Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

276. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 6, 1966.

SUBJECT

• The Indian Food Situation: The Problem of Timing

I have been reading the history of the last great famine in India—in 1943—and discussing with experts the timing of various aspects of the Indian food situation this year.

Three facts emerge.

1. During February and March of this year there will be about 500,000 tons of unutilized Indian port capacity which could be used to build stocks if grain shipments get there on time. From April on port capacity will be tight.

2. If chemical fertilizers are to be applied in time to raise output in the November 1966 harvest, they must arrive in India by June.

3. If the food situation is as serious as all our experts tell us it will be, there will be certain signs of malnutrition and famine in the spring; but the most dangerous period will come in the months August–October 1966. From these facts, it seems clear that we ought to make a maximum effort now to use the 500,000 tons of idle port capacity available during February and March. That would be enough grain to feed something like 10 million people in the three critical months before the November harvest. Although we will be exploring with the Indians the possibility of extraordinary methods for food delivery, it is possible that what we lose in February and March will be lost for good.

So far as the U.S. is concerned, it may take a prompt decision by you to proceed with a PL 480 agreement beyond the 1.5 million tons in order to mobilize the wheat and the shipping in time to exploit the idle port capacity available in February and March.

In addition, it may be necessary for the Indians to put direct, very high-level pressure on the Canadians and Australians to divert some ships from their commercial traffic to Indian ports. I suspect only decisions by the Prime Ministers could force the special arrangements required to divert cargoes. We may wish Chet Bowles to call this possibility to Shastri’s attention when he returns from Tashkent.

Frankly, what worries me, as a planner, is that a good many human beings may starve in those critical months before the next harvest because all of us didn’t make the special urgent effort necessary to use the idle port capacity briefly available in the next several months.² (Probably 3 million Indians starved to death in the 1943 famine.)

A similar sense of urgency will be required to round up the chemical fertilizers and get them there by June. If they don’t lay the fertilizer down in time, we could have a second thin harvest in 1966–67. In the case of fertilizers, pressure will probably have to be exerted on Japan, Germany and Britain, since I am told that our fertilizer production and shipping capacity are committed to the hilt. Again, the Indians should be leaning on them; and we should be backing their play.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, 9/65–1/66. No classification marking. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.
2. Komer sent a memorandum to President Johnson on January 8 in which he also stressed the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity to ship grain to India before Indian port capacity was cut by the onset of the rainy season in late May. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18, January 1–8, 1966)