Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, February 12, 1966, 12:38 p.m.

1225. Joint State/Defense. [Refs] (a) Deptel 1417 to Delhi, 1184 to Karachi, 331 to Rawalpindi; (b) Deptel 1410 to Delhi, 1120 to Karachi, 328 to Rawalpindi;² (c) Deptel 1467 to Delhi, 1213 to Karachi, 340 to Rawalpindi, 2342 to Saigon.³ Notal.

Subject: U.S. Military Sales Policy re India/Pakistan.

1. In light of prompt and effective movement by India and Pakistan to implement withdrawal provisions of pertinent SC Resolutions and Tashkent Declaration, USG has concluded that our objective in imposing total ban on military shipments to India and Pakistan has been largely accomplished and that retention of this policy would not serve U.S. interests or objectives in either country. At same time, there have been fundamental changes in our relationship with subcontinent and phasing and substance of future military shipments to India and Pakistan must take this into account.

2. President has therefore authorized more flexible policy to permit some commercial sales and MAP credit sales of nonlethal military equipment. Policy will be administered on selective, limited, case-by-case basis with decisions clearly related to events on subcontinent and subject to continued satisfactory moves toward peace, e.g. actual troop withdrawal.

3. New policy, which Vice President will convey both Governments, designed to (a) relieve some of the pressures on both leaders, but particularly Ayub; (b) ease pressures on India and Pakistan to turn to Soviet and ChiCom sources of supply respectively and give us stronger basis for action designed prevent such dependence; (c) indicate U.S. understanding of security problems facing both countries; (d) enable us to retain military relationship with both, and most important (e) indicate U.S. approval of India’s and Pakistan’s movement toward reconciliation their differences at conference table. Specific sales under this policy will be concluded only upon satisfactory completion of withdrawals; i.e., presumably February 25.

4. We plan to approve export military items gradually, at least at outset, and with special attention to political and military effects of each approval given circumstances on subcontinent. At outset we will look with greater favor on straight sales than credit sales, getting into latter as and when situation on subcontinent continues improve. (We anticipate GOP will wish to take advantage of opportunity to place their purchases on a credit sales basis. If this matter is raised GOP should be advised that we are prepared discuss further steps in implementing a credit arrangement.)

5. Definition of Nonlethal: Includes transport, observation, trainer aircraft, and unarmed helicopters and support equipment and spares;

Trucks, trailers, and miscellaneous wheeled vehicles and spares;

Communications, radar and signal equipment (includes Star Sapphire, but not grant aid at this time);

Engineer equipment (including Border Roads Organization support), medical and Quartermaster equipment;

Training;

Excluded from the foregoing are armed or armored vehicles such as tanks and APC’s, infantry weapons, artillery, ammunition, armed helicopters, and combat aircraft. Spare parts in support these items also excluded.

Machine tools for defense production not on Munitions List and non-lethal but there likely be problem availability since in any event surplus U.S. tools being diverted to U.S. munitions industry for priority Vietnam needs.

6. Execution: USG prepared to accept cash and credit sales requests (i.e. either new orders or requests for revalidation orders presently suspended) through medium of USMSMI and MAAG Pak for items and services identified as non-lethal in para 5 above. It should be emphasized, however, that each such request will be treated on case-by-case basis and willingness of U.S. to acquiesce in sale must necessarily be weighed against conditions prevailing at time on subcontinent. Further relaxation of U.S. policy to permit resumption of some grant aid and possible sale of lethal items not predictable at this time.

7. We consider that opening up of our sales policy to both India and Pakistan gives us opportunity to re-establish measure of cooperation and rapport between MAAG Pakistan and USMSMI and their host country’s military colleagues. Accordingly, we consider it of utmost importance that items requested by India and Pakistan be submitted through MAAG Pakistan, USMSMI and CINCMEAFSA channel for validation.

8. Most appropriate initial items (in addition to exceptions already made ref b) seem to us to be in field communication equipment; e.g. Pakistan, Electro-Craft radios of value $3 million; India, AN/PRC–25 radios from RCA (we willing offer credit for these since delivery unlikely until mid-year in accordance our request to Indians to give up early delivery in favor our needs Vietnam).

9. Request Country Team comments on initial military items falling under non-lethal definition para 5 to be released soonest. For time being you should not discuss this with third country missions, i.e., British, Canadian, Australian.

10. New policy should not be conveyed to Governments until visit of Vice President. At that time each Government should be informed policy applies equally to other. No public announcement should be made and we would expect GOI and GOP follow similar course. We will inform U.K., Canada and Australia of new policy after it has been conveyed to both Governments.

11. For Karachi/Rawalpindi: We are informing Pak Embassy here that Department has Electro-Craft problem under active review, and that we assume GOP will take this into consideration before pressing further to break contract.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by William L. Simmons and Schneider (SOA), and Stoddard (DOD/ISA); cleared by Komer, Hoopes, Warren, Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs (NEA/NR) Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, and Dwight M. Cramer (G/PM-MC); and approved by Handley. Also sent to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, and Saigon and Bangkok for the Vice President. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA, CHUSMSMI, and CHMAAG Pakistan.
2. Telegrams 1410 and 1417 to New Delhi deal with unrelated matters. The references are in error and have not been further identified.
3. Document 293.
4. Telegram 1485 to New Delhi, also sent to Karachi as telegram 1229, February 12, expanded upon a primary concern conditioning policy considerations in Washington: “As we begin to move back selectively toward new economic aid and supply of military items to India and Pakistan, their level of military expenditure is high among the issues of concern to us. In brief, our concern stems from belief that overspending on defense endangers progress by both toward accommodation and causes them unduly divert their resources and energies from task of internal economic development.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 INDIA)