Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

285. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, January 20, 1966, 1345Z.

1865. 1. Although I was invited to visit Mrs. Indira Gandhi at her home early last evening following her election, I thought it wiser to postpone my presentation of the Pres’s invitation² until this morning when she might have more of an opportunity to talk. I called on her at 11:30 (local) Thursday and talked with her for 35 mins on a wide range of subjects.

A. Mrs. Gandhi expressed her appreciation for my congratulations and for Mrs. Bowles personal call on her last evening and admitted deep personal satisfaction over her election. If she had taken over following her father’s death, she said, it would have been properly written off as an emotional carry-over of the Nehru name. Although the present circumstances were tragic she was now accepted by the party in her own right and this meant a great deal to her.

B. Mrs. Gandhi spoke in a friendly manner of Morarji Desai; while deploring his rigidity she said he had great courage and she particularly appreciated his generous remarks following her election. (Note: There are many rumors and counter-rumors here regarding Desai becoming a member of Cabinet in either Home or Finance Ministries. Many people in and around the govt favor this move because of his demonstrated ability to carry one-third of the parliamentary group along with him while others argue that he is too disruptive a personality or that he would not accept if asked.)

C. Mrs. Gandhi was much pleased with the Pres’s letter and invitation; also with the letter from the Vice Pres.³ In view of all the fence mending and political decisions that lay ahead she did not see how she could get away during the first week in Feb before the budget session of Parliament started. She was hopeful however that after the budget message is delivered (Feb 28) there might be a lull which would permit her to accept the Pres’s invitation at that time. She stressed her desire to visit US as soon as it was humanly possible.

D. Mrs. Gandhi expressed concern over stories which she said had appeared in the US press stating that she leaned towards the USSR and was a close friend of Krishna Menon. She asked for my personal cooperation in clearing up what she described as a gross misunderstanding.

E. Mrs. Gandhi stated that she had deep respect and affection for the US and was a great personal admirer of Pres Johnson. She understood the importance of US assistance, and was profoundly grateful for what we had done. While India was also helped by the USSR she was under no illusions about the totalitarian nature of Soviet society nor was she unaware of Soviet long-term objectives in regard to India.

F. In regard to Krishna Menon the stories of his alleged political connection with her were simply not true. Indeed he had done more to harm her during the past difficult week than any other single individual. He had worked relentlessly for Nanda and had done so in a manner designed to discredit her personally. While Krishna Menon still had followers among the younger people because of his speaking ability and personal charm, he would have no part in her administration; she had come to look on him as an adversary and not as a friend.

2. In response, I urged her to relax in regard to her relationship with the US. She had many good friends and admirers there and Pres and Mrs. Johnson were eagerly looking forward to her visit. Most thoughtful Americans understood India’s desire to build a bridge between the US and USSR and were hopeful that the new govt under her direction would be increasingly successful along these lines.

3. I added that there was however some feeling in America that GOI neutrality in recent years had been bent towards the Soviet Union and I was hopeful that this impression could be corrected during coming months. As I saw it the formula for good relations with us involved three basic points:

A. Continue fully to support the Tashkent settlement and do everything in India’s power to implement not only withdrawal portion but also proposals for dealing with outstanding disputes.

B. Maintain a genuine and positive neutrality in regard to US and USSR assisting us wherever possible in our efforts to move the Soviet Union towards a more constructive world position which would enable us to go forward on such questions as disarmament, stabilization of trouble areas, etc.

C. Key India’s requests for US aid to pragmatic economic policies which take into account the recent successful experience of such countries as Japan, Italy, Mexico, etc. giving high priority to agriculture, education, and population planning and assigning a major developmental role to the private sector.

4. Mrs. Gandhi expressed her appreciation of my personal assurances and stated she could not take exception to any of my comments in regard to Indian policy in the context of the India-US relationship. If this was in fact the essential formula for a good working relationship between India and the US it would be an easy matter for her to follow it.

5. In an obvious further effort to reassure us in regard to her general economic and political posture, Mrs. Gandhi spoke in the highest terms of Subramaniam whom she described as ablest man in the Cabinet and also went out of her way to praise Asoka Mehta and Chavan for whom she knows we have a high regard.

6. She also expressed her appreciation of Pres Johnson’s effort to find a basis for peace in Viet Nam and stated that her govt would do everything in its power to assist us to that end.

7. Mrs. Gandhi added that in economic matters she thought her new govt would be significantly more action-minded than the previous one. Although she had the greatest admiration for Mr. Shastri, she would insist on more young people in the govt and would press hard on such programs as family planning.

8. Comment: Throughout this informal and relaxed exchange Mrs. Gandhi was calm, articulate and assured. Indeed I sensed a significant change in her personality which was reflected in a new appearance of personal security and a willingness to comment freely on controversial matters.

9. We still have no hard info in regard to the new Cabinet except for the assurance that Subramaniam will probably stick with Agriculture but that if he should move to Finance someone in whom he personally has total confidence will take his place.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 INDIA. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, Karachi, Moscow, and USUN and passed to the White House at 1:45 p.m. McGeorge Bundy passed a copy of the telegram to the President on January 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, 1/3–2/23/66)
2. See Document 283.
3. Not found.