Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, October 21, 1965, 8:24 p.m.

704. Following summary of conversation FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review.

Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto called on Secretary at Bhutto’s request October 21 to discuss progress within UN on Indo-Pak situation.² Ambassador Ahmed and Counselor Farooq present Pak side; Ambassador Hare and Assistant Secretary Sisco on U.S. side. Bhutto appeared primarily interested get USG views on desirability further UNSC meeting, indicating Paks in favor. Meanwhile Paks prepared defer UNGA approach. Bhutto also emphasized desirability SYG visit to subcontinent. Secretary said we would want further reading from SYG before commenting on desirability SC meeting but reaffirmed that USG prepared join in maximum effort to give effect to entire September 20 resolution. End summary.

1. Bhutto said Paks still sorting out thoughts on further SC meeting. Said he thought French position on “constitutional problems” not too difficult and in any event had assured Paks this had nothing to do with substance of issue. Soviet position less clear and meeting might not be too good if Soviets were going to be sticky. All things considered he thought another SC meeting would be useful solidify cease fire, get progress on withdrawal and “perhaps a bit more.” Bhutto agreed with Secretary on importance maintaining unanimity already achieved within Council.

2. Bhutto said unfortunately Indian position meanwhile was hardening and yesterday Paks had heard Indians intend launch new offensive in Rajasthan sector, probably similar earlier one in Tithwal. Indians had turned down proposal by UNSC President that Bhutto and Swaran Singh lunch together in New York. Indians’ objective was to get the entire problem frozen again. Secretary commented September 20 resolution made it clear issue could not be frozen.

3. Bhutto concurred but asked how we proceed. In response to Secretary’s query regarding Soviet Tashkent proposal, Bhutto said proposal still there but Soviets now saying it better for parties to talk directly. Added that Gromyko had invited him to visit Moscow en route back to Pakistan. Secretary said he thought Bhutto should know about comment he had made recently to Gromyko; telling him, when Gromyko had referred to Tashkent proposal, that for 17 years U.S. had had one dog chewing on one leg and another dog chewing on other and if Soviets wanted find out what it was like that was all right with us. Bhutto commented Paks would chew a little higher if they tried it on Russians.

4. Secretary said he hoped our position clear on Tashkent proposal. He had been somewhat negative in earlier comment on proposal with both Bhutto and Gromyko, but this had been with respect to outlook for settlement through that route and not to Soviet role in current consideration of problem. Secretary said that as prophet he could not be hopeful on ultimate outcome talks in Tashkent. On other hand he wanted Paks to understand we would not object to any step that might further prospects ultimate settlement; indeed U.S. would be happy to see talks in Antarctica if that would settle the matter. If Soviet proposal meant some forward movement on Soviet position from previous rigid stand on Kashmir issue that was all to the good.

5. Bhutto said he thought U.S. position clear and had also been emphasized previous day in talk with Ambassador Goldberg.

6. Secretary went on to say that for many reasons we see advantages proceeding within UNSC, especially if permanent members can continue act in unison. As of present, however, Secretary thought we did not have very precise indication what was in Soviet mind. Sisco commented it fairly clear Soviets not keen on four-power proposal idea but we not very clear on Soviet position over-all. Bhutto then inquired about possibility actions by SYG in context “in the meantime” clause of resolution; specifically visit by SYG to subcontinent. Sisco commented SYG focusing now on GOI and GOP replies to his message of October 14 on withdrawal; Bhutto said Paks thinking more in terms resolution as a whole, adding he felt it clear that SYG had independent mandate to proceed without further meeting UNSC. However if French and Russians felt it better to arm SYG with specific mandate there was no harm in that either from Pak viewpoint. Sisco interjected that we see effective cease fire as first requirement and withdrawal as next step, noting that “in the meantime” clause referred to what parties themselves might be able to do on underlying political problem, and that after first two steps implemented SC consider how to assist peaceful settlement.

7. Bhutto responded that even for purposes speeding withdrawal, visit by SYG to area may be needed. Paks had accepted resolution in its entirety and were prepared to fulfill their commitment. Unfortunately Indians were not, and there were many examples over the years to point to as evidence. GOP had made clear its willingness cooperate on withdrawal. Indians keep talking about need for effective cease fire and at same time go on violating cease fire on one pretext or another, nibbling away at Pak territory they could not get by war. There was limit to Pak restraint. All this emphasized further desirability of SYG visit since he could see problem for himself. Since withdrawal would have to be negotiated at very high level, could also get views top-level GOP and GOI. Would also help put curb on “genocide” Indians practicing against Muslim villagers on their side CFL Kashmir. It also important that some UN movement take place before Soviet attitude hardens still more.

8. Bhutto noted Paks had been considering approach to UNGA, not as way of stymying things but to give stimulus to negotiating process. He had told Ambassador Goldberg Paks would not move to GA unless U.S. felt it useful. But if all concerned felt it best Paks wait, then there would very soon need to be some further endeavor in UNSC. Secretary said he could understand that if SC approach blocked then there would be some point in having UNGA throw its weight behind Council and he would think UNGA would be strongly inclined do so. Sisco said that if SC remedies exhausted, there would probably be considerable support in UNGA for kind of approach already taken by SC. Bhutto added that Paks had made fairly extensive analysis situation and thought they could get fairly good UNGA resolution, though not perfect one.

9. Bhutto wondered what Secretary would recommend if progress thwarted completely in UN forum. Secretary responded this was one of those questions where answer was so unsatisfactory he could only say that all concerned must work so that progress not thwarted. Prospect of renewed Indo-Pak hostility so appalling there must be progress within UN. In response further Bhutto question whether Secretary would then conclude that SC meeting now would be best thing to do, Secretary said U.S. would like to get further reading from SYG as to how he saw situation in light responses he has received to Oct. 14 proposal. It might well be that some meeting would be necessary at some point. In response Bhutto said Paks would cooperate and would do their best ensure that unanimity continued prevail in Council. Pakistan was not asking for the moon; all it wanted was some forward movement.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen, cleared by Sisco, and approved and initialed by Hare. Also sent to Rawalpindi, and repeated to London, New Delhi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA.
2. Bhutto was in the United States for the meeting of the UN General Assembly. His meeting with Rusk took place in the Department of State.
3. In an October 22 memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy reported that Bhutto had also raised with Rusk the issue of an Ayub visit to Washington. Bundy noted that Johnson had told Ayub in a telephone conversation that he wanted to meet with Ayub before Shastri. With Shastri also indicating a desire to visit Washington in December it became a question of which leader to see first. “Ray Hare and Bob Komer think Shastri first is better, both because India is more important and because if you see Ayub first, he is bound to press you to mediate Kashmir—and that is something we can’t do in 1966.” Bundy added that his feeling was that because the United States had so little to offer Ayub he ought to enjoy the small comfort of the first visit. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16, 9/23/65–12/23/65)