Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, November 10, 1965, 4:32 p.m.

861. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Embassy’s reporting on attitudes of GOI leaders regarding next steps in Indo-US relations, and particularly on Shastri’s visit to USA, suggests that message we want to get across to them is just not getting through. Consequently believe you should know how we see things here as background for your negotiations re visit.

2. It appears that GOI leadership, in its present militant and go-it-alone mood, may have developed mistaken notion of relative weight of elements in equation of our relationship. While we do not discount either intrinsic importance of India to us or importance at this juncture in our relations that Shastri come here, we are not prepared to make overtures to get him here or to bargain with Shastri over conditions under which he will come. Given purpose of visit, it seems to us that it is of greater importance to Indians than to us that it takes place, and it is going to be a long, cold winter in our relationship unless he gets over here to sort things out with the President. We do not wish to encourage Indians to delude themselves regarding this basic point by our posture and our actions in period before meeting takes place. Moreover, while we recognize Shastri’s narrow writ on Kashmir, it would seem from your reporting that he does have enough additional political strength these days to cope with any domestic political risks which he feels he may run in visiting US without prior understandings.

3. Our central concern will be to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US bound to respect. We have obligation to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In India’s case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction includes following:

a. Actions to turn swords into plowshares. Present twilight state of no-war, no-peace threatens progress of economic development. Since India is larger country, special responsibility falls upon it to make every effort to restore peace and maintain security of subcontinent, along lines of SC Resolution of September 20. While movement toward reconciling Indo/Pak differences may be extremely difficult at this juncture, nevertheless there is in present situation an unparalleled opportunity for India to steer Indo/Pak relations into new and more hopeful direction. At present time Pakistan is facing up to kind of hard realities and choices that would dispose it to come to terms with India on something less than plebiscite on Kashmir if India could provide way out. This means an honorable retreat for Pakistan into negotiations that will hold promise of easing its fears of Indian threat to Pakistan’s security. Clearly this will involve Kashmir as well as other outstanding issues, and sorting out may take a long time. However, what is at stake is security of subcontinent and India’s own larger interests vis-à-vis China. A serious and sustained process to find solutions to issues that divide India and Pakistan and to minimize thereby prospect of future war or exploitation by China is not too much for a friend interested in India’s future to ask. And we intend to ask for such an effort while recognizing that settlement may be a long way off.

b. Actions to translate economic promises to Indian people and to US into economic performance. Most critical issue here is question of food production. My 800² and other messages have already spelled out nature of our concern over India’s record to date and how this relates to future of PL 480 assistance.

4. On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Indians that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. Aid resumption is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by “we” I include the Indians as well. As I told S.K. Patil when he came to see me, it was only by my assurances to the Congress that I was able to prevent legislative prohibitions on aid to South Asia.

5. As great Asian country, now alert to threat of expansionist Communist China, we believe India should be able understand and, indeed, give more support to efforts US and others making in Vietnam to thwart China’s ambitions. We recognize GOI’s difficulties, particularly with Soviet Union, in taking strong public position on this and that privately it does not wish see US pull out of Southeast Asia. But we consider that India’s position and actions to date fall considerably short of what is possible.

6. In sum, Shastri should understand that President is interested in talking to him on wide variety of subjects in order to develop a personal sense of what kind of relationship between our two countries will best serve our mutual interests in years ahead, and that until this is accomplished we will not commit ourselves on numerous operational problems our two countries face. We do not intend to start out on journey until we know where we are going.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laise and Handley; cleared by Hare, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk.
2. Document 240.
3. Bowles responded that all of the issues raised in telegram 861 merited exploration during the proposed Shastri visit. He added, however: “if the tone of the message faithfully reflects the atmosphere in which the visit would occur I believe it would be a disaster.” (Telegram 1270 from New Delhi, November 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK)