258. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1
India Food Catastrophe. Freeman’s best expert is just back with the considered judgment of the people out there that the food crisis is even more catastrophic than previously estimated.2 The shortfall will [Page 485] probably run as high as 20 million tons instead of 10–12 million (we’re shipping at an annual rate of 6 million). Some famine and starvation seem inevitable, almost despite whatever we do. The whole crisis is now public, with major coverage in the Sunday papers here.
On the longer term front, you’ve seen Bowles’ report (Delhi 1430)3 that Indian cabinet bought almost all of the Subramaniam/Freeman recommendations. They will be announced Tuesday. India is also allocating $52 million equivalent to buying fertilizer.
Recommended US Response. We are already past the 4 December deadline if the pipeline is not to be interrupted. The tactics of our response should be to go big enough to seem generously responsive, yet limited enough to retain full bargaining leverage. The sheer magnitude of India’s food crisis makes this easy.
- A.
- Make the next allocation 2 or 3 months. The case for a longer period is to reduce panic and hoarding in India by showing that the US will come through. A secondary reason for 3 months is to carry us through Shastri visit, so he won’t have to come beg. However, we could stick with 2 months or even one if we went big on amount.
- B.
- 500,000 tons per month would now seem utterly incommensurate with the need (which may be three times higher). With some famine inevitable, should we open ourselves to accusations later that we share the responsibility for having shipped less than Indian capacity to receive? Given all the crisis publicity, our response won’t look credible any longer if we keep shipments at 500,000 tons. However, port capacity gives us a ceiling well below the need; thus, going to 750,000 tons would show responsiveness, while still making India come to us. Even one month of this would look much better than 2–3 months at 500,000. Bell favors staying at 500,000 Title I but adding on 250,000 Title II disaster relief. We pay the freight on the latter, but it looks better and protects us against Krishna Menon-type allegations that we charged money for food when Indians were starving.
- C.
- $50 million Fertilizer Loan will save 4 million tons of grain we’d otherwise be pressed to give later, though it alone will not meet the immediate problem in the months before the new crop comes in. Bell feels strongly that we should tie conditions to this loan which will force Subramaniam to carry out his promises.
If Subramaniam comes through publicly, we recommend a reciprocal White House statement (attached)4 tailored to your decisions above. It should get a good reaction here and abroad, make the Indians your debtors, and usefully remind Ayub we won’t play Kashmir politics with food. But it still leaves India’s food crisis unsolved (and only we can solve it), so keeps Shastri coming to you.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. I. Secret.↩
- The expert was Lester Brown, a staff economist in the Department of Agriculture and Freeman’s adviser during his meetings with Subramaniam in Rome. On December 6 Freeman sent a portion of the report prepared by Brown after his trip to India to President Johnson. (Memorandum from Freeman to President Johnson; ibid.)↩
- On December 6 Bowles reported that the Indian Cabinet had accepted the agreement reached at Rome with one minor exception relating to fertilizer distribution, which was to be studied by a subcommittee before final decision. (Telegram 1430 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA) On December 7 Subramaniam made parallel statements in the Lok Sabha and the Raj Sabha reporting the Cabinet decisions concerning agriculture policy. (Telegram 1440 from New Delhi, December 7; ibid., AGR 1 INDIA)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩