227. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State1
122. U.S.-Pak summit meeting. During meeting today with Pres Ayub (reported separately),2 I referred to my instructions follow up on Sept 23 telephone conversation Presidents Ayub and Johnson with regard possible Ayub visit to U.S. I said should Ayub go to UN we would hope and expect he would also visit Washington for talks with President Johnson along lines their telephone conversation. I invited him to indicate what precise moves might be possible.
Ayub replied had discussed this matter previous night (presumably in Cabinet). Had decided would like ask UK agree to postponement long scheduled State visit owing to grave emergency situation facing GOP. Said UK must surely understand reasons for postponement, and he believed President would understand need for postponement of trip to U.S. for same reason. Asked, “Please tell President Johnson on my behalf my first duty is to my country. With popular feelings as they are, and you know them, would be most difficult. We have attempted to damp down these feelings. We have kept U.S. reaction our request for implementation defense agreement secret between myself and FonMinistry. But, nonetheless, things could possibly get out of hand. If President Johnson gives me six or eight weeks, I would be flattered to come. This also what we telling UK. That visit has been postponed so many times, but I just cannot go. I am not reluctant to go. It is a question of my inability. President Johnson will understand; he must understand this. As I told President Johnson during our telephone conversation, this war is long distance from Washington but nonetheless he cannot leave U.S. My war is much closer to my country, and I also cannot leave now.” I interjected that of course his visit to U.S. would not be extended State visit, but important short negotiating discussion. Ayub said true and he certainly would not be going to discuss economic affairs but only political matters. “The former are for you to decide, not for me. They are your decision. Please explain to President Johnson there is no reluctance toward visit on my part. You must understand my problem. For example, only yesterday Indian Air Force attacked, and our boys were eager to retaliate. Only I could make decision not to retaliate. I must be here all the time and on top of [Page 434] everything. The people in Pakistan must also understand.” I conceded that it would be difficult for Ayub leave country before cease fire fully effective. He said any day something can happen until real disengagement has taken place. Compared situation to a U.S.-Mexican war. I returned to his comment about visit possibility in six or eight weeks. He replied, “Yes, as soon as possible, but there are great difficulties and I must be on tap all the time.”
I told President Ayub my great concern to get things off dead center in U.S.-Pak relations and observed in important respects meeting of two Presidents necessary to get things moving again. Ayub replied, “Of course, President Johnson can say what he likes in our discussions, and I shall speak frankly to him. But too I shall be reasonable. All we want is that you do not add to our problems.”
Later in conversation when Ayub complained about lack U.S. appreciation his efforts, I underlined that all those matters argue for face-to-face meeting between two Presidents. (Ayub was referring to his efforts to exert moderating influence on ChiComs.) At conclusion of discussion, I promised report President Ayub’s views on U.S. visit and expressed hope that in next few weeks it would be possible work out arrangements.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the White House, London, New Delhi, and Karachi.↩
- See Document 226.↩