295. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
1626. Following is brief of uncleared memorandum of conversation between VP Humphrey and President Ayub in Karachi Feb 15/66 (full text being pouched2):
Summary. Vice President Humphrey met for nearly two hours February 15 with President Ayub to discuss United States Vietnam policy with particular attention to Honolulu Conference results, and to inform Ayub of United States decisions: (1) to negotiate economic commodity loan of $50,000,000; (2) to negotiate shortly interim PL–480 agreement; (3) to relax ban on military shipments to permit some commercial and MAP credit sales of non-lethal military equipment.
Ayub expressed hope for success of efforts launched at Honolulu to promote social and political progress in Vietnam, but stressed formi dable [Page 570] obstacles which Indo-Pak confrontation imposes upon Pak capability offer assistance other than continuing attempts counsel moderation on Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, which Ayub indicated readiness to do as opportunities arose. Ayub was appreciative of United States aid decisions noted above, pointed to critical Pak requirements for replacements for range of United States origin military equipment, and underlined felt threat to Pakistan of growing Indian military capability. Throughout, Ayub stressed desire for peace and Pak intention carry out Tashkent declaration provisions in “letter and spirit.” End of summary.
Vietnam
After conveying President Johnson’s good wishes to Ayub, and with reference President Johnson’s letters of Feb 103 and 114 to Ayub, Vice President Humphrey gave long and detailed account of American diplomatic and military effort with respect Vietnam and related events of recent Honolulu Conference. VP described root problem of moving local govt towards social progress and recognition of South Vietnamese leaders of this problem and its magnitude. VP noted South Vietnam Govt had developed program which intended meet military needs and reconstruction goals and coordinate them at provincial level, emphasizing self-help aspect. Program not perfect and hour late, but in US view program can be effective and deserves support. Military situation manageable and improving. It is political-social problems which loom large. Other countries can help with non-combatant support in this struggle for development and social progress which in Pak of particular concern. Moreover, whole struggle in Southeast Asia in US view is vital for all. VP described total program of Communist attack on Southeast Asia, noting that in President Johnson’s view this large-scale challenge must be faced now: otherwise it will be necessary meet it elsewhere at other time. US must show determination and strength, and believes its actions this regard tie directly into Pak security. While recognizing each nation’s sovereignty, US feels strongly factual case is as stated.
Governor Harriman gave strong support VP’s presentation elaborating on reasons which impelled resumption of bombing. He adverted to possibility Ayub might impress upon Communist China, Moscow, Hanoi desirability of moderation; stress particularly to Soviets sincerity [Page 571] with which US seeking peace; consider contribution of medical team or other contribution to Vietnam struggle.
Ayub expressed thanks for explanations, and appreciation to President Johnson for keeping him informed. He said, “I know you face great difficulties, are doing your best, and I hope you succeed.” He noted 35 years of terrible continuing war in area had resulted in tremendous problem. Good deal depends upon how much local people prepared to sacrifice. Problem also of growing nationalism in area. But key is willingness undertake social reform, then outside forces can assist.
In response to remarks by Governor Harriman, Ayub noted that Indian pressure of 1.2 million men under arms fantastically reduces Pak abilities enlarge its military and political commitments. Pak very security at stake. Pak greatly interested in Vietnam situation. In Peiping and Moscow, Ayub pointed out US had interests in Asia as world power. Pak will continue at least plead for moderation. Anytime ChiCom or Sov leaders pass through “we shall certainly continue these efforts.” Regarding matter of contribution Ayub noted that if Pak to do so it would incur enmity of Sov Union and Chinese and put itself in impossible situation with India as avowed enemy while US unable really underwrite Pak liabilities. (FonMin Bhutto noted parenthetically that following resumption of bombing GOP had not issued any adverse statement although India, member of ICC, had.)
Elsewhere Ayub noted Pak has accepted commitments and risks far beyond its military and economic power, vide instance U–2 incident. For sake US friendship Pak incurred wrath of USSR despite latter’s capacity destroy Pak. Pak was asked in 1961 contribute battalion for Laos and replied with offer of brigade. Unfortunately owing present problem with India, Pak ability do anything like that greatly reduced.
Ayub went on delineate difficulty Pak situation geographically split with 1400 miles of “not very friendly India” between wings. India constant open threat. If any of Pak’s big neighbors move, Paks in difficulty. Then too Pak is ideological state bordered by Communist neighbors USSR and China. Security important, but also a country must have good social and economic programs. Pakistan has been cited by many as outstanding example of effective economic development. US has been major contributor and Pak deeply grateful.
Tashkent, Indo-Pak Relations and Arms
Pak bedeviled by problem of how to find peace with India. Tashkent declaration (TD) good start which requires diplomatic followup. Pak has every intention follow through. Tashkent in interest whole region. Pak wants live in peace and only hopes India does too. But [Page 572] what is sense of fabulous Indian expenditures for armaments? Before 1962 India had ten divisions. Now has 21 plus three recently organized and talking about additional seven. Indians spending $2.6 million [billion?] for military purposes. Much of military equipment not suitable for use in Himalaya against Chinese. Some reduction in armed forces indicated in interests of all. In another connection Ayub enjoined VP tell Indians Paks “want peace” and indicated great achievement for all would ensue if US could persuade India be reasonable.
VP reminded Ayub of US gratitude concerning statesmanlike Tashkent. He pledged US would do everything possible to insure implementation of UNSC Sept 20 resolution and TD provisions. US does understand Pak problem and President Johnson greatly disturbed at possibility of arms race on sub-continent. [garble—He feels] India committed to TD and that India concerned over possibility ChiCom attack.
Economic Aid
VP noted President Johnson told him he wished contribute to Pak progress and TD implementation. US prepared negotiate $50 million dollar economic commodity assistance at this time and to open up discussion further economic assistance that may be needed. VP indicated stipulation concerning priority for economic development and application of loan to imports for existing plant capacity.
PL 480
VP indicated US readiness negotiate shortly interim PL 480 agreement and discuss longer-term food requirements. Doubtful that US able fill all Pak requirements although would like to in view drought and Pak achievements in agricultural development field.
Military Supplies
VP informed Ayub of US decision to relax ban on military shipments to permit some purchases non-lethal equipment. Ayub wondered what Pak to do with its fighters when US had given only three months supply of spare parts. “We can’t leave Pak defenseless; no country can allow that. If we can’t get what we must have from you then we must go elsewhere.” VP noted US taking look at whole picture and that as Tashkent proceeds it can take new look. US not trading but working with reality. We can take further look this spring or early summer and spring is just around corner.
Purposes in India
VP noted for Ayub’s info he intended in India: (1) emphasize importance Indo-Pak relations along TD lines; (2) inform PM Gandhi of US and Pak views this regard; (3) discuss 100 million dollar com [Page 573] modity loan to India in similar terms as $50 million dollar loan to Pak.5
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/VP. Repeated to New Delhi and passed to the White House at 11:10 a.m.↩
- The memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to airgram A–511 from Karachi, February 25. (Ibid.) A transcript of this conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 6A. The transcript indicates that the meeting began at 5:35 p.m. and ended at 7:25 p.m. It also lists the participants in the meeting as Humphrey, Harriman, Valenti, McConaughy, Ayub, Bhutto, and Shoaib.↩
- Document 292.↩
- Johnson’s letter to Ayub of February 11, transmitted to Karachi in circular telegram 1531 of that date, conveyed Johnson’s impressions of the recent Honolulu conference on South Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S)↩
- Humphrey issued a statement to the press on February 15 following his conversation with Ayub in which he announced the $50 million loan and the offer to negotiate an interim P.L. 480 agreement. (Telegram 1614 from Karachi, February 15; ibid., POL 7 HUMPHREY) The Embassy reported on February 16 that the Pakistani press had headlined the announcements concerning the loan and the P.L. 480 agreement. The Embassy noted that it was the best press the United States had received in Pakistan in months. (Telegram 1625 from Karachi; ibid.)↩