Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, September 23, 1965, 1525Z.

607. Indo-Pak crisis: UNSC ceasefire resolution.

1. President Ayub telephoned me evening September 22 in Rawalpindi for post-ceasefire conversation. He informed me of his phone conversation earlier in the evening with President Johnson.² He said it was a fair connection and he clearly felt good about the way the conversation went. He expressed his gratitude for the kind sentiments the President had expressed in regard to the ceasefire decision and prospects for peaceful settlement. Ayub said President had very kindly mentioned possibility of his visiting US a few weeks hence when respective schedules might make it possible. Ayub said he had replied that he very much wanted to accept. He would be preoccupied for next two weeks or so with the aftermath of hostilities. But after that, he would need to confer with UNSYG U Thant in New York and he would like to combine that trip with a visit to the President in Washington. Indicated his hope to work such a visit out, although he made no attempt to be specific.

2. Ayub appeared grateful for US efforts to bring about ceasefire, but went out of his way to recall assurances I had conveyed that US would strongly support UN efforts for resolution of Kashmir problem. He said GOP would look seriously to US for significant action to encourage peaceful negotiation. He was confident US influence could be decisive. He said he would expect me as US representative here, who had played active part and knew situation well, to do full share in pursuing implementation of US assurances.

3. I told Ayub he knew we would stand by our assurances, but he also knew the limitations which we had stated. I jokingly upbraided him for keeping me in suspense until last moment as to whether he would agree to ceasefire. Ayub said he was sorry about this but he in truth could not be certain himself until almost the deadline because of his distrust of the Indians and his need for Bhutto’s assessment from New York.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:05 p.m. Also sent to the White House, and repeated to USUN, London, Tehran, New Delhi, DOD, and CIA.
2. The telephone call from Ayub in Rawalpindi was taken by Johnson in Washington at 10:55 a.m. Ayub placed the call to inform Johnson that Pakistan had accepted the cease-fire agreement. Ayub added: “We believe that you are a man of honor and a gentleman and will see that an honorable settlement is reached to prevent such unfortunate happenings occurring again.” Johnson replied: “You may be sure of the readiness of the United States to support and sustain the position that settlement of the underlying problems is needed and is essential.” He added, however, “I cannot give you any assurance of any particular form of settlement.” Johnson concluded the conversation by inviting Ayub to visit the United States, and Ayub said that he would as soon as he could arrange it. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and President Ayub, September 22, 1965, 10:55 a.m., Tape F65.05, Side A, PNO 2) Three slightly variant transcripts of this conversation are in the Alpha series, ibid. An additional transcript prepared in the White House by Juanita Roberts is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Memos, 9/65–1/66.