Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, September 17, 1965, 6:13 p.m.

498. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation and is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review.

Indian Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary September 17 to deliver letter from Shastri to President² regarding Indo-Pak fighting. In addition, based on phone call he had had from Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Nehru requested:

1) That USG make formal statement warning Chicoms that US will intervene if Chicoms attack India; said formal warning desired to supplement helpful informal statement already made by Secretary.³ Nehru said GOI hopes such formal warning by US would prevent Chicom intervention.

2) That US come to India’s assistance if Chicoms attack; said nature of such assistance would be for US to decide. Secretary said request for formal US statement warning Chicoms re intervention involves major US decision and said that decision make formal warning statement would subsume decision provide assistance in event of Chicom attack, since warning would have no credible deterrent effect if not backed by decision to act. Secretary said only President can make this decision, and told Nehru he would discuss matter with President as soon as possible. Secretary said that, in context Indian request for US warning statement and decision intervene in event of Chicom attack, in our view it of greatest importance that fighting between India and Pakistan be stopped somehow.

3) That as requested in Shastri letter US “neutrality” re Indo-Pak fighting will be modified if other outside powers intervene. Nehru said that India’s unconditional acceptance of U Thant’s appeal for unconditional ceasefire puts India in the clear and GOI feels it has now gone along with Security Council resolution. Nehru added that Foreign Minister Singh told him to request that US posture in Security Council take into account threat posed to India in latest Chicom note,⁴ and that US modify “neutral” position it thus far has adopted re Indo-Pak fighting.

Secretary asked whether it was GOI position that Kashmir not even discussible, and to what extent settlement of Kashmir problem is war aim of both India and Pakistan. Nehru replied that settlement of Kashmir issue not an Indian war aim. He said, however, GOI cannot discuss anything with Pakistan at this time and GOI cannot agree as condition to any settlement ending fighting that it will discuss status of Kashmir; said situation must go back to status quo ante bellum and Paks must get their forces out of Kashmir. Nehru said there no man in India today who can agree to discuss Kashmir.

In response to question whether in requesting US assistance in event of Chicom attack India invoking Air Defense Agreement, Nehru replied he had no specific instructions as to nature of assistance US might provide.

In reply to question whether GOI thinks Chicoms would violate demarcated international boundary in Sikkim, Nehru replied that Chicom ultimatum “raised everything—the whole border.”

Referring to request for formal statement warning Chicoms against intervention, Secretary told Nehru we had used occasion of last Cabot-Wang talks in Warsaw to warn Peking about interfering in Indo-Pak fighting.⁵

In closing Secretary said he would discuss Shastri letter and Indian requests for formal warning statement, and for US agreement provide assistance in event of Chicom attack, with President and get in touch with Nehru as soon as possible. Nehru reminded Secretary that time limit on Chicom ultimatum runs out on Sunday.⁶

Comment: It apparent Shastri letter written before receipt Chicom note; Nehru request for US support vis-à-vis Chicoms made orally, based on his conversation with Foreign Minister this morning.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Lakeland, cleared by Laise, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Karachi, London, Hong Kong, Moscow, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DOD, CIA, and the White House.
2. Document 206.
3. On September 15 Rusk made a statement at a press conference warning China to stay out of the conflict between India and Pakistan. See The Washington Post, September 16, 1965.
4. Reference is to a September 16 note from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy in Peking. The note reiterated China’s support for “the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination” and China’s support for Pakistan in its fight against the “unbridled aggression” of India. The note reviewed the boundary dispute along the border between China and Sikkim and closed with a demand that India dismantle all of its military works along that border within 3 days of the delivery of the note. The text of the note is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 752–754.
5. The meeting between U.S. Ambassador to Poland John M. Cabot and Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Kuo-chuan took place on September 15. For a report of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXX, Document 101.
6. September 19.