Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, July 9, 1966, 0953Z.

82. Separatist Movement in East Pakistan.

1. During July 7 call on S.M. Yusuf in his new capacity as Foreign Secretary, I called attention to accusations of American involvement in East Pak separatist movement being given currency in Pak press and also in public statements of GOP officials, and cited:

A. Articles in Dacca newspaper, Paigam, of April 30 and May 1, 1966 in which headlines alleged “Unholy Alliance of American Circles with Advocates on “[Six?] Points” and “Six Points Nourished by American Injection” and in which assertion was made that U.S. “has purchased one particular party in West Pakistan” and given this party its six points;

B. East Pak newspaper Janata June 23, 1966 alleging that U.S. is “creating a secessionist trend in East Pakistan” and that U.S. “wants to use East Pakistan as a springboard in world strategy”;

C. A resolution of ad hoc working committee of East Pak Muslim League of June 23, 1966, alleging that “certain foreign elements” attempting to fan autonomy movement in East Pakistan “with a view to serving their own global interests”; and

D. National Assembly speech on June 29, 1966 by Communications Minister Sobur alleging that East Pak “autonomy movement could not conceal its own alliance with some hostile powers, those who for their global interests want to drive a wedge amongst the solidarity of the people.” That these indirect accusations were also against the U.S. was clear, I said, from use of expression “foreign powers with global interests.” I noted, and Foreign Secretary indicated agreement, that in Pakistan “power with global interests” meant the United States. We had no doubt on basis of reactions we had received that people of Pakistan clearly understood such articles and statements were intended to be charges against U.S.

2. I said such allegations were completely false, and that to give them currency in press and in public statements by GOP officials could only have a depressing effect upon efforts to maintain and develop atmosphere of collaboration and understanding which would strengthen US-Pak relations. I developed at some length illogic of any assumption that U.S. policy would now seek to fragment Pakistan when we had devoted extensive efforts and resources over period of years, and were so now doing, to help build, in collaboration with GOP leaders, strong and unified Pakistan as source of stability in subcontinent and as barrier to Communist penetration. I noted that, with this basic and long-standing policy, U.S. could not conceivably favor separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan, process which would occasion political strife, economic dislocation, and popular unrest, promoting serious instability in sub-continent and offering temptations and opportunities for Communist China. it would not be reasonable to assume U.S. would work against its own interests and its own policy objectives by seeking to press [for] political disintegration of Pakistan. Nor could it be alleged that the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing and that U.S. was in fact pursuing two policies with respect to East Pakistan. I said U.S. policy in Pakistan is policy of the President of U.S. and that he and his representative in Pakistan, the American Ambassador, have responsibility and authority to assure U.S. policies and objectives are supported by all branches and agencies of U.S.G. I told Secretary that this in point of fact was the situation in practice and would continue to be the situation governing American actions in Pakistan. I summarized by saying that U.S. policy toward Pakistan continues to be based on need for an independent, strong, and unified Pakistan; that U.S. does not support separatism in East Pak; and that constitutional arrangements for the two wings and question of greater autonomy for East Pakistan are internal matters to be worked out by Pakistan in accordance with its own processes.

4. Secretary Yusuf said he welcomed assurances as to U.S.G. policy with respect to unity of Pakistan and our attitude on question of separatism in West Pakistan. He then referred to the conversation between Ambassador Locke and President Ayub on June 16² at which he had also been present. Yusuf noted that Ayub had initiated this topic and had cited reports which GOP continued to receive about conversations between American officials in Dacca and opposition political figures. Foreign Secretary said there were numbers of such reports. He admitted there was high degree of sensitivity about East Pakistan on part of GOP officials which he attributed to GOP conviction that India is promoting East Pak separatism. Amplifying this point, Yusuf said that radio stations from India were beaming separatist propaganda into East Pakistan seven or eight hours each day and also that pamphlets and leaflets urging East Pakistan separatism were printed in India and brought into East Pakistan for distribution. (According UK HICOM Pickard, East Pakistan Governor Monem Ekhan cited these same points in discussion with him last week in Dacca.)

5. Yusuf wondered whether American officers in East Pakistan were on all occasions as discreet in their choice of contacts as they should be. He said GOP did not take position that all opposition leaders were beyond the pale. GOP considers an opposition necessary. Some opposition figures accepted the premises of Pakistan’s constitutional system. (Yusuf in fact referred to them as the “loyal opposition.”) However, other opposition leaders were “disruptionists,” seeking to promote disintegration of Pakistan and separate existence for East Pakistan or a Bengali state. Yusuf said he was making no assertion as to facts, but that if American officials were in frequent contact with opposition leaders of the disruptionist type, this would certainly give rise to misunderstanding.

6. I responded that I was certain there was not such a pattern of contacts by our people in East Pakistan, that they of course talk with opposition political leaders as part of their normal functions as political officers of U.S.G., but that in such conversations they did not take positions on controversial domestic issues, much less lend support to separatist elements in East Pakistan. I said that the pitfalls with respect to kinds of reports he had been talking about were well known to both of us as were pressures which might affect their credibility. Yusuf acknowledged this and remarked that Ayub “did not credit all these reports.”

7. Foreign Secretary said Secretary Rusk in Canberra had raised topic of allegations about American activities with respect to East Pakistan in conversation with Additional Secretary Shahi. Secretary Rusk had suggested joint inquiry into this problem. Yusuf quickly added that GOP did not think joint inquiry would be useful approach.

8. Foreign Secretary undertook to explain rationale by which some Pakistanis might believe that U.S. “global interests” would be served by separatist movement in East Pakistan. He entirely disassociated himself from such view, but said was useful to broad understanding of problem. Rationale which he developed was that U.S. support of India was basic U.S. policy, part of its global strategy; India was now in great difficulty because of its limited access to Assam, routes across East Pakistan being not now open to India; Indian position vis-a-vis China would be strengthened by more ready access to Assam; therefore U.S. might be prepared encourage East Pakistan separatist movement. I said that such line of reasoning was fantastically erroneous, adding that I had noted Foreign Secretary did not accept it. As I had outlined earlier, our estimate was that separate East Pakistan would be great factor of instability in South Asia.

9. Foreign Secretary again stated his belief that Indian policy is directed toward detaching East Pakistan. I said I found it impossible to believe Indian policy in fact pointed in this direction, that persons following this view would be clearly misguided, since, if successful, it would result in enormous pressures being brought to bear on India with respect to Bengal and would be advantageous only to China. I added that so far as I could see only one country would stand to benefit, in terms of its known goals, from East Pak or Bengali separatism and that country was Communist China. Yusuf made no comment on this remark.

10. I told Secretary Yusuf that Embassy was acutely aware of sensitivity to GOP of issues relating to East Pakistan and that we had very responsible officers serving in East Pakistan. I said we would be ready at any time to discuss with Foreign Secretary any reports of charges as to alleged American actions in East Pakistan. I reiterated again our concern as to harmful effect of press charges and public allegations by GOP officials and asked him to let this be known to appropriate authorities of his government.

11. Comment: Allegations that U.S. is fomenting separatism in East Pakistan are extremely difficult to deal with effectively because of:

A. Politically tense situation there and in Pakistan generally which moves Pak officials to be sensitive, suspicious, alarmist;

B. Short-run utility to Pak political leaders of being able to attribute pressing difficulties to nefarious foreign influence;

C. Pattern and style of government and society which assume deviousness and anticipate intrigue;

D. Vulnerability of U.S., which is widely accepted here as having capability for large-scale under-cover manoeuvre.

For these reasons, such allegations are to certain extent inherent in situation which can be expected to continue.

12. Nonetheless, I believe there are measures which we can take with some prospect of blunting these allegations. This is particularly true to extent such allegations reflect concerted campaign of defamation, instigated or abetted at various levels of Pak Government. In my judgment, best tactics in private discussion are:

A. Unreserved assertions of the complete falsity of the allegations;

B. Confident statements that there is no evidence to support them; and

C. Persuasive arguments that they are totally illogical.

The core counter-argument here is that East Pak separatism would be entirely contrary to United States interests, and inconsistent with United States policy toward Pakistan.

13. My discussion with Foreign Secretary took place in good atmosphere and, I believe, illustrates the utility of getting this subject out in the open in discussions with GOP officials. It is also evidently much more possible to have a reasonable discussion on this question with the present Foreign Secretary than with his predecessor.

Cargo

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAK. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, and Dacca.
2. Locke’s meeting with Ayub on June 16 was reported in telegrams 803, 805, and 806 from Rawalpindi, all June 17. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–PAK, AID (US) PAK, and POL INDIA–PAK, respectively)