Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

284. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, January 19, 1966, 0615Z.

286. President Ayub on Tashkent.

1. During Jan 18 call on Pres Ayub I told him Pres Johnson and Secretary Rusk had instructed me to convey their great appreciation for Ayub’s high statesmanship in reaching Tashkent agreement and undertaking to follow promising but not easy course in relations with India. I further told Ayub I was instructed to say US will follow developments stemming from Tashkent with interest and sympathy and with a disposition to do everything possible to support and help in conciliatory course he is following.

2. Pres Ayub said Prime Minister Shastri had realized necessity of peace for both India and Pakistan, and Ayub thought Shastri had also realized need for some resolution of Kashmir dispute. According Ayub, at Tashkent Shastri initially suggested freezing the Sept 23 cease-fire line but Ayub has opposed this as lacking in principle and had emphasized that this and other aspects Indo-Pak relations must be based on recognized principle. Here Ayub said Russians were helpful in moving Indians along in reasonable direction. Ayub stressed US also can play important role of helping bring India along. This not question of forcing Indian decision, which he agreed with Pres Johnson not feasible. Nonetheless, he said, US has role to play, and its influence on India could promote consolidation of Tashkent spirit. Any event, GOP will keep us informed about Tashkent follow-on negotiations with India. I said hoped new Indian Prime Minister could go promptly to Washington and believed this important to Pakistan as well as India and US. Ayub agreed reiterating importance of US influence on India. If that influence used, US policy objectives will be advanced, according Ayub. Ayub said Kosygin worked night and day at Tashkent and had expressed hope Paks would not feel USSR favoring India. To this Ayub said he replied that he hoped Kosygin would thoroughly understand position of Pakistan as well as India. According Ayub, Russians played big role in Tashkent agreement. For example, he said, right at the end India had pressed for no-war declaration but in this as other matters Kosygin had been able to exert constructive influence. Ayub then remarked “I think US can now play much bigger role.” Ayub impression was that Kosygin a big man, reasonable and open to argument.

3. I remarked that statement on non-use of force in Tashkent declaration was in line with UN Charter and predicted that Pak people will surely come to understand reason behind it. Ayub agreed they would understand and observed that, in any event, he couldn’t act contrary to Pak national interests. He added, “If they want someone else, I am willing.” I probed with observation Ayub apparently being supported on Tashkent by east wing and civil servants, business and bulk of rural populace, but he did not take the bait.

4. I observed it tragic irony that every time Pakistan appears to be making progress with Indian leader he passes on, as in case Gandhi, Nehru and now Shastri. I inquired if there any private understandings with Shastri at Tashkent to which his successor might not be privy. Ayub said had feeling Shastri relieved after signature Tashkent declaration. At following private luncheon Shastri had suggested to him both sides should take visible actions that would have impact on their peoples, e.g., meetings of Indo-Pak military leaders on withdrawal, prompt exchange of high commissioners, perhaps revival of air transit rights. Ayub said they also discussed such problems as shootings along East Pak-Indian border. Ayub said he noted all East Pakistan under one administration while West Bengal under several, and had proposed all border control West Bengal be put under single military commander.

4. [sic] After Shastri’s death Ayub said he promptly convened Shastri’s advisors and passed on to them what Shastri had indicated to him privately. These advisors included Defense Minister Chavan, Fon Min Swaran Singh, Fon Secretary Jha, High Commissioner to Pakistan Kewal Singh and two or three others. I expressed hope nothing in way of specific understandings had been lost in process, and Ayub said he hoped same.

5. Ayub said Defense Minister Faruque, who attended Shastri funeral, had reported from Delhi that population there seemed relieved to see him, although, Ayub added, one doesn’t know how Indian Government feels. I said there appeared be good general reception of Tashkent declaration in India, although no doubt some dissatisfaction bound be present on both sides.

6. During brief exchange on Indian succession, Ayub indicated considerable reservations about leading candidate Indira Gandhi. He seemed to think she an extremist who, being a woman, might embark on adventures. While believing she perhaps better than Morarji Desai, Ayub said he apprehensive lest she be dominated by Krishna Menon.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, New Delhi, London, Karachi, Moscow, Tehran, Ankara, and Kabul.