263. Memorandum of Conversation1
President Johnson said that he knew that he and President Ayub were running a little late since a luncheon was scheduled at 1:15 pm but that they both had wanted to use every possible moment. He said that, despite what the radio and newspapers had said, he and President Ayub were very good friends and that there was no one he admired more. He said that he and the President would arrange more meetings and that President Ayub had reassured him and convinced him, if he ever needed convincing, of the importance of Pakistan, of the friendship between Pakistan and the United States, and of the problems Pakistan has been facing. “Our people”, the President said, “must be friends, [Page 502] we must find out what went wrong and erase it and we are going to do just that”. The President was proud of the association between the United States and Pakistan and especially of President Ayub, one of today’s truly great men.
President Ayub responded by saying that he had the greatest affection and regard for President Johnson. “The President when he was Vice President had no reason to take any note of me when I was here in 1961 but he invited me to his ranch and was so kind and generous that I will never forget it. The amount of kindness and affection he and Mrs. Johnson bestowed on me was unbelievable. The United States is very fortunate to have a man of his stature as President and I am truly happy the President is where he is. President Johnson is a man of very large heart.”
President Ayub said that he and President Johnson talked about problems between Pakistan and the United States. They had recognized that there has been a certain amount of drift in the last few years. Pakistan’s basic concern was its national security. United States policy had begun to change in 1959 when we had started reassessing the value of our pacts and alliances with various countries. It was during this period, with our changing views of the importance of pacts, that we had decided that we could do business with neutrals and that this had special application to United States relations with India. This was further stepped up when Communist China and India began to have border difficulties. The Indian military budget had been increased 300%. An army of a million had been established. It was difficult for him to understand how an army of this size could be used against China since there was no room for it given the difficulty of the terrain. He felt that this Indian buildup was directed principally against Pakistan. He stated that India had increased its divisions from 9 to 21. India was now raising 10 more divisions. Within the past four or five years the Indian military budget had increased from $600 million annually to $2.6 billion. He saw absolutely no requirement for such a large military establishment. If it were not for United States generosity India would be starving. On the other hand, if peace were possible, India and Pakistan could divert large sums to economic development. Pakistan intended to be reasonable about Kashmir with the hope that some kind of solution could be reached. After that, a reduction of forces could take place and then there would be freedom of fear from each other. If peace were to come United States interests would be promoted as would those of India and Pakistan. The question, of course, is how to bring this about. There was the United Nations. There was the possibility of a plebiscite or of arbitration where two or three eminent people might be asked to make the decision. With binding arbitration neither side would lose face. There was a precedent for this in the Radcliffe [Page 503] Commission as well as the arbitration provision worked out for settlement of the Rann of Kutch border dispute.
Ayub said that he and the President had discussed United States-Pakistan relations, how attached both sides were to these relations and distressed to find that they had been adrift. The United States was the greatest power in the world and the United States should ponder how it could bring about the mechanics for moving India and Pakistan toward a settlement.
Ayub said that Pakistan was in a unique geographic position “with three major powers breathing down our necks”.
Pakistan had to do what it could to maintain its security in the face of three powers whose motives were certainly questionable. For Pakistan, it was a compulsion of circumstances and they had therefore been trying to normalize their relations with China. As an indication of the dangers in Pakistan’s geographic position, he said that the Soviet Union “had put an enormous amount of stuff in Afghanistan and that at the time of the Indian-Pakistan conflict that the Afghans had mobilized their resources against Pakistan”. (Our information is that the opposite was true.)
Pakistan was made up of many races and tribes but they were all bound together by religion. There was no internal communism in Pakistan since the Communist Party had been banned.
He realized that the United States had its global problems and could recognize the difficulties facing the United States in trying to deal with DeGaulle, Viet-Nam, etc. But if the United States could make a gesture towards settling Indo-Pak disputes it would be enormously appreciated.
He concluded by saying that, if India and Pakistan were to clash, ruination would take place and then there would be no need for Communist China or the Soviet Union to bring communism to the subcontinent from the outside. Communism in such circumstances would surely come from within. United States interests in the subcontinent were, therefore, very much involved in having peace between India and Pakistan.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2569. Secret. Drafted by Handley on December 17 and 20. The memorandum is marked “Draft.” Although it is dated December 15, according to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting took place on December 14 in the Cabinet Room at the White House. President Ayub was in Washington for an official visit December 14–15. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the other U.S. participants in the meeting were Ball, Hare, Handley, McConaughy, and Ambassador Lloyd Hand. The other Pakistani participants were Bhutto, Minister for Commerce Ghulam Faruque, Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed, Altar Guahar, Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Salman A. Ali, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Embassy Iftikhar Ali. (Johnson Library)↩