Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

277. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 7, 1966.

SUBJECT

• India—Technical Team Visit

1. McGeorge Bundy has relayed to me your instructions.² The technical team will not leave as scheduled.

2. The team will stand by for further instructions. Bundy informs me that it is not your intention to cancel the team but rather to delay it until the Pakistan India Tashkent conversations have concluded.³

3. It is important that we keep as much pressure on Shastri in particular and the Indian Government in general as possible. To date they have conformed to our wishes in general terms. Public announcements implementing your expressions in your conference with Subramaniam and the Rome agreement have been made and a number of actions have been taken and instructions issued in New Delhi. However, that does not mean that the Indian Bureaucracy and the Indian States are acting. To the extent that we can measure the real commitment of the Indian Government and the Indian people by actions taken as well as announced, this should be done prior to the Shastri visit. We can make such judgments only from detailed information verified on the spot, not from generalizations. Hence the importance of getting the team to India and back as quickly as possible. They have been instructed not only to review and survey the Indian capacity for handling various volumes of grain (no commitments implied), but also to check thoroughly plans for the 1967 crop and how the long term Indian agricultural program is moving.

The team will be headed by Clarence Eskildsen, the Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service. He is a highly competent, experienced man. His rank is such that the team is clearly on a professional technical not a policy mission and there will be no basis for reading any commitment into it.

4. The Indians have been following up the possibility you suggested to Subramaniam that I might visit India before the Shastri visit. They have sent a number of inquiries this week about my plans. I expect I owe them a response one way or the other fairly soon.

Advantages

(1) Obviously I would be able to advise the President more solidly after following up the technical team’s conclusions personally on the ground.

(2) Attention will be focused world-wide on the generosity of President Johnson and the U.S.A. where India’s food needs are concerned.

(3) It may be that I could put more pressure on the Indians to take actions we might think are necessary prior to the Shastri visit rather than after. Commitments we may conclude are necessary which I could not get the President might require from Shastri at the time of the visit.

Disadvantage

An appearance by a Member of the President’s Cabinet might well be interpreted as an overall commitment of the United States to provide whatever food is necessary in India in 1966. As you are well aware there has been considerable speculation to this effect already. We have done our best to prevent such speculation and to make clear that there is no commitment. Yet the very process of planning the logistics for the future (which we cannot afford to postpone) tends to stimulate speculative stories of U.S. commitment no matter how cautiously we proceed.

Recommendation

On balance I would recommend my visit to India wait until after the Shastri visit.

Additional pressure that we might be able to build up by a pre-Shastri visit would on balance, I think, be negated by the inevitable publicity which would carry an implication of a far-reaching commitment by the United States Government should I visit India this month. On the basis then that we will keep the most pressure on the Indian Government by withholding my visit until after the Shastri visit I would so recommend.

Action⁴

1. Postpone your visit until following Shastri.

2. Plan to go prior to the Shastri visit.

3. Discuss this with me further.

4. Send the technical team as soon as the Tashkent Conference concludes.

5. Talk to me further before you send the technical team.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, 9/65–1/66. Administratively Confidential.
2. Bundy sent this memorandum to the President on January 7 under cover of a memorandum that reads: “I had a talk with Orville this morning after my conversation with you, and this is the result. I hope you may find it more nearly what you want from him.” (Ibid.)
3. Freeman sent a cable to Bowles on January 7 informing him that the survey team would be delayed. (Telegram 1227 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA) On January 8 Bowles replied to Freeman that the Indian Government, and Subramaniam in particular, were “severely let down” and concerned by the last-minute postponement for unspecified reasons. (Telegram 1173 from New Delhi; ibid.) Komer sent a cable to Bowles on January 8 in which he explained: “Might be helpful if I underline privately that failure GOI as yet to mount all-out effort to get famine aid from other countries is impeding our own response.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles) Telegram 1247 to New Delhi, January 11, informed the Embassy that the trip had been rescheduled and the Eskildsen team was planning to be in India January 14–16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA)
4. Options 1 and 4 are circled on the memorandum. It is not clear that the President made the markings, but the choices reflect the decisions that were made.