Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

246. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, November 12, 1965, 0330Z.

1247. Yesterday at his request I called on L. K. Jha who said he wished to discuss the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States.

After careful consideration it had been decided that any thought of a December visit should be abandoned. Parliament will not adjourn until the 10th of December and with the heavy agenda the session may drag on beyond that date which would leave almost no time before Christmas.

Therefore, the most convenient timing from the standpoint of the Prime Minister would be the first half of January, early enough to enable him to return by January 15 for the annual meeting of the All India Congress Committee in Jaipur on the 16, 17 and 18 of January.

Jha added that while the Prime Minister was anxious at some future date to spend more time in the US, he felt the current situation in India placed heavy demands on the Prime Minister and the visit should be a purely business occasion; he contemplated staying two or three days in Washington with possibly a day in New York. This would suggest the Prime Minister’s arrival in Washington around the 10th of January and his return to India around the 14th, provided of course this fits the President’s convenience. The Prime Minister was anxious that there not be any announcement of the suggested visit until a mutually agreed time in the future.

Jha then rather hesitantly stated that the Prime Minister and indeed the whole cabinet was deeply concerned about the outcome of the visit. India badly needed the US and if there is to be an independent non-Communist Asia with an effective block on Chinese expansionism the US also needed India. With so much at stake, Jha pointed out that the failure of the President and the Prime Minister to reach an understanding would have a catastrophic effect on the politics not only of India but of Asia at a very critical historic moment.

Therefore, did I see any discreet way of exploring on a preliminary basis the key questions that might arise and thus determine in some measure to what extent a meeting of the minds in Washington was likely? I said that I fully understood his concern but that I felt that with good will on both sides we can approach the meeting with confidence.

India’s basic objectives and ours are very similar, i.e., India and America are equally anxious to block Chinese expansionism, and help maintain stability in Asia and Africa, to strengthen the UN, etc. The US also recognizes that a stable, economically viable, and democratic India with one-seventh of the world’s population is absolutely basic to a stable and peaceful Asia.

For nearly twenty years we have been striving to create an Asian balance of power with almost no help from the major nations of Asia such as Japan, Indonesia, India and Pakistan.

This suggested a very key point of critical interest to us all: because we had no mass support for this essential effort we have been forced to fall back on relatively minor Asian powers such as South Korea, South Viet Nam and Taiwan and because these nations represented only 5 per cent of Asian peoples there has been no alternative but to introduce massive American military power into the equation.

One of the first questions the President might ask would be India’s willingness and ability to work towards a more effective balance of power vis-à-vis China and thus to relieve some of the present pressures on the USA. To this Jha responded in a generally affirmatively although quite naturally non-committal manner.

Comment: We believe that it is of the utmost importance that this meeting go forward and I hope that the dates mentioned will be generally accepted. We also assume that we are as keenly aware as are the Indians that the failure of these discussions would have a profoundly adverse effect on US as well as Indian interests. It is my belief that in order to create a favorable and receptive mood the following steps are important:

1. As much as our policy will permit we should seek to relieve India of any reasonable suspicions that we are trying to take advantage of their food dilemma. We have made a vigorous rebuttal to these suspicions and in the effort we have had the powerful and effective support of Subramaniam.

It would be a master stroke for the USG to invite Subramaniam in the next 2 or 3 weeks to come to the US to discuss the Indian agriculture program and outlook. This suggestion would be received with warm approval in India and would put the Indian Government in a receptive mood for the kind of discussion which I am sure the President has in mind. If at the same time, we could release the non-profit fertilizer loans so that India could order the fertilizer urgently needed for the spring planting, Indian appreciation would be profound.

2. Here in India we could continue to impress on the Indians the need for curbing the careless and sometimes irresponsible statements of such Indian leaders as Indira Gandhi, Chagla, etc.

3. In New Delhi and in the UN we should press the Indians fully to carry out the cease-fire in spite of Pak provocation and to meet Pakistan more than halfway in regard to withdrawal. This will help lay the basis for a discussion of the long-term political problems facing the two countries without running head on into India’s absolute determination not to give up the strategically important Kashmir Valley.

4. With the advice and guidance of the Department we would like gradually to proceed with more substantive discussions with Shastri and his advisors such questions as India’s continued willingness to stand up to China, India’s defense requirements under varying situations, the willingness of the Indians to give economic development the highest priority and the economic moves by India which encourage us to give India the support she requires to become self-sufficient in ten years.

There is every evidence that thoughtful Indians in and out of government are deeply conscious that many Indian criticisms of the US during the past months have been grossly unfair and there is evidence on every side of a desire to bring the situation back into balance. With careful handling in both Washington and New Delhi, we are confident this mood can be strengthened and a basis for successful negotiations in Washington established.

We would appreciate Department’s response as soon as convenient, particularly in regard to Subramaniam visit² which will require some planning all around.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. McGeorge Bundy relayed Bowles’ suggestion concerning an invitation to Subramaniam in a November 14 memorandum to President Johnson. Johnson indicated his approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Memos and Miscellaneous)