Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

341. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May 27, 1966, 1229Z.

3261. Pass White House and Dept of Defense.

1. We share concern expressed in Deptel 2311² over recent deterioration in relationship established at Tashkent. We also agree that the next few weeks in Indo-Pak relations will be critical.

2. On May 25 and 26, Carol Laise and I spent a total of more than four hours with Mrs. Gandhi, L.K. Jha, C.S. Jha and Swaran Singh during which the question of Pak-Indo relationships was the primary subject. The mood on the Indian side was extremely moderate with a genuine concern over the situation which has been developing since Tashkent combined with an equally genuine uncertainty as to what to do about it.

3. The general theme which we developed in these conversations was (a) that India with its large population, growing industrial strength, and democratic base has a wide open opportunity to become the major force for peace, progress and stability in Asia and (b) that this objective can be reached only if India’s economic growth rate can be stepped up sharply and a way found to keep Pakistan from diverting India from its crucially important, overriding national goals.

4. As in previously reported conversations with the two Jhas and with other members of the govt I also stressed:

A. Since the last Pak-India meeting was held in Rawalpindi it is India’s responsibility to take the initiative in inviting Pakistani reps to India;

B. A ministerial level conference at this time will create the same old confrontations between the same old professionals with little hope of progress; the wiser course therefore lies in meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub Khan.

5. While agreeing with my general thesis, L.K. suggested that in the present context a top-level meeting was risky since a failure at the summit would seem to close the door to further progress. Mrs. Gandhi later remarked that several of her staff associates had advanced this thesis.

6. I disagreed with this conclusion on the grounds that no one could legitimately expect a miracle from the first meeting between Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi; indeed Mrs. Gandhi’s invitation could state that the purpose was to exchange views on current difficulties and to establish some system of communication through which future progress might become possible.

In his first meeting with Mrs. Gandhi, Ayub Khan would almost certainly be restrained and since Mrs. Gandhi herself would be anxious to create a feeling of goodwill we could expect a minimum of conflict and a maximum of constructive atmospherics.

7. Although neither L.K. Jha nor Mrs. Gandhi responded directly to this proposal both stressed that they are searching for an effective approach and that my suggestion had not been ruled out. (Note: When I next see L.K. Jha I shall suggest that the tangible outcome of a meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub might be an agreement on a series of regular monthly meetings between personal reps of Mrs. Gandhi and Ayub similar to our Warsaw meetings with the Chinese. Through these meetings the two parties could keep the dialogue open and maintain a regular channel for exploring current problems which in turn could provide the basis for meaningful negotiations.)

8. During our meetings with the two Jhas, Singh and Mrs. Gandhi the Indian view which was presented with varying emphasis was as follows:

A. At Tashkent Ayub seemed generally anxious to find a solution to the Pak-India impasse and at no time insisted that Kashmir must be settled before progress could be made on other issues. In his opening remarks at the Rawalpindi meeting, Ayub had continued this friendly and open-minded approach. However, shortly thereafter the mood abruptly changed and at the close Ayub spoke in very different terms. The assumption was that during this interval Bhutto had somehow managed to increase his influence over Pak policy.

The GOI seems genuinely to believe that Ayub is a moderate in search of a reasonable settlement. Bhutto is considered a reckless and intensely ambitious man comparable in some ways to Subandrio.

B. The Chinese would now like to use the Paks as they are using North Vietnamese as an instrument of Chinese policy and if necessary to do their dying. Pakistan in its turn has eagerly seized on this opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the US and USSR as well as on India.

C. Bhutto is promoting thesis that India is about to disintegrate. This reflects the Peking view which in the case of China is explained by the isolated position of its leaders.

D. Although they find this situation profoundly disturbing with no ready answers, the Indians assert that they will continue to do their best to break the impasse.

9. In our talks with L.K. Jha and C.S. Jha I brought up the problem of Kashmir by expressing the hope that though problems between India and Pakistan will require persistence and time, India could simultaneously move to straighten out their relationship with the Kashmiris and thereby eliminate basis for Pak charge of oppression.

To this suggestion L.K. Jha, as in the past, responded affirmatively again hinting that some answer might be found before or during elections next February. However, C.S. Jha said he saw no hope whatever for progress through Sheik Abdullah whom he loosely described as pro-Chinese and pro-Pak.

10. In our talk with L.K. Jha I also brought up the question of military equipment to Pakistan. I pointed out that without spare parts from the US many of the Pak F–86’s were inoperative and that if we fail to provide these parts there will be additional pressure on the Paks to procure MIG 19s from China (which the Indians know is a superior plane).

11. To this and other references to military aid to Pak L.K. Jha expressed profound distress and opposition. He stated that to give arms to Paks at a time when they were openly threatening India, drawing closer to China and pressing US to increase their military capacity for use against India would be not only self defeating but dangerous.

Such a move, he said, would enable the Paks to raise their price to the Chinese (which the Chinese would almost surely meet) and would accomplish none of the objectives which we seek. A modest amount of military aid would be wholly ineffective in easing out the Chinese and would only lead to Pak demands for much more aid; if we then raised ante we would increase the likelihood of war. Swaran Singh vigorously reiterated this position the following day; in addition he said such a move would directly and adversely affect India’s ability to initiate moves to reduce Indo-Pak tensions and resolve outstanding differences.

12. We believe that India is earnestly seeking some appropriate gesture that might help to ease the current tensions and strengthen hand of Ayub. There is every evidence among Indian leadership of a moderate though worried mood. At the All India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay the subject of Pak-India relations was carefully sidetracked in order to avoid provocative speeches. Although news stories occasionally headline border incidents Indian editorial comments have been consistently sober.

13. L.K. Jha indicated India is searching for a concrete proposal or proposals for economic cooperation which might signal their desire to reduce tensions. In this connection he acknowledged Beru-Bari transfer might provide useful gesture towards reconciliation. (Subsequently David Scott, Acting UK HICOM reported that during his trip to Pakistan Aziz Ahmed had indicated this kind of move would not be acceptable GOP.) This morning’s headlines state that GOI is moving unilaterally to permit normal trade relations with Pakistan.

14. We shall continue to work along above lines not only in our conversations with GOI but also with the many friendly and cooperative members of the Indian press. However, in one sense, we are leaning against an open door since the Indians are already persuaded of dangers; the question is how best to deal with them.

15. I suggest this is an important time to bring all appropriate pressure to bear in Karachi and Rawalpindi to meet India at least part way and above all to take advantage of Mrs. Gandhi’s genuine good will before pre-election mood takes over here in India and she loses her political flexibility.

16. Although the GOI mood now is affirmative there are three developments which would abruptly destroy whatever hopes there may be for a rational settlement of Pak-India differences.

A. An aggressive border action by the Chinese. This could foreclose any conciliatory move by the Indians on ground that such a move would make them appear to be giving ground to Paks in the face of Chinese pressure;

B. Intensification of Pak disruptive efforts in Kashmir and in eastern hill areas.

C. A decision by USG before Indian elections next February to provide military supplies to Pakistan, particularly in face of ominous internal developments in Pakistan such as increasing influence of Bhutto and input of sizeable amounts of Chinese military equipment. In the politically charged pre-election atmosphere here this resumption of US military supplies would absolutely foreclose any Indian initiative on the Pak question, undermine the political leadership of Mrs. Gandhi and the moderates, greatly strengthen both Krishna Menon and the fellow travelers on the left, and the extremists on the right and destroy current prospect for a significant economic and political breakthrough in this critical and strategically-placed nation.

Although it is impossible accurately to foresee the situation that we will face next winter, by that time the answers to some questions at least will be a lot more clear.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Rawalpindi, London, Moscow, USUN, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and CINCMEAFSA and passed to the White House and DOD at 2:55 p.m.
2. Dated May 25. (Ibid.)