Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

259. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 31–32–65

Washington, December 7, 1965.

INDO-PAKISTANI REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

The Problem

To estimate the reactions to certain US courses of action by India and Pakistan.

Scope Note

The problems of the subcontinent and US interests there are complex and interrelated. They are complicated still further by the deep involvement of the USSR, China, and other powers. It follows that any particular US action will produce different reactions according to the overall international situation, and to the other decisions which accompany it and set the general context of US policy. In order to render the problem manageable, we deal in this estimate with five general US courses of action, as given to us by the Department of State. It is recognized that many other combinations of policy decisions and many variations of emphasis are equally possible.

A Military Annex² incorporates our response to certain specific questions submitted by the Department of Defense concerning the effects of the US/UK arms embargo.

Assumptions

1. Communist China remains preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and does not launch a major military attack on India, though we do not rule out the possibility of limited military probes across India’s northern border.

2. The USSR, while seeking to avoid an outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities, continues its basic pro-Indian policy, including both economic and military assistance.

3. The formal cease-fire endures, but no political settlement is in sight and the Security Council remains the focal point of US action.

Discussion

I. The Current Situation

1. Indo-Pakistani relations. The two countries now regard one another with heightened suspicion and fear as a consequence of the recent war. Pakistan continues to press for negotiations and for a change in the status of Kashmir, i.e., one under which India would give up at least part of the area of Jammu and Kashmir it now holds. India remains adamant in refusing to do so; its determination has been reinforced by its awareness that its military superiority has been enhanced as a result of the recent fighting. The cease-fire is still shaky, and frequent violations continue. A renewal of major hostilities now seems unlikely, and the UN may be able to secure some token troop withdrawal over the next few months. However, there is, in this period, little likelihood that negotiations will make progress towards a political settlement.

2. India. India came out of the recent war with a new sense of self-confidence and pride and a heightened determination to hold on to Kashmir. Though many of its claims were exaggerated, the Indian Army in fact did well enough to erase many of the memories of its previous humiliations. The war’s outcome has greatly strengthened Prime Minister Shastri’s position and that of the Congress Party. However, the war aggravated India’s already serious economic problems. For several years its rate of growth has been about 3–5 percent instead of the planned 7–8 percent, and the dislocations caused by the conflict have probably lowered this rate even further. Despite large food imports, very serious food shortages have existed. Shortfalls in this year’s harvest now threaten India with a food crisis of major proportions. India’s foreign exchange reserves are now at the minimum statutory level; at the same time, it has current foreign debt obligations of nearly $500 million a year.

3. Pakistan. The war brought on a similar mood of patriotic zeal in Pakistan, and most Pakistanis probably still believe their government’s claim that Pakistan “won.” Pakistani public opinion is now even more determined to force some progress on Kashmir. However, the military and government leaders probably know that India got the best of it in the war, and they now recognize that India is the stronger power. The fact that Kashmir remains in Indian hands is apparent to all. So far, Ayub’s position and authority have not been threatened, but an increasing number of Pakistanis may come to blame him as it becomes clear that his recent policies have not weakened India’s hold on Kashmir. The war has shaken business confidence and significantly reduced the level of private investment, a fact which is slowing Pakistan’s heretofore impressive rate of economic growth. Its immediate economic problems, however, especially in the area of food supply, are not as critical as those of India.

4. US Aid to the Subcontinent. The US has provided military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan.³ Over the past 15 years, the US has provided about $3 billion in economic aid to India and about $2.1 billion to Pakistan. In the same period, it also shipped PL 480 food grains worth some $3 billion to India and $1.1 billion to Pakistan. Military aid delivered to India (starting in 1963) has amounted to $92 million and to Pakistan (starting in 1954) $676.7 million. Since the outbreak of hostilities in September 1965, all US military aid has been stopped. No new US economic aid commitments have been made, but assistance already in the pipeline still goes on. PL 480 food grains shipments continue, but are committed on a short-term basis.⁴

5. Both countries are now extremely worried about future US aid policies, though for different reasons. Pakistan, whose military power vis-à-vis India is now significantly weaker than it was before the recent war, wants military aid and sales resumed. Its armed forces, being almost completely dependent on the US for replacements and spare parts, have been weakened by attrition and the termination of US aid. India’s leaders are concerned primarily with the resumption of US economic assistance. In particular, they need non-project aid to provide large amounts of fertilizer and other materials to increase agricultural output. Pakistan wants the US to use its aid to force India into a Kashmir settlement. India does not want the US to furnish Pakistan with military equipment under any circumstances.

6. PL 480. A highly important aspect of US aid to the subcontinent is the PL 480 food program which provides eight percent of the food consumed in each country. Its loss would hurt both countries, but Pakistan less than India. The Pakistani Government has built up relatively larger reserves of foodstuffs, and its domestic food grain production record is better than India’s. Though short of foreign exchange, it could purchase the extra food needed for its 112 million population more easily than could India for its 484 million. Further, Pakistan could, more easily than India, arrange for equitable distribution throughout the country.

7. India’s leaders fear a PL 480 cutoff. Were these shipments terminated, India would face a grave crisis. India does not grow enough food to be self-sufficient, its most recent harvest has been very poor, and it suffers from serious and continuing troubles in assuring equitable food distribution. These difficulties have already led to recent sharp price rises, hoarding, black marketing, and serious shortages in food deficit areas despite heavy PL 480 imports. Though India has minimal foreign exchange reserves, it could utilize its hard currency earnings (about $1.2 billion annually, mostly from the export of raw commodities) to buy food imports on the open market. However, it is doubtful that on a crash basis the Indian Government could divert the exchange and arrange for shipment. Even if it could, the diversion of several hundred million dollars of its export earnings would have a serious adverse effect on India’s development program and its economy.

8. The Subcontinent and Communist China. Pakistan has developed progressively more cordial relations with Peking since the Chinese humiliated India in the border war of late 1962 and the US began military assistance to India. During the recent fighting, the ties between China and Pakistan became even closer. Though recognizing that China can provide little effective economic assistance and not enough military hardware, Pakistan views Chinese military power as a valuable asset in its confrontation with India. It sees considerable advantage India’s fear of China’s military power and the consequent deployment of major Indian forces along the Chinese rather than the Pakistani border. Moreover, Pakistan will wish to retain the option of seeking active Chinese intervention in the event of renewed Indo-Pakistani hostilities.

9. The Role of the USSR . Over the years, the USSR has been relatively hostile to Pakistan and has consistently backed India on Kashmir. Moscow has pledged over $1 billion of economic assistance to India; the latter will probably be utilizing Soviet bloc aid at the rate of $250–$300 million a year over the next several years. The USSR has also, since 1962, become a major arms supplier to India. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to view India as by far their primary area of interest on the subcontinent, continuing to grant economic aid and probably selling India additional military equipment. Recently, however, Moscow has apparently decided to improve its relations with Pakistan insofar as this is compatible with its position in India. This move has been made both possible and desirable by a series of developments: the deterioration of US-Pakistani relations; the growth of the Sino-Soviet dispute; the Chinese threat to India; and Chinese influence in Rawalpindi. Moscow now sees an opportunity to try to undercut both the Chinese and the US by seeking improvement in its relations with Pakistan.

II. Courses of Action

10. In general, the following possible US courses of action represent various means of attempting to influence the policy of India and Pakistan by use of military and economic aid. Both countries urgently require such aid, though in different degrees. Neither country could wholly replace, from other sources, the types and amounts of aid previously received from the US. Therefore, both will be greatly affected by US policies in this respect.

11. There are nevertheless limits to the influence which the US can exert on either government by its aid policies. We do not believe that the basic antagonisms between the two countries can be significantly reduced by the influence of any outside power. India will remain hostile to Communist China, but will try to retain good relations with both the USSR and the US. India is unlikely to forego the option to develop nuclear weapons. For its part, Pakistan will almost certainly want to keep some sort of relationship with Peking as insurance against India, no matter how favorable its relations with the US may become. Pakistan believes it must have arms for protection against India and will seek such arms wherever it can.

12. Of the following courses of action, all except Course III differ significantly from those the US has followed in the past. Assuming that the US persisted for a long time in any one of these courses, the whole context of the situation would change. The balance of forces operating within the subcontinent would be different from what it is now, and the influence of the USSR, of Communist China, and perhaps of other powers would bear on the situation in ways largely unpredictable. This estimate does not attempt to trace out the numerous possible ramifications of such developments, or to assess their various meanings for the interests of the US. The following paragraphs set forth our judgment of reactions to the postulated courses in the fairly near future—a few months to a year or so—with only a few hints of some possible repercussions of wider scope or longer term.

13. Courses I, II, and III postulate continued economic aid from the US at approximately 1963–1964 levels to both countries. In Courses I and II, military assistance at 1963–1964 levels is provided to one country, while the other receives only “some military assistance”; in Course III, military assistance is resumed to both at 1963–1964 levels. The three courses differ not only in respect to amounts of military aid supplied, but also in the quid pro quo demanded of each country, and in the degree to which the US associates itself with the policies and aspirations of one or the other of the two. In respect to all five courses, reactions would to a considerable extent be determined by how the two countries interpreted US motives and long range objectives in each instance.

Course I: The US, convinced that a stable, influential, and economically viable India is the most effective Asian counterweight to China, and that Pakistan’s involvement with China can be held within acceptable limits, moves clearly toward India. In a variety of ways the US seeks a closer identification with India, resumes large scale economic and substantial military assistance to India and refrains from pressing India to make concessions on Kashmir. As part of this new relationship, the US would expect agricultural and other economic reforms, closer Indian security collaboration with the US vis-à-vis China, and renunciation of an independent nuclear weapons capability. The US would bolster its new Indian policy by resuming economic aid at approximately 1963–1964 levels and some military assistance to Pakistan.

14. India. If the US should make such a definite choice favoring India, Indian good will toward the US would increase, particularly if there were a dramatic increase in US food shipments in time of threatened famine; however, this positive reaction would be tempered by the resumption of even limited arms aid to Pakistan. The US would be able to improve substantially its relations with the Indian Government. The prestige and primacy of Shastri and the Congress Party throughout India would be considerably enhanced, thereby contributing to Indian stability. Cooperation with the US in the security field, directed against China, would continue and probably increase. The Indian leaders would be more receptive to US advice in such fields as economic reform and improved food distribution. Their ability to carry out reform measures would continue to be limited, but the level of economic achievement would probably show some improvement. Although India’s leaders would not formally and permanently renounce an independent nuclear weapons capability, they would probably be willing to give assurances that they would not order the manufacture of a nuclear device for some time.

15. At the same time, however, the Indians would hold fast to their policy of nonalignment between the US and the USSR. The Soviets would probably continue to provide India with substantial economic and military aid, and Indo-Soviet ties would remain close. In various areas of foreign policy, India would, from time to time, be at odds with the US.

16. Pakistan. We do not believe we can estimate with confidence the reaction of Pakistan. Important individuals would react in different ways, and conflicting emotions would be aroused. What Pakistan would do would depend in part on how the US actions were presented, on the actions and promises of other countries (including India), and on a variety of factors which cannot be foreseen. Many Pakistanis, probably including Ayub himself, favor closer Western ties and fear too close an association with Communist China. They realize the benefits of renewed US economic aid. They are also aware of their immediate need for even limited military assistance from the US, particularly badly needed spare parts for Pakistan’s air force.⁵ Pakistan’s government might therefore swallow its profound disquiet and resentment at US policy toward India simply on the grounds that it would prefer to have what US help it could get, distasteful as the whole situation was.

17. Pakistan’s relations with the US, in such a case, would remain formally correct. Its CENTO and SEATO alliances would probably not be ended; nor would the principal US special facilities be likely to be closed down, though occasional harassments might take place. At the same time, Pakistan’s leaders would make every effort to find alternate sources of military supply and hardware. Thanks to their expanding economy, boosted by the resumption of US and Consortium economic aid, they would be able to purchase substantial military equipment and hardware, though their requirements might be a good deal greater than they could fill by this means. Relations with China would probably be little different from what they were prior to August 1965, though public expressions of support for Peking would probably diminish somewhat. Pakistan would probably try to improve its relations with the USSR.

18. It is possible, however, that the Pakistanis would react in a truculent manner. They would soon become aware that the US had changed its earlier policies and had selected India rather than Pakistan as its principal associate in South Asia. This would come as a severe shock, diminishing Pakistan’s hope of enjoying, in its own view, a position of security against India and achieving a favorable solution in Kashmir. Public opinion, already resentful of what it considers an unsatisfactory US role in the recent conflict with India, would be further inflamed. It would be difficult for any government in Rawalpindi, however strongly it desired renewed US military aid and closer ties with the West, to ignore or resist the pressures generated from below. Most of the top leaders themselves share at least some of these sentiments. In this situation, the Pakistan Government might lash out with extreme hostility to the US.

19. Were this to occur, Pakistan, while it would not break relations with the US, would react in such a manner as to make any normal relationship practically impossible. It would probably terminate the US special facilities in Pakistan, and quit CENTO and SEATO—even at the risk of losing US military and economic assistance. President Ayub’s association with Pakistan’s pro-US attitudes of the past would render him vulnerable to political attack, though he could probably sustain himself as the leader of a new policy based on denouncing the US and moving closer to those powers, particularly China, which are hostile to India. Whether Ayub remained or was replaced, Pakistani policies would take a more radical turn. Pakistan could throw in its lot with China and the radical Afro-Asians, perhaps leaving the UN, and embarking on a course similar to that which Indonesia has followed over the past several years.⁶

Course II: The US, convinced that Pakistan can once again be made a reliable ally at acceptable cost in terms of US-Indian relations, focuses its support on Pakistan. On condition that Rawalpindi will limit its relationship with China, the US resumes military and economic assistance, and presses hard for a Kashmir settlement satisfactory to Pakistan. The US would bolster this policy by resuming economic aid at approximately 1963–1964 levels and some military aid to India.

20. India. Indian reaction to a US course favoring Pakistan would be sharp and verbally violent. This would be particularly so in regard to renewal of substantial military aid to the country which India regards as the clear-cut aggressor in the recent hostilities. New Delhi would continue to see the USSR as its best potential source of sophisticated armaments, and relations with Moscow would remain excellent. Such a course would probably have little effect, one way or another, on India’s nuclear weapons policies. Cooperation with the US in the security field against China might take at least a temporary downturn. However, India’s leaders would want to count on US support against Communist China, particularly in the event of military attacks by the latter against India.

21. Moreover, the resumption of large-scale economic aid would be especially pleasing to India, which needs it far more than it does military aid. Especially at a time of threatening famine, India would welcome the assurance that PL 480 food would continue and that US assistance in a program to increase agricultural output would be resumed. India’s political system would be little affected; its economy would continue to show modest and unspectacular progress. Nonetheless, India would resent and vigorously resist US pressures on the Kashmir problem.

22. Pakistan. Pakistan would find distasteful the resumption of even limited US military aid to India. Rawalpindi would press for a formal guarantee of defense against an Indian attack, and would resent any negative US responses. Moreover, should US pressures on India fail to produce a Kashmir settlement (which would almost certainly be the case) Pakistan would become increasingly critical of the US. Pakistan would be likely to limit, though not to end, the relationship it has established with China over the past few years.

23. Despite these negative and adverse factors, however, US-Pakistani relations would be likely to show an overall improvement, particularly as it became clear that the US was indeed focusing its support on Pakistan rather than India. Special US facilities in Pakistan would be undisturbed, and those now closed would almost certainly be allowed to reopen. Pakistan’s sense of security against India would be enhanced by the resumption of US military aid. However, the tensions caused by new Pakistani efforts to get a Kashmir settlement and the residue of distrust remaining from alleged US non-support during the recent war would prevent Pakistan from again regarding the US with the degree of trust or accepting the degree of dependence that existed during the mid-1950s.

Course III: The US, believing that its previous “even-handed” approach to the subcontinent still best serves its interests, resumes economic and military aid to both countries at approximately 1963–1964 levels and under the same conditions as before the hostilities. Simultaneously, while not taking the lead on matters relating to Kashmir, it encourages efforts in the UN and elsewhere to get negotiations for a political settlement underway. Without using aid as a sanction, it presses Pakistan to limit its relationship with Communist China and India to improve its agricultural program.

24. India. Renewed military aid to Pakistan would initially bring a sharp and angry Indian reaction. At least in official circles, however, this reaction would be somewhat softened by India’s continuing need for US economic aid and support against Communist China. American pressures for an improved Indian economic performance, especially in the agricultural sector, would have some limited success. Various forms of cooperation against Communist China would continue. India would nevertheless be concerned by US military aid to Pakistan, and would itself seek a continuing high level of arms assistance from the USSR. This Moscow would almost certainly provide. The Shastri government, which would continue to dominate the political scene, would not abandon India’s generally nonaligned posture in international affairs. The course postulated would probably have little effect on India’s nuclear policies.

25. Pakistan. US-Pakistan relationships would probably revert to something similar to what they were a year or so ago. However, the experiences of the war and its aftermath have had a considerable impact. Pakistan realizes, more than it did before, that it must for some time depend on the US to maintain an effective military capability. This would lead it to refrain from brusquely or needlessly antagonizing the US; the US special facilities would not be interfered with. Even so, Pakistan would probably still blame the US for not sufficiently pressuring India into negotiations or concessions. It would also criticize the US for continuing to supply arms to India. These major irritants, plus the belief of the Pakistani leaders that they cannot count on the US to save it from any further Indian “aggression” would lead them to seek to reduce this dependence on the US. Thus they would continue to try to maintain good—though perhaps more covert—relations with the Chinese. They would also seek to diversify their sources of arms supply to the maximum extent possible.

Course IV: The US, convinced that a lasting political solution can only be arrived at between the disputants themselves and that US participation in the negotiation process would be disadvantageous, adopts a wait-and-see policy. It resumes limited economic aid on a short-term basis and conditions longer term economic assistance on Indo-Pakistani tensions being kept under control, on Pakistan’s self-imposed limitations on its relationship with Communist China, and on India’s economic performance. Depending upon progress in limiting Indo-Pakistani tensions, the US may make available selected military hardware to both countries, but would avoid longer term MAP negotiations.

26. Regardless of US aid policies, the leaders of both countries would probably like to reduce the chances of renewed hostilities. The prospects for resumption of even limited US assistance would be attractive to each. We believe that the two governments would be able to reduce some of the tensions on the subcontinent over the next year or so. They would probably maintain the cease-fire and achieve some partial withdrawal of the military forces. Some modest progress would be likely in settling long standing disputes, such as the Bengali border enclaves and the large scale expulsion from Eastern India of Muslims claimed by India to be Pakistani citizens. In these circumstances, each would probably claim that it had fulfilled the necessary conditions for the resumption of aid.

27. However, there would be some formidable obstacles to the two disputants, on their own, making much substantive progress toward a lasting political solution in the subcontinent, or even towards setting up any effective process to keep Indo-Pakistani tensions under control. Pakistan would find it almost impossible to stop insisting on a negotiated Kashmir settlement, and this would clearly inflame Indian public opinion. Pakistan, fearing Indian military power, would probably maintain some type of relationship with China directed against India. India, militarily stronger and already enjoying de facto control of Kashmir, might be willing to make minor readjustments on the cease-fire line, but it would make no major concessions on Kashmir.

28. For some months, US relations with India and Pakistan would probably remain much as they have been since the cease-fire of September 1965. There would probably not be much prospect for a substantial improvement in these relations, for the US would, in the Indian and Pakistani view, be obviously trying to pressure both countries into modifications of basic policies by denying them more than limited economic aid. Both nations would continue to suffer from relatively unsatisfactory economic conditions, though they should enjoy political stability. Their relations with other powers would probably remain unchanged. Though Pakistan might not move closer to Communist China, it would not abandon its present ties, and would continue to develop its relations with the USSR. It would probably make no move to close the US special facilities, but it might move in various ways to limit use of them. India would continue to have good relations with the USSR. At the same time, Indo-US cooperation in many fields would continue. This course of action would have no significant effect on a decision by India to manufacture a nuclear device.

Course V: The US concludes that Indo-Pakistani hostility is so profound as to be insoluble in the foreseeable future, thereby rendering previous levels of US assistance disproportionate to US interest in the subcontinent. Taking a calculated risk that India and Pakistan will increase their dependence on Communist and other support, the US adheres to modest programs providing limited PL 480 assistance, limited amounts of programs aid, but no new project assistance and no military aid.

29. Each side would at first probably view such an American decision as one similar to Course IV, intended to exert pressure on them to arrive at some mutual accommodation. In India the reaction would be much the same; in Pakistan, the response would be more severe because of the urgent need for US military assistance. Some pressure against the special US facilities could be expected. As time passed and the US action came to be widely understood, Pakistan would become increasingly concerned about the weakness of its position. It would almost certainly move closer to Communist China.

30. India would be extremely hard hit by such a course. Its concern for its security would be sharply increased. It would come to regard the USSR as its most reliable friend and would turn to the USSR for substantial new amounts of military hardware and economic aid, with a good chance of success. It would be more likely than at present to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the near future. However, India’s leaders would seek to avoid anything approaching an open break with the US, especially in view of their desperate need for PL 480 assistance.

31. Even if the USSR and some Free World countries continued to provide economic aid, the virtual termination of the US aid program would cause India’s growth rate to fall below any level it has achieved in recent years. India would almost certainly default on some of its foreign debt obligations. Prime Minister Shastri and his government could probably rally the Indian public by taking an increasingly truculent line against Pakistan and denouncing the new US policy. Their position would probably not be threatened in the short run, for the Indian public would not hold them responsible for alleged US hostility towards India. A clearcut economic disaster could probably be avoided (assuming continuance of PL 480 aid) but as the economy settled into near stagnation, the Congress Party’s position would become increasingly weak, and domestic stability might be threatened.

[Here follow Annex A, a 7-page assessment of “Indo-Pakistani Military Capabilities,” Annex B, a chart detailing “Economic Aid Pledged to India and Pakistan,” and Annex C, a chart outlining “US Military Assistance Value of Deliveries.”]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, NSA, and the AEC. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on December 7 except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
2. Not printed.
3. US economic aid (exclusive of PL 480) has been generally matched collectively by that of the other Western powers. The total amounts of economic aid received over the past several years by both countries from all sources—the US, the other Free World countries, and the Soviet Bloc—are given in Annex B. Amounts of military aid are shown in Annex C. [Footnote in the source text. Annex B and Annex C are not printed.]
4. Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that a more realistic and useful description of Indian and Pakistani views of US aid would read as follows: The Subcontinent views US aid. The US has provided military and economic aid (including PL 480) to India and Pakistan totalling about $10 billion. Because of the enduring hostility between the two countries, each assumes that the US has regularly considered this assistance program to each in relation to the other. India knows that despite its comparative size, international influence, democratic institutions, development potential and its increasing confrontation with Communist China, it has received only one-third as much assistance as Pakistan in per capita terms (roughly $6 billion including a small fraction of military aid as opposed to roughly $4 billion, one-sixth of it military). Pakistan undoubtedly assumes that this favorable past imbalance has resulted from a combination of its alliance status, its comparatively successful economic program, the provision of important facilities to the US, and India’s persistent policy of non-alignment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In general, each probably considers that past US assistance to it would probably have been greater but for predictable US policy complications with the other. The Indians think this is especially true of the restraints on our supplying of military aid to them after the 1962 Sino-Indian hostilities. Both India and Pakistan are surely aware that as the US-Chinese confrontation in Asia grows, India’s increasing hostility toward China, in contrast with Pakistan’s expanding ties, are introducing major new factors into this situation. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. See Annex A for an analysis of Pakistan’s military needs and procurement problems. [Footnote in the source text. Annex A is not printed.]
6. Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, recognizes that either of the Pakistani policy choices set forth in paragraphs 16–19 is possible, but believes that on balance Pakistan would probably react in the more rational manner of paragraphs 16–17 rather than in the hostile manner of paragraphs 18–19. Even should it adopt a net posture of hostility, including, say, withdrawal from SEATO, he does not believe that termination of the facilities would automatically follow or even be probable. He believes this because of: (a) Pakistan’s great dependence on US aid and its lack of satisfactory alternative sources, (b) Pakistan’s probable assumption that the facilities have been and will remain a source of leverage for high US aid levels, as well as for continuing attempts to influence US policy toward India, and (c) the considerable practical utility which the large facility has for Pakistan itself as a result of the training its personnel receive as well as the exclusive enclave it has there for its own purposes—an asset which continued to be used uninterruptedly throughout the recent hostilities. He further notes that unlike CENTO and SEATO, the presence of the facilities has never been a public issue in Pakistan. He believes that in view of these fundamental considerations, the direct mechanical relationship which the estimate establishes in paragraphs 19, 23, 25, 28, and 29 between the level of US support on the one hand, and the continuance of the facilities on the other, is artificial and misleading. [Footnote in the source text.]