Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

228. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson¹

Washington, September 29, 1965.

Pressure on Peshawar. Several days ago the Paks closed a small [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. On 22 September they forcibly closed a minor [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] acoustic installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [1 line of source text not declassified] This morning they closed two more small installations near Karachi.

Later today Pak guards barred our people from the airfield in Peshawar [1 line of source text not declassified]. No notice or explanation was given in any of these cases.

McConaughy raised the earlier incidents with Ayub this morning. Ayub professed total ignorance (cables on meeting attached)² but the Foreign Secretary knew all about it and indicated these installations were being used against Pak security. Since the installations closed have nothing to do with Pak/Indian matters, however, the pattern seems rather to point to a deliberate Pak effort to show us they have cards too, and as pressure to get us to resume aid.

If we can’t get Kashmir for Ayub, our only lever to keep Ayub on the reservation is aid. If so, then we must keep convincing Ayub that unless he plays ball with us (e.g. on our installations), there won’t be any. This suggests that we should quietly respond to the Pak squeeze on our installations by suspending at least some of the aid now in the pipeline. We have the following options:

A. Of the $264 million odd in FY’65 and prior aid now in the pipeline, about half is not yet covered by letters of commitment authorizing disbursements. AID could simply hold these up. It would take about a week for the Paks to catch on.

B. Once letters of commitment are issued, about six big US banks then issue letters of credit. A simple AID query as to how much credit remained to be drawn under these letters would get back to the Paks very quickly, and worry them.

C. We could go further and ask the banks not to issue any new letters of credit, and even to suspend any remaining disbursements under existing ones. This would get Pak wind up immediately.

D. This would leave only the aid goods already bought and perhaps in transit. Repossessing and/or diverting this entails many complications.

E. We could also hold up administratively the 175,000 tons of grain on which PA’s were just issued.

Since the Paks are in a highly agitated frame of mind, it seems best we move carefully. Steps A and B above would put us in a good position, would worry the Paks, yet wouldn’t entail early publicity. We also wouldn’t want to trigger Pak closing of Peshawar before they had had a chance to digest the likely cost.

State probably will not have a recommendation before tomorrow. Among other things, we are worried over the possibility that Ayub is not fully master in his own house. Thus this memo is only to bring you up to date on the state of play.

R.W. Komer

Mr. President:

My guess is that the State Department will come out recommending A. and B.³ In this rather edgy situation, this seems enough to me. Any preliminary indication of your feelings would be helpful:

I am ready to do A. and B.

I will approve more if recommended

I want to be sure that we do not get into a debate on this, but simply act quietly and wait for Pak inquiries (I offer this last option because of the State Department’s impulse to debate by cable.)⁴

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15, Sept. 23–Oct. 14 1965. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.
2. Attached were copies of telegram 122 from Rawalpindi (Document 227) and a telegram sent through special channels on September 29 in which McConaughy reported on the conclusion of his conversation with Ayub that morning. McConaughy protested against the actions described in Komer’s memorandum to the President.
3. Komer sent a memorandum to Bundy later on September 29 in which he reported that “instead of quietly cutting off aid, NEA is recommending to Ball that we make one more try with Ayub, and ask him what he is trying to accomplish.” Komer noted that he had “registered in spades our view that it was futile to try to talk with Ayub, and that I doubted he was out of control but was rather fully conversant with the squeeze play and for McConaughy, of all people, to go back and ask again what’s up would simply invite Ayub retorting ‘Restore MAP or we’ll close Peshawar.’” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II)
4. No response by the President appears on the memorandum.