub appeared have no objection but said generals would have to turn to political leaders to ascertain conditions determining military requirements. For example, he said, defense requirements would vary with Kashmir solution. I attempted to counter Ayub’s scepticism about working separately towards arms limitation with suggestion India and Pakistan begin from current force levels and through discussion seek to establish some understanding of mutually tolerable military relationship.

10. Comment: (A) My impression is Ayub might go along if we insisted on separate arms discussion with India, but he does not think such an approach can accomplish anything under present political conditions. Accordingly, I believe we should promptly sound out Mrs. Gandhi on willingness to establish “trusted communications” channel, i.e., secret talks between confidants of Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi on all topics, including Kashmir and arms limitations.

(B) I believe we need to know more specifically what would contribute to subcontinental security. This regard, it would be useful if Washington could proceed with military studies concerning reasonable defense establishments in India and Pakistan. These could serve as basis for separate US supporting discussions with GOI and GOP.

(C) I suspect Ayub may interpret Pres Johnson’s letter and my presentation to signify likely postponement of US decision on lethal spare part sales to Pakistan until after Indian elections. While a little doubt may be healthy, I do not believe we should permit Ayub to draw too pessimistic a conclusion in this regard. In my judgement, best interests of US would be served by informing Ayub promptly after adjournment later this month of present session of Indian Parliament, and certainly well before Indian elections, of US willingness to discuss lethal spares with him in connection with Indo-Pak arms limitation and Sino-Pak military supply relationship.⁷

Locke

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 38151 to Karachi and Rawalpindi, August 30, transmitted the text of President Johnson’s August 30 letter to President Ayub. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476, Lebanon thru Pakistan) For text of the letter, see Document 372.
3. Neither found.
4. See Document 369.
5. Telegram 813 from Rawalpindi, September 1, transmitted the text of a press release prepared by the Press Information Department entitled “India’s Wanton Aggression.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK)
6. Dated September 2. (Ibid.)
7. In a follow up conversation on September 3 with Additional Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi, Locke pointed out that the emphasis during his conversation with Ayub on the difficulties faced by the United States with regard to military supply policy was not intended to foreshadow a negative decision. He reported that his purpose was to prevent Ayub from making decisions based on the mistaken notion that the United States had decided against him in the critical national security field. (Telegram 847 from Rawalpindi, September 3; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK)