342. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Gandhi1
Dear Mrs. Gandhi:
Your letter2 was a source of strength and satisfaction to me.
We are both leaders of a democracy and must put our policies to the test of national elections and carry our parties with us in the process. That means we are almost always at work in a sea of troubles. Understanding that, it is good to share our thoughts as we try to solve the problems we face.
I have been reading with admiration the reports of your spirited defense of your policies against political attack—most recently at the Congress Party meeting at Bombay.
As you may have gathered, I am also meeting my critics at least half way as we enter our congressional campaign.
We learned much from Planning Minister Mehta about your plans for moving India ahead to faster economic progress. I was particularly pleased—even moved—by his account of the gathering energy and determination in evidence from the farmers in the villages to the new generation of ingenious and determined young industrialists.
It was also good to hear directly from him of his encouraging discussions with the World Bank. As I told him, I wish to be as helpful as possible to you and to your government in the period that lies ahead.
I feel the state of relations between our two countries is bright and promising. I know we both are seeking much the same thing: practical ways of achieving an economy of abundance with social justice and freedom from exploitation.
Against the background of this generally hopeful picture, I share your concern about one matter of great importance to the future of free Asia—indeed, of the whole world community. That, of course, is the present state of relations between Pakistan and India.
I well know how difficult it is for democratic leaders to be conciliatory and moderate in the face of critical public opinion. But it seems to me extremely important that communications be maintained between the two countries, with the objective of creating a firmer basis of peace.
[Page 660]The process begun at Tashkent must not wither and die.
Quite apart from the overriding need for peace, any thought that last fall’s hostilities might recur would provide a ready argument to political leaders in this country who are opposed in principle to any substantial aid program. More important, it would plant doubts among even the strongest supporters of our foreign assistance. This could strengthen efforts to cut back the next aid bill in general and more particularly to block the resumption of economic aid to India and Pakistan on the scale that you and I know is necessary.
As a concrete means of reversing a dangerous arms buildup, it seems to me crucial that India and Pakistan find some way of limiting their defense expenditures and starting them on parallel downward paths. This is essential to both peace and development. I know from our own experience with the Soviet Union how difficult this is to do. However, before Viet Nam both we and the Soviets—without ever talking about it—had begun a series of unilateral but seemingly reciprocal cutbacks in our spending.
Let me add that I remain as convinced as ever of the genuineness and depth of your own dedication to the cause of peace with your neighbor. The knowledge of your commitment to peace is a source of encouragement and strength to me as I ask the American people to help in India’s development.
You suggested you might be interested in my view of the current state of affairs in Pakistan. It does seem that Pakistan is going through a difficult period. The government there is under considerable political pressure to demonstrate some achievement on Kashmir. It is hard to predict where these pressures will lead, but I believe we both have an opportunity to influence future events.
As I told you when you were here, I have confidence in President Ayub, and I believe that he intends to maintain friendly ties with the Free World. As you know, I am about to send a new Ambassador to Pakistan, a trusted and capable colleague, Mr. Eugene Locke . He has clearly in mind the necessity of peace on the subcontinent and the requirement of responsibility and flexibility on the part of both countries. I shall be most interested in his thoughts as to how the U.S. and Pakistan can go about working out a relationship that is best for all of us. I shall keep in touch with you and will hope for your support during the weeks ahead.
I have often thought, late in the night, of the burden of history and political pressure borne by you and my friend Ayub in this matter. I have only two observations: first, as I told your Minister of Planning, we have learned from our experience with Mexico the special responsibility that the larger partner must bear in making it possible for the smaller nation to live in confidence and dignity as a neighbor; second, [Page 661] in working forward from our present difficult position, you may have to take small steps, each then understanding the political problems of the other, each fighting loyally before his own public opinion for whatever limited agreements can be achieved.
From this distance it would appear that a forthcoming invitation for high-level talks might now be timely.
I was interested in your remarks about the Indo-American Foundation. I know from my own experience that even a project as intrinsically worthy as this one can become a source of political controversy; it is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that a good project has been strongly questioned and vigorously debated as a part of the democratic political process. Working together, however, and with a full understanding of the problems which confront us both, I am sure that we can find a way to launch the Foundation in a form which will preserve its essential character and its ability to stimulate Indian education as we both intend.
Your observations on the food situation in India were helpful to me and, on the whole, heartening. As you are aware, I am following this matter personally. Congress reacted favorably to the message I sent it toward the end of your visit here, and we will continue to do our part to help you weather this difficult season. However, our own stocks of wheat have dropped more rapidly than expected, and I have recently had to increase wheat acreage here. That will not increase our anticipated stocks until 1967.
My prayers are joined with yours that the coming rains are bountiful.
The political disturbances in Viet Nam have been disquieting. But I am convinced, in the phrase I quoted in my African talk the other day, they are “growing pains.” They are part of the process by which the Vietnamese people are working out their political future in their own way. We are using our limited influence to persuade them to work these matters out by discussion rather than by violence.
The Vietnamese government has made clear its continuing commitment to elections before the middle of September and the work of the committee set up to prepare for these elections is going forward. We support the government’s commitment to these elections and we continue to believe that in this way and in other ways the process of building a truly free nation in Viet Nam will go forward.
As for the war, we shall apply that minimum of our great military power necessary to convince those responsible in Hanoi that the aggression should cease, while searching every day to bring the matter from the battlefield to the negotiating table.
Before closing, let me say that I admire your courage in sticking to a policy of foregoing nuclear weapons. I think this is a wise and a [Page 662] good policy. I cannot believe, knowing the costs and limitations of small national nuclear systems, that they represent the wave of the future in this increasingly interdependent world.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 3/1/66–12/31/66. Secret. Transmitted to New Delhi for delivery to Prime Minister Gandhi in telegram 2357 to New Delhi, May 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 INDIA)↩
- Document 337.↩